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An assessment of the methods that are used to recruit college students into the Turkish
Hezbollah.

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy at Virginia Commonwealth University

by

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Abstract

AN ASSESSMENT OF THE METHODS THAT ARE USED TO RECRUIT COLLEGE STUDENTS INTO THE TURKISH HEZBOLLAH.

By Tuncay Unal, PhD.

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at Virginia Commonwealth University

Virginia Commonwealth University, 2010

Major Director: William W. Newmann, Ph.D., Professor of Political Science, L. Douglas Wilder School of Government and Public Affairs

This study aims to identify tactics used by the Turkish Hezbollah to recruit college students into joining their terrorist organization. This study based on the assumptions that social networks and institutional structures are two main tools that are used effectively by the Turkish Hezbollah to recruit college educated students. In this sense, the researcher claims that Social Learning theory and Social Control Theories can be used to provide theoretical explanation to the Hezbollah's recruitment strategy. Parallel to these theories assumptions, while having militants within social networks increases the likelihood of being recruited through social learning theory assumptions, college students who are away from their families are more likely to be recruited through social control theory assumptions.

The researcher uses individual level secondary data related to members of the Turkish Hezbollah. The data comprised of self reports that each member submitted to the Turkish Hezbollah as part of their recruitment process. The data are derived from the

Turkish National Police's database. Initially, frequency table is used to determine which structure and which theory best explain the Turkish Hezbollah's recruitment strategies. Then, to decide which demographic factors increase or decrease the likelihood of being recruited through social networks (social learning theory) or institutional structures (social control theory), logistic regression is used. Eight independent variables are used to identify those factors such as having Hezbollah militants within social networks, pursuing college education while being away from family, family's religious ideology, having online or campus education, family size, income level, college student's religiosity level, and reason for attending Hezbollah.

The findings indicated that social networks and institutional structures are two important tools that are used by the Turkish Hezbollah. Social networks are more effectively used structures comparing to institutional structures. According to the results, there are two important variables have more weight on dependent variable comparing to other variables. While having militants within the social networks increases the likelihood of being recruited through social learning theory assumptions, being away from families during college education increases the likelihood of being recruited through social control theory assumptions.

1 CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Over the past three decades, countries throughout the world have struggled to fight against terrorism due to the thousands of lives that have been lost in addition to the billions of dollars shed to disrupt terrorist activities. Considering these tremendous losses, terrorism obviously has a devastating effect on any given country's efforts to protect their citizens as well as their economic and political interests.

1.1 Purpose of the Study

According to Crenshaw (2000), an individual's motivation for joining a terrorist organization can be classified into theoretical models that generally include an individual's perception of injustice, search for identity, need for belonging, and ideology, among others. Taking these motivations into account in my study, the tactics used by the Turkish Hezbollah to recruit college students into becoming members of their terrorist organization are identified based on the following research questions:

- 1. What methods are used to recruit college students into the Turkish Hezbollah, a religiously motivated terrorist organization?*
- 2. What are the demographic profiles of the individuals who are recruited by the institutional structures and social networks?*
- 3. Does social control theory or social learning theory best explain the Turkish Hezbollah's most successful method of recruiting?*

In the first question, recruitment methods that are used by the Turkish Hezbollah militants were examined. To answer the second question and help to identify the

significance of each variable, eight hypotheses were developed. Each variable's weight used for recruitment purposes were then assessed pertaining to two structures: (a) institutional structure and (b) social networks. For the third research question, I strived to develop a better theory that would provide a better explanation concerning the Turkish Hezbollah's recruitment strategies. To answer this question, I examined the factors that influence and make college students more vulnerable to be recruited from the standpoint of two criminological theories: (a) social control and (b) social learning theories. First, however, the target population needed to be identified according to these two important criminological theories. College students who had the following characteristics were excluded from this segment of my study because it was difficult to determine whether they were recruited through social control or social learning theory perspectives: (a) those who were with their family during their college education and stated that they were recruited in college and had militants within the social structure; and (b) those who were away from their family during their college education and stated that they were recruited while away from the family and had militants within their social networks.

Briefly, social control theory states that an individual who leaves his or her native habitat lacks the traditional social forces that could act to restrain his or her involvement in criminal activity (Vold, Bernard, & Snipes, 2002). Earlier, Gibbs (1989) maintained that social control theory helps to understand the conception of deviance counteraction and the suppression of terrorism through decreasing extreme behaviors.

On the other hand, social learning theory implies that an individual is more inclined to learn behavior through interaction with others who may serve as the stimuli for committing crime (Akers, Lanza, & Radosevic, 1979).

In my study, I expected that social networks in the area where a person grew up would have a significant effect on the decision as to whether or not to commit crime(s). Parallel to this expectancy, Ross (1993) further claimed that shared attitudes, beliefs, values, opinions, habits, customs, traditions, and myths permit the development of fanaticism, violence, nationalism, and terrorism in a population's subgroup. Ross added that group perceptions shared by a person may diminish the risks of committing terrorist actions, and its inspirational effect may increase a member's commitment to the group.

Considering the strong social network within the geographical area in which the Turkish Hezbollah effectively operates, I postulated that the Turkish Hezbollah would be more likely to use social networks in recruiting new militants who held college degrees.

To determine the Turkish Hezbollah's most effective recruiting method, descriptive statistics were used for the first research question, and for the second and third research questions, logistic regression was applied in order to reveal the demographic details concerning the Turkish Hezbollah militants. This method helped to identify the variables that lead college students to be recruited. In other words, the independent variables (IVs) were tested over the dependent variable (DV) to observe each IV's weight that increased the likelihood of being recruited. In addition, for the second and third research questions, descriptive analyses were applied to determine the

most successful method and to decide which theory best explained the Turkish Hezbollah's recruitment methods.

In 2000, reports were seized by the Turkish National Police during an operation against Hezbollah's leader. According to Nachmias and Nachmias (2000), these personal reports were believed to accurately represent a view of one's life, and they were not contaminated by another person's analysis. In addition, rather than providing subjective information, the Turkish Hezbollah members revealed only actual self-reported information concerning when and how they were recruited, their family structure, and about themselves. Further, because the reports were never intended to become the property of the Turkish National Police, there was no reason for the militants to falsify their backgrounds. Besides, the Turkish Hezbollah is a religiously motivated terrorist group and lying is considered to be one of the greatest sins within the seven that are mentioned in the Qur'an. For example, if a person lies about his or her background, it is highly possible that he or she may be considered as an intruder within the Turkish Hezbollah. Finally, unbiased reporting was believed to exist given that militants are expected to provide reliable information that the Turkish Hezbollah has the power to validate.

Turkey was selected for this research because, first, there are few academic studies that specifically address the Turkish Hezbollah. In the modern world, government policies should rely on academic studies because a lack of them may give incorrect policy implications. Thus, to support the operational solutions, the Turkish government clearly needs well-addressed policy changes in an effort to minimize terrorist activities. Second,

social factors play important roles in Turkey. For example, in comparison to the United States and other Western countries, an eastern culture increases the effectiveness of one's social environment, wherein being from the same city, social background, and ethnicity plays a significant role (Cakir, 2007).

Consistent to the expected findings of my study, by employing social networks to recruit new members as opposed to institutional structures, the Turkish Hezbollah would be more effective. As a policy implication, I implied that Turkish government officials need policy changes such as providing better human rights, democracy, and religious freedom against Turkish Hezbollah's strategies and propaganda. Thus far, it has been shown that the current policy of responding harshly to terrorists does not solve the problem but rather assists the Turkish Hezbollah in recruiting more militants through its use of propaganda aimed against the Turkish government. Thus, new tactics and strategies are needed to fight the Turkish Hezbollah. Parallel to the Turkish government's efforts in becoming a member of the European Union, it must expand on social and religious rights. Farr (2008) argued that the source of social identity is constituted by religion, and suppressing religion creates high tension within a society. This possible negativity over religion may, perhaps, be an effective tool used by the Turkish Hezbollah to recruit more militants through social networks. On the other hand, providing social and religious freedom may decrease the recruitment of new militants through social networks. This issue will be further discussed in-depth in the section related to policy recommendations.

1.2 Recruitment Effectiveness

By examining the motivational factors of joining a terrorist organization, I focused on the effectiveness of the Turkish Hezbollah's recruitment strategies. In order to provide a better perspective of each strategy, effectiveness was defined in terms of the organization's successful achievement in recruiting more militants. Based on different perspectives, effectiveness can be defined in various ways. For example, in the field of economics, the term describes "the extent to which the desired level of output is achieved" (Scheerens, Glas, & Thomas, 2003). On the other hand, from a human resource perspective, Miller (2009) stated that the basic step for all types of recruitment effectiveness is good profiling and selection. In my study, effectiveness is defined as the Turkish Hezbollah's successful achievement based on the quantity of members recruited. The number of militants recruited was each separately converted to percentages in order to make a comparison between those who were recruited using social networks versus those who were recruited through institutional structures. Depending on the results, I expected my study to reveal the following.

1.2.1 Using social networks to recruit more militants

Social learning theory asserts (Vold et al., 2002) that behaviors and ideas can be learned, and they may be supportive of criminal behavior within particular groups. Parallel to this statement, if social networks are responsible for recruiting a larger percentage of Turkish Hezbollah militants, considering the eastern part of Turkey's social

structure, my study is expected to demonstrate that family members and relatives have a great influence over a person's decision to make right or wrong choices.

1.2.2 Using institutional structures to recruit more militants

Contrary to other criminal theories' assumption that people naturally obey the law if they are left to their own devices, control theory takes the opposite approach and assumes that all people are inclined to commit crimes if they are left to their own devices. According to control theorists, controlling forces restrain persons from committing crimes, and weakness of these forces drives them to do so (Vold et al., 2002). Similar to other terrorist organizations, the Turkish Hezbollah takes advantage of this environment through its institutional structures.

If institutional structures were found to be responsible for recruiting a larger percentage of militants, I demonstrated that the Turkish Hezbollah has very strong institutional structures within colleges that influence other students to join the organization.

Given that the Turkish Hezbollah members provided detailed information in their personal reports regarding when and who recruited them, this information assisted me in identifying the effectiveness of both strategies.

1.3 Significance of Terrorism as a Problem

Woolsey (2002) contended that many of the ideological, political, and national hostility that motivates terrorists will remain unresolved in the 21st century. Accordingly,

it is safe to assume that terrorists will continue to instigate violence in order to achieve political, economic, and social changes. Clearly, finding the reasons for terrorist activities is the core element to successfully combat terrorism. According to Gerwehr and Daly (2006), fighting against terrorism should not only include responding to attacks and threats but also should include proactive steps in order to diminish terrorist activities.

In my study, I strived to determine the Turkish Hezbollah's effective recruitment methods as well as the underlying reasons for Hezbollah's support in Turkey's eastern part. In the following discussion, continuing causes of terrorism are suggested.

1.3.1 Unnoticed reasons behind terrorism

According to Yayla (2005), most of the problems related to terrorism remain unsolved, and further, most have never been researched. One main drawback in today's governments and agencies concerning current terrorist threats focuses on short-term policy resolutions. Yayla argued that a majority of the strategies designed to fight terrorism lack long-term solutions, for example, making attempts to identify the main causes and pursuing them in an effort to eliminate the justifications behind terrorist organizations.

1.3.2 Determination of the terrorists

My study was designed to determine if Turkish Hezbollah militants were recruited through either institutional structures or social networks. By doing so, perhaps new policies for combating terrorism will be established. For example, the Turkish

Hezbollah provides shelter or food free of charge to college students, the target population in my study. By taking into consideration the lower income level in Turkey's eastern part, these types of activities help the terrorist organization to create a sense of sympathy for college students. In addition, the organization's legal structures become extremely effective in recruiting more militants. Thus, universities may play an important role in decreasing the number of newly recruited militants by providing lower-cost campus housing and controlling those areas as a means of steering college students away from terrorist organizations. Thus, I expected to find that students who came from lower income family members would be more likely to be recruited by institutional structures through the organization's provision of complimentary housing or other necessary college commodities.

Moghaddam (2005) suggested that the more an individual becomes involved in a terrorist organization, the more likely he or she will adhere to the organization's ideologies. For the sake of their illegal organizations, many terrorists do not hesitate to kill not only themselves but also as many civilians and innocent people as they possibly can. For example, Al-Qaeda, one of the ruthless terrorist organizations, killed over 3,000 innocent people simultaneously on September 11th, 2001. When planning a terrorist attack that is not suspected, this determination becomes one of the most dangerous weapons in the world.

1.4 Approaches to Terrorism Analysis

Although I aimed to reveal the best recruitment strategy of the Turkish Hezbollah, I also examined the motivational factors that drive college students to join terrorist organizations. The Turkish Hezbollah's militants' self-reports provided detailed information concerning how and why they chose to join Hezbollah. My study was designed to reveal the best working argument of the Turkish Hezbollah for recruiting new militants. Considering the eastern part of Turkey, the area is more conservative when compared to the western part. Although there may be some criticism regarding Turkey's religious policies, the country's secular and democratic regime guarantees each individual's religious life. In this regard, I provided a general assessment of the terrorist mind and mindset.

Hudson (1999) discussed that identifying terrorist methods and tactics may improve counterterrorist policies. He stated that there are five basic approaches to analyzing terrorism. The following brief discussion of Hudson's basic approaches was found to be beneficial in understanding the general insights in my study that explain why people join terrorist organizations.

1.4.1 The Multicausal Approach

Hudson (1999) stated that terrorism usually results from multiple causal factors. Accordingly, those factors may be psychological as well as religious, economic, political, and sociological factors. Since terrorism is a multicausal phenomenon, it would be

erroneous and simplistic to explain an act of terrorism by a single cause such as the psychological need of the terrorist to perpetrate an act of violence.

The causes of revolution and political violence in general may also compose the causes of terrorism that include: (a) religious, (b) ethnic and ideological conflicts, (c) modernization stresses, (d) poverty, (e) political inequities, (f) traditions of violence, (g) lack of peaceful communications channels, (h) the existence of a revolutionary group, (i) erosions of confidence in a regime, (j) governmental weakness and incompetence, and (k) deep divisions within governing elites and leadership groups (Wilkinson, 1993).

Throughout history, terrorist groups have used not only Islam but also other religions as a justification for their vicious activities (George, 2006). However the Qur'an does not advocate killing innocents nor does the Torah or the Bible. Contrary to religiously motivated terrorist groups, all religions harshly condemn terrorist activities. Thus, I will reveal how the Turkish Hezbollah uses religion as a tool to entice college students.

1.4.2 Political Approach

According to this approach, political environmental factors play an important role for terrorism. Preconditions—subnational, national and international environments—may give some justifications for terrorists to start violence (Hudson, 1999). Preconditions, also known as permissive causes, can be attractive to political dissidents who may be motivators of terrorists. According to Crenshaw (1981), permissive causes consist of (a) urbanization, (b) the transportation system that may allow a terrorist to quickly escape to

another country, (c) communications media, (d) weapons availability, and the absence of security measures (Crenshaw, 1981).

Although most Turkish Hezbollah militants originated from the Kurds, they do not aspire to racial segregation that is harshly criticized by the Qur'an. Because claiming ethnic supremacy is not tolerated by Islam, I revealed that the Turkish Hezbollah does not use political argument to recruit new militants

1.4.3 Organizational Approach

According to the organizational approach, terrorism is seen as a rational strategic course of action that is decided by a group (Crenshaw, 1990). In other words, terrorism is not committed by an individual. Although the level of individual commitment to the group and its beliefs varies, acts of terrorism are committed by groups who reach collective decisions based on commonly held beliefs (Hudson, 1999).

Because the Turkish Hezbollah is a religiously motivated terrorist organization, unless someone insults Islam through the media, it does not kill people to create propaganda (Cakir, 2007). For example, Hezbollah kills its target but does not reveal the target, a policy that has resulted in many unknown killings especially from 1989 to 2000. However, after the Turkish Hezbollah's archives were obtained in 2000, the public learned that most of the unknown killings were perpetrated by the Turkish Hezbollah. In my study, I did not discuss the organizational approach.

1.4.4 Psychological Approach

According to Hudson (1999), the relatively few psychologists who study terrorism are primarily interested in the individual terrorist or the terrorist group's micro-level. In essence, the psychological approach is concerned with the study of terrorists themselves that includes their recruitment and induction into terrorist groups and their personalities, beliefs, attitudes, motivations, and careers as terrorists (Hudson, 1999). In my study, however, I did not assess the college student through this approach.

1.4.5 The Physiological Approach

The physiological approach suggests that in any discussion of the causes of terrorism, the media's role in promoting the spread of terrorism cannot be ignored. Through media coverage, for example, the methods, demands, and goals are quickly made known to potential terrorists. Oots and Wiegele (1985) proposed that a model of terrorist contagion is based on physiology in which the psychological state of the potential terrorist has important implications for society's stability. In their analysis, because potential terrorists become aroused in the violence—accepting the media's way of presenting terrorism—by the nature of their actions, terrorists must have an attitude that leads them to commit violence. Oots and Wiegele added that in order to become aggressively aroused, the potential terrorist only needs to see that terrorism has worked for others. Accordingly, an individual moves from being a potential terrorist to being an actual terrorist through a process that is psychological, physiological, and political.

In my study, I did not examine the media part of terrorism for the following reasons. Considering the low income of people who live in the area, they may not be able to afford media sources. Therefore, I expected that very few people would be affected through the Turkish Hezbollah's media propaganda.

1.5 Statement of the Problem

Turkey's struggle against all kinds of terrorist activities for more than four decades set the country as a good place to develop a case study. The reasons behind Turkey's varied terrorist activities lie in its geographical and historical background. Turkey's unique geographical location situated between Europe and Asia causes Turkish social life to be affected by many cultures that provide a diversified society—a hallmark of modern Turkey (Ozeren, 2004). Although democracy and civil society are welcomed by Turkish citizens for the most part, fundamentalist ideas may also find ground within the society. According to Ozeren, being in the more problematic geographical location causes Turkey to be more open to fundamentalist terrorist activities. In addition, supported by Iranian fundamentalist groups, the Turkish Hezbollah has sympathy for the Kurdish population who reside within the eastern part of the country (Cakir, 2007).

Especially during the cold war era when Turkey represented the only Islamic nation in NATO, the country faced a significant threat from the Soviet Union. For example, fundamentalist left wing groups supported by the Soviet Union murdered many people including politicians and high ranking officers (Olçay, 1991). Turkey not only has extremist left terror organizations within its border but also has extremist religiously

motivated terror groups which were mostly affected by the Iran revolution in 1979 (Yavuz & Ozcan, 2006).

Beginning especially in the 1960s, Turkey suffered too much from terrorist activities of the leftist Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C), the separatist Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), and religiously motivated Turkish Hezbollah. These terrorist organization activities that peaked particularly from 1990 to 1995 not only weakened Turkey's political center but also challenged Turkish democracy. These terrorist activities often destabilized political life, and some political parties were accused of supporting extremist groups. During this period, none of the political parties gained a majority in the Turkish Assembly to run the country and make necessary social and economical reforms.

Following this period, beginning in 1996, Turkey has made significant constitutional changes in terms of improving human rights and restructuring democratic institutions for accession to the European Union. However, Onis (2003) recommended that Turkey still needs to make important reforms by stating that decentralization, political demilitarization, and state control over religion are some essential issues. However, to make these changes, a parliamentary system in Turkey requires a strong government. Nevertheless, during the 1990s, most of the governments were based on weak and short-lived coalitions. At the same time, rapid economic and social transformation over the past 15 years has worsened the critical problems (Kramer, 1999).

Candarli (1999) argued that the social transformation and new demographic structure has made great changes in the Turkish political center. Unfortunately, the old

system and its official ideology have been unable to respond to this change. In particular, the secular elite did not want to give up their political, social, and economic privileges, and they considered a threat to these privileges as a threat to the republic itself. Rather than enlarging the scope and framework of democracy, these secular elite called in the military. In addition, conflict between the left and right groups created high tension within the country, and thousands of lives were lost throughout 48 years. As a result, destabilization within the political life resulted in the Turkish army becoming involved and establishing three military coups.

The 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution opened new horizons for Turkish Islamist ideology and its movements (Cakir, 2007). Because the 1980 military coup intended to weaken the radical left and radical nationalist movements, the Turkish Hezbollah was given the opportunity to take advantage of the process and thus became stronger.

Cakir (2007) stated that being surrounded by Iranians and Arabs, the Kurds had significant exposure to Persian and Arabic languages resulting in *madrasa* (seminary) education becoming widespread in the Kurdish populated region. Additionally, Islamic identity helped the development of a strong clergy class with titles including *mele*, *sheikh*, and *sayyed*.

1.6 The Current Gap in the Literature

For implementing attacks and sustaining operations, manpower is a crucial resource for terrorist organizations. Hence, hindering recruitment of terrorist organizations will disable their ability to function (RAND, 2006). To obstruct the Turkish

Hezbollah's recruitment, it is therefore necessary to understand how recruitment works, where the Turkish Hezbollah recruits, and what tool it uses, whom it targets and the selection reasons. Thus, having a clearer picture of these recruitment strategies could help the Turkish government to enact better policies to combat against terrorism.

Although there is much research regarding the recruitment strategies of terrorist organizations throughout the world, unfortunately there is no scientific research relating to the recruitment strategies of Turkey's terrorist groups. Parallel to Width and Fahoum's (2006) "Future Research Recommendations," I provided demographic details concerning the recruited militants. Nichiporuk (2003) stated that high fertility rates, unregulated and unchecked migration flows, and volatile religious and ethnic rivalries can increase terrorist activities. He claimed that the link between demography and the causes of extremism should be broken in order to enhance the victory against terrorism. According to Nichiporuk, fertility rates, ethnic/religious composition, internal/international migration, and level of human capital and population/environment interactions are very important variables for terrorist activities. In my study, I also provided economic and demographic details to determine the underlying reasons for joining with the Turkish Hezbollah.

1.7 Criminological Theories and Terrorism

To clarify the Turkish Hezbollah's recruitment strategies, it is important to address social control and social learning theories given that they represent two major sociological theories of crime and delinquency. Thus, I used these theories to discuss the

traditional and post-traditional criminological perspectives in explaining terrorism. First, however, the definition of terrorism as used in my study provides general insights regarding the relationship between crime and terrorism.

1.7.1 Definition of terrorism

Although terrorism has existed since the beginning of recorded history, defining the term is problematic (Ferracuti, 1982). Depending on whose point of view is being represented, terrorism has been described in various and controversial ways. For example, terrorism may be referred to by some as a crime and a holy duty, a tactic and a strategy, a justification of reaction against oppression, or an inexcusable abomination (International Terrorism and Security Research, 2009). This creates a major dilemma in a concise definition and therefore affects future studies and development of policies. According to Victoroff (2005), there are numerous analyses of terrorism that may include political, social, ideological, and economic aspects, many of which are typically given less emphasis when compared to security factors in policy formation.

Thus, because there is no single, universally accepted definition of terrorism, the terms used are generally inadequate as well as frequently neglected by terrorism researchers who prefer to cite the basic U.S. Department of State definition (Hudson, 1999): “Premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.”

Traditional approaches claim that the major difference between terrorism and crime is: Opinions are divided from both a theoretical and policy making perspective. For

instance, scholars who consider terrorism as a form of crime are controversial due to the differences in motivational factors. Terrorists and criminals have diverse motivations such as political, ideological, ethnic, or religious goals. Contrary to criminals who may be motivated to perpetrate crime for its own sake, terrorists commit violence for specific reasons, namely causing self-destructive reactions in a society (Asal & Wilkenfeld, 2005). Spencer (2006) asserted that terrorism that is used as a politically motivated tactic involves the threat or use of force or violence.

Contrary to the traditional approach, Asal and Wilkenfeld (2005) maintained that there is no motivational difference between terrorists and criminals. They claimed that although the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) was formerly a politically motivated terrorist organization, it currently profits from drug trafficking, and its members have always acted criminally to gain financial freedom. This is also the case of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) which remains active in the eastern part of Turkey (Candarli, 1999). Especially over the last decades, political rebels have become criminals while still pretending to be rebels in an effort to recruit new militants by maintaining their legitimate public image. Clearly, most terrorist organizations, including Lebanese Hezbollah, Al-Qaeda, PKK and Hamas, operate sophisticated fund-raising networks throughout the world (Asal & Wilkenfeld, 2005).

1.8 Similarities and Differences of Crime and Terrorism

Ferracuti (1982) claimed that although terrorists use terror, their goals and motivations remain criminal. In addition, their actions begin with legal and accepted

forms of dissent such as individual oral protests or petitions that easily progress to illegal but often tolerated acts, for example, violent demonstrations, vandalism, or seizures of property. Eventually, these actions escalate to unacceptable and illegal behavior where sabotage, personal assaults, bombings, and kidnappings occur. Considering their final actions, according to Ferracuti, terrorists should be approached as criminals.

In discussing the issue that terrorism often involves various kinds of crime including kidnapping, arson, murder, and conspiracy, it is very difficult to make a distinction between terrorism and crime (Ferracuti, 1982). Besides being involved in the same illegal activities, other similarities between terrorists and criminals include the actions and tactics employed by both groups (Koseli, 2008).

On the other hand, traditional scholars have declared that separate motivations and goals create the differences between crime and terrorism. While terrorism uses violence as a strategy to achieve political goals, it may also be used by those who oppose existing governments (Crenshaw, 2001).

1.9 Social Learning and Social Control Theories

Although there are differences of opinion as to how terrorism and criminality are related, both social learning and social control theories can be applied to research concerning why individuals join terrorist groups since each theory explains why certain individuals may be prone to engage in crime.

1.9.1 Social learning theory

While developing his general sociological theory of crime and delinquency, Edwin H. Sutherland relied heavily upon the work of Shaw and McKay, Chicago school theorists (Akers, 2004). Ecological and cultural transmission theory, symbolic interactionism, and culture had an impact on the formulation of Sutherland's theory.

Sutherland revised the final version of his theory in 1947, based on nine postulates:

1. Criminal behavior is learned.
2. Criminal behavior is learned through interaction with other persons in a process of communication.
3. The principal part of the learning of criminal behavior occurs within intimate personal groups.
4. When criminal behavior is learned, the learning includes: (a) techniques of committing the crime that are sometimes very complicated, sometimes simple; and (b) the specific direction of motives, drives, rationalizations, and attitudes.
5. The specific direction of motives and drives is learned from definitions of the legal codes as favorable or unfavorable.
6. A person becomes delinquent because of an excess of definitions favorable to violation of the law over definitions unfavorable to violation of the law.
7. Differential associations may vary in frequency, duration, priority, and intensity.

8. The process of learning criminal behavior by association with criminal and anticriminal patterns involves all of the mechanisms that are involved in any other learning.

9. While criminal behavior is an expression of general needs and values, it is not explained by those general needs and values since noncriminal behavior is an expression of the same needs and values.

Social learning theory suggests that behavior is learned not only through direct experience but also through observation of one's environment. In this theory, aggression is viewed as a learned behavior, and through observation one may learn the consequences of the behavior. Oots and Wiegele (1985) contended that if aggression is viewed as learned behavior, then terrorism—a specific type of aggressive behavior—can also be learned.

Social learning theory is a modified and clarified version of Sutherland's differential association theory that consists of two basic elements. First, to commit a crime, specific techniques are needed to be learned from criminals. Second, interaction with others provides appropriate drives, motives, attitudes, and rationalization for law violations (Vold et al., 2002). According to Akers (2004), in the eighth principle of Sutherland's theory, he asserted that criminal behavior involves all the mechanisms of learning; however, Akers failed to identify them. To create the social learning theory, Burgess and Akers (1966) retained all the principles of Sutherland's differential association theory and combined them with differential reinforcement and other principles of behavioral acquisition, continuation, and cessation in addition to adding

more concepts taken from behavioral learning theory (e.g., differential reinforcement, discriminative stimuli and internal stimuli, and schedules of reinforcement). They contended that criminal behavior is learned in the same way that any other behavior is learned and may be explained through the rewards or punishment a person receives from his or her environment (Orcutt, 2002). Parallel to Orcutt's perspective on social learning theory, I also argue that any individual's perception of crime may change depending on the social network where the person grew up. In other words, having criminals in the social networks increases the likelihood of an individual's involvement in criminal activity.

Akers (2004) pointed out that social learning theory is not competitive with differential association theory but rather represents a broader version. Evidence in research that supports Sutherland's differential association theory supports social learning theory as well. Furthermore, Akers maintained that social learning theory explains criminal and delinquent behavior more thoroughly than does Sutherland's differential association theory. According to Akers' theory, a great deal of learning between humans occurs in nonsocial situations and social interactions by observing the consequences of people's behavior from others. Akers' social learning theory focused on the following four major concepts (Vold et al., 2002).

1. Differential association refers to direct and indirect association and interaction with others who engage in certain kinds of behavior or express values, norms, and attitudes. These patterns of interactions with others may result in either unfavorable or favorable reactions to violating the law (Akers & Jensen, 2005).

2. According to Akers (2004), definitions reflect the meanings of one's own behavior. They may be more right or wrong, desirable or undesirable, appropriate or inappropriate, good or bad (Vold et al., 2002).

3. Differential reinforcement refers to the balance of actual or anticipated rewards and punishments that may be consequences of the behavior (Akers & Jensen, 2005).

4. Imitation is the act that comes after observation. The individual observes a behavior from others and then engages in a similar behavior. According to Akers (2004), the imitated behavior is influenced by the characteristics of the model, the observed behavior, and the observed consequences of the behavior.

Through social learning theory, I endeavored to answer the question, "How strong is the family structure in the recruitment of more militants?"

1.9.2 Social Control Theory

Similar to other terrorist organizations in Turkey, Hezbollah effectively uses its broad social structure. For example, Muslim associations, mosques, publications, and foundations are some of the tools that Hezbollah employ (Kardon, 1998). As earlier discussed by Karmon (1997), Hezbollah supports its effectiveness within universities to recruit and indoctrinate militants through its radical publications. More especially, students who are living far away from their families may be easily manipulated to take part in the organization. In this regard, Hezbollah's ability to recruit militants in universities may be best tested by social control theory.

By definition, control theory emphasizes the role of control in terms of counteracting delinquency and states that strong social bonds hinder delinquency (Booth,

Farrell, & Varano, 2008). Britt and Gottfredson (2003) contended that in order to better understand terrorism, it should rightfully be studied within criminology. They further stated that to achieve political ends, terrorism is related to certain elements of low social control.

Vold et al. (2002) asserted that many theories of crime and delinquency assume that people generally obey the rules if they are left to their own will, and there are various special forces—biological, psychological or social—that drive them to commit crime. Control theories, however, take the opposite side by stating that all individuals are natural animals and if left to their own devices, they are prone to commit crime. Thus, the key question for control theorists becomes: “Why do people not commit crime?” To answer, they focus primarily on special forces that intercept persons from committing crime. Therefore, the main hidden point behind not committing crime is the weakness of forces that restrain people from doing so. Parallel to this statement, being away from social networks increases the likelihood of being recruited by terrorist organizations. Hirschi (1969) assumed that everyone has the potential to become delinquent and criminal, and social controls—not moral values—maintain law and order. Thus, with a lack of social control, one is free to commit either terrorist or criminal acts. There are four aspects of social control discussed in the literature:

1.9.2.1 Attachment

By attachment, Hirschi (1969) referred to the extent to which a person is attached to others. For example, as the individual becomes more attached to others, he is far less likely to become delinquent.

1.9.2.2 Commitment

The concept of commitment assumes that the interests and benefits of persons living in a society are at risk if they are engaged in criminal acts, because most people acquire their reputation and prosperity from the society in which they live. In 1957, Jackson Toby introduced the concept of “stakes at conformity” and argued that all youths are tempted to break the law but some risk much more than others when they give in to those temptations. Youths who do well in the school not only risk being punished for breaking the law, but they also jeopardize their future careers. In other words, they have high “stakes at conformity.”

1.9.2.3 Involvement

The component of involvement proposes that if a person is engaged in conventional activities, he or she is less likely to commit crime. The assumption is that a person may be simply too busy doing conventional things to find time to engage in deviant behavior.

1.9.2.4 Belief

Matza (1964) argued that people have some conventional moral beliefs but they neutralize them to commit crime. In the first stage, Hirschi (1969) tested his theory against social strain (the motivation aspect) and Sutherland’s or Miller’s theory (cultural or group influence). Hirschi reported that contrary to strain theory [when individuals cannot successfully reach their goals, they experience pressure which may cause them to commit crime] (Cullen & Agnew, 2003), there was, in general, no relationship between the delinquent acts and social class. In addition, racial differences did not play a

significant role in self-reported delinquency (Vold et al., 2002). In Hirschi's analysis of attachment to parents compared to students' schools and peers, scoring low on parental bonds revealed the possibility of scoring high for crime (Leiber, 2007). Although Hirschi's findings supported control theory, they were inconsistent with cultural theories. He also found that youths who were not successful in school were more likely to commit crime that also supported control theory.

Contrary to the findings of strain theory, Hirschi (1969) analyzed the effects of attachment to parents, schools, and peers on reported delinquents. Regardless of race or class, and regardless of the delinquency of their friends, Hirschi found that boys who were more closely attached to their parents were less likely to report committing delinquent acts than those who had less close parental attachments (Vold et al., 2002). According to Hirschi, peers do not play important roles for committing and hindering crime (Leiber, 2007).

According to social control theorists, terrorism emerges from a social response to perceived deviance that stems from underspecific, observable structural conditions (Messner & Rosenfeld, 2004). McCord (2004) further stated that lack of cultural norms and values decreases an individual's responsibility. Simply put, individuals who display ineffective or weak social ties are easy targets for terrorist groups.

The Turkish Hezbollah movement is located mainly in the southeastern part of Turkey by Kurdish citizens. To gain a better understanding of why the Turkish Hezbollah has a broad support in this area, it is necessary to provide background information about the Kurdish people's political and social life.

1.10 Ethnic Origins of the Kurds

Barkey and Fuller (1998) argued that divisions among the Kurds along geographical, linguistic, and political lines have played an important role. The Kurdish population is divided territorially and linguistically among four regional states—Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey.

The Sevres Treaty (1920) “envisaged interim autonomy for the predominantly Kurdish areas of Turkey with a view to full independence if the inhabitants of these areas wanted this” (Barkey & Fuller, 1998). However, the Kurdish population was not mentioned in the Lozan Treaty (1924) although the provisions of the Sevres Treaty were reviewed.

According to Bruinessen’s (1999), definition, Kurds include “all native speakers of Kurmanji or Zaza, as well as those Turkish-speaking persons who claim descent from Kurmanji or Zaza speakers who still (or again) consider themselves as Kurds.” Earlier, Barkey and Fuller (1998) considered Kurds to be those who have “willingly been assimilated and are . . . Turkish, and Christians who have embraced Islam (such as the many Armenians who have assumed Kurdish Alevi identity over the centuries).” However, during the Ottoman Empire, Islamic law recognized only non-Muslims as minorities; hence, because Kurdish people were Muslims, they were never considered to be members of a minority group.

Regarding Turkey’s number of Kurds, the most widely accepted figure represents 20% of the population (Barkey & Fuller, 1998). According to the 1965 census, 2.2

million Turkish inhabitants claimed Kurdish as their mother tongue, and 1.2 million claimed Kurdish as their second language. The number of Zaza speakers was estimated to be approximately 150,000 (Barkey & Fuller, 1998).

In discussing the possible factors that have played an important role on Kurdish identity, Barkey and Fuller (1998) listed geography as one given that the people primarily inhabited mountainous regions that were scattered and isolated from each other without having a central state structure. Accordingly, their nomadic lifestyle also contributed to the divergence of several Kurdish dialects. In addition, the Kurdish people generally lived in the more isolated regions of larger empires, namely the Persian, Arab, or Ottoman, which affected the development of their identity (Barkey & Fuller, 1998).

1.11 Ideology of the Turkish Islamic Movement

According to Karmon (1998), most scholars agree that although Turkish Islam has many features common to other Muslim countries in the region, its uniqueness lies in the different political and social environments. Turkish ideology is occupied with Turkish nationalism that includes the secularist components and European identification of Kemalism.

Contrary to other religiously motivated terror organizations in other countries, terrorist groups in Turkey have never attacked military or security personnel, although they lost many members in the antiterrorist campaigns that were led by the state. In addition, they have never attacked Western targets or acted abroad even though they have some infrastructure in Europe.

Turkish security authorities outlined the objectives of the radical religious movements through three stages: (a) *First* is the message to call people for an effort to adopt the Islamic religion to social life and establish an Islamic state and administration through the radicals in order to persuade the community; (b) *second* is for the community to restructure in accordance with the requirements of the first stage; and (c) *third* is the struggle to safeguard the Islamic way of life.

Interestingly, although religious motivated groups have struggled for the constitution of an Islamic State, they have used leftist slogans in their publications and they accept ex-Marxists in their ranks.

In the early 1990s, the PKK attempted to gain religious communities of Turkey's southeast region. To achieve this goal, they established organizations such as the Kurdistan Imamlar Birliđi—Association of Imams of Kurdistan—(imam = the official person assigned to each mosque). Ozeren and Van De Voorde (2006) argued that PKK attempted to become the major power in the region by gaining those communities through causing a fight between Turkish Hezbollah and the PKK.

1.12 The Turkish Hezbollah

As a religiously motivated terrorist organization, the major goal of the Turkish Hezbollah is to establish a state based on Islamic laws (*seriat*). As a model, Iran is the only country that has *seriat*. Thus, the Hezbollah foresaw three different stages to reach their goal: propaganda (*teblig*), organizing (*cemaat*), and armed struggle (*jihad*).

Beginning in the 1980s and peaking especially during the 1990s, some extremist religious groups located in Diyarbakir, the largest city in southeast Turkey, became more active and began to address larger populations in order to succeed in their ideological goals. Additionally, they published numerous books and magazines in an effort to gain more supporters. For example, publishing centers played a central role in that extremist religious groups were able to reveal their ideology to more people as well as the opportunity to inform, organize, and even give orders to their supporters.

Regarding the leadership and strategy of the organization, a critical problem arose in 1993 between two groups of the Turkish Hezbollah—Ilim and Menzil. A year later, the leader of the Menzil Group was kidnapped and murdered, and furthermore, 50 members from both sides lost their lives in this internal fight during the second half of the 1990s (Aras & Bacik, 2002). Between 1991 and 2003, Turkish security forces arrested 14,622 people and cleared 1,648 terror incidents (Ozeren & Van De Voorde, 2006).

Between 2000 and 2001, the Turkish National Police conducted two successful operations against the Turkish Hezbollah which pushed the organization to underground for a long period of time. In 2000, Huseyin Velioglu, the leader of Turkish Hezbollah, was killed by security forces, the organization's archives were seized, and 61 high level members were arrested. In total, 4,679 suspects were arrested in 2000 and 2001, and the bodies of 67 people who were kidnapped and murdered by the organization were located.

Each new arrest and interrogation of the Turkish Hezbollah militants helped the Turkish Intelligence Group to become more familiar with the organization. In addition,

several more discoveries and arrests were made through these operations and the Turkish Hezbollah systematically dismantled (Nugent, 2004).

In terms of how the Turkish Hezbollah view Iran, some facts may be helpful in understanding the situation. For example, high level leadership, including Velioglu, received military, political, and religious training in Iran. Karmon (1998) further confirmed that members of the Turkish Hezbollah also receive training in Iran. Although the organization's members are in favor of the methods used by Iran's revolution, they do not want to be controlled by Iran. Further, although they do not accept the Islamic sect (*shic*) of the Iranian people for themselves, they do not consider that it is a good idea to discuss the differences. Despite the many problems, however, they stayed in touch with Iranian intelligence units between 1992 and 1999.

Ozeren and Van De Voorde (2006) stated that the Turkish Hezbollah is also known as the Kurdish Revolutionary Hezbollah (*Hisbullahi Kurdi Shorishger*) among Iraqi Kurds because its members are predominantly made up of Sunni Muslim Kurds.

In terms of the recent situation of the Turkish Hezbollah, they have been attempting to reestablish their high level management and regain their support groups, and they remain active in prisons and abroad as well. As a new strategy, they avoid armed struggles until the right time comes. As a different approach from that of the past, the organization has been seeking peace with other religious groups and organizations in addition to publishing books and periodicals in an effort to regain support from their communities.

1.12.1 Religious motivated terror organizations and the Turkish Hezbollah

Although there are demographic similarities between the Turkish Hezbollah and the PKK, there are also serious ideological differences between them. While the Turkish Hezbollah is a religiously motivated terrorist organization, PKK is a Marxist Leninist Kurdish separatist terrorist organization. Until 1996, when Irfan Cagirici, one of the Turkish Hezbollah leaders was captured, Turkish authorities had underestimated Hezbollah by focusing primarily on PKK.

Being a more popular issue throughout the world, it is useful to first briefly address religious motivated terrorist organizations. Because each terrorist organization's goals and strategies are different when establishing an Islamic state and society, defining the Islamic movement is a complex task (Karmon, 1998). Sayari (1996) distinguished terrorist groups as traditionalists and radicals as those minority groups who were inspired by the Iranian revolution in 1979.

Additionally, Imset (1993) divided Turkey into two parts—western and southeastern Turkey. According to Imset, while there is a resistance to the Islamic state in the western part of the country, the southeastern part is dominated chiefly by the Kurdish population which represents sympathy toward Islamic movements. Hezbollah, also known as Hezbol-contra, first began to spread in southeastern Turkey.

Religious-oriented terrorist activity in Turkey began in the 1960s, and between 1967 and 1973, the leaders of Hizb ut Tahrir, the Islamic Liberation Party, were imprisoned for attempting to change Turkey's constitutional structure through armed activities (Karmon, 1998). By 1979, the Islamic revolution in Iran had an enormous effect

over the religious motivated terrorist organizations and opened new horizons for them. As a result, hundreds of young Islamists visited Iran in search of ways to transform Turkey into Iran (Cakir, 2007).

Similar to other terrorist organizations, the Turkish Islamic movements were heavily affected by the military coup in 1980. However, with its beginnings in 1983, the democratic regime encouraged the general Islamic trend, and Marxists and nationalists lost their influence although free political space helped them to strengthen their position. This ample space also aided the Islamic Jihad to play a noticeable role as a real terrorist threat that committed a series of assassinations. By 1984, the Turkish Hezbollah publicly appeared for the first time and showed support for the Iranian revolution (Karmon, 1997).

According to Karmon (1997), beginning in the middle 1980s with the conversion of some members of the right wing nationalist movement to Islam, a significant development occurred. Unlike their origin, they believed that their movement should not tolerate nationalism, and contrary to PKK's ideology to be separated from the Turkish Republic, Hezbollah aimed to change the *laic* regime to the Islamic *Sharia* Regime. These militants were professionals in the field of terrorism and represented significant operational support for the Islamic movement. They organized more especially in poor towns and villages with a large Kurdish population among the young and unemployed. In addition, they often structured themselves around extremist Islamic publications such as Objektif, Tevhid, and Yeryuzu and followed the teachings of sheiks and Muslim scholars.

Karmon (1998) later discussed that the starting point of terrorist activities for religious organizations occurred in 1990 against the Turkish secular establishment. After

this date, a professor, journalist, political scientist, and writer were assassinated by the Islamic Jihad and Islamic Operation.

The Turkish government, security authorities, press, and public became extremely aware and shocked when Ugur Mumcu, one of the top prominent investigative reporters, was killed by a car bomb in January 1993. The series of terrorist events emerged a sharp reaction from Turkish public opinion and massive demonstrations were held. In addition, a strong press campaign led the Turkish security forces to take swift action against both the perpetrators and their sponsors.

For the first time, the arrests and interrogations unveiled the story behind the killings of some Turkish secular intellectuals, and the relationship between the Islamic Action or Movement and Iran were directly involved in acts of terrorism against the Turkish Republic.

Due to its ethnic structure based on Kurdish minority, one of the most controversial activities of the Turkish Hezbollah in southeastern Turkey was the killing of PKK members whose aim was separatist ideology in the area. Between 1991 and 1993, thousands of people were killed from each side. However, the conflict ended when an agreement was reached between the two terror organizations to not interfere with each other's activities.

A turning point toward religious oriented terrorist organizations occurred in March 1996. Until that time, Turkish authorities underestimated these groups and thus made no attempt to hinder their activities. In that month, the arrest of Irfan Cagirici, one

of the leaders of Islamic action, changed this period (Karmon, 1998) whereas Turkish security forces increased operations every year.

On January 17, 2000, the Turkish police raided a house located in the Beykoz district of Istanbul and killed the head of Hezbollah, Huseyin Velioglu, and captured two other key lieutenant leaders as well. Many documents were seized that unveiled Hezbollah's secret relationships. Approximately one year after the Beykoz operation, Hezbollah assassinated Diyarbakir's chief of police, Gaffar Okkan, as revenge for their leader's death.

This incident led to the second crackdown against Hezbollah when nearly all of its top leadership were either imprisoned or killed. As a result, these operations limited Turkey's religious motivated terror groups for a long period of time. At least temporarily, they ceased their armed attacks and entered into a phase of serious internal confrontation.

According to Cakir (2007), the Hezbollah were trying to recover, but nevertheless, it is possible that in the near future, they may regain the power they once had. Clearly, the decrease in terrorist activities of radical religious motivated groups was primarily the consequence of determined counteraction taken by Turkish officials (Karmon, 1998).

1.13 Other terrorist organizations in Turkey

Turkey does not only experience religiously motivated terrorist organizations, but also experiences ethnic and extremist leftist terrorism. It is therefore necessary to learn their strategies and ideologies in order to gain general insight concerning the terrorist

activities in Turkey. Also, revealing their recruitment strategies will help to obtain an overall perspective regarding the terrorist activities in Turkey.

1.13.1 The PKK

The PKK was created during a term of anarchy and turmoil during the 1970s (Barkey & Fuller, 1998). The anarchy and turmoil in this era resulted in three military coups that resulted in harsh policies against any opposing movement. The Kurdish movement was one of them.

The primary goal of the PKK is the creation of a unified, independent Kurdish state. According to Barkey and Fuller (1998), the PKK sought not only independence, but also a political and social revolution among the Kurds in order to transform Kurdish society's' feudal structure. The PKK adopted a Marxist- Leninist left-wing antiimperialist approach at first; however, this approach was abandoned in the new post-cold war era.

Some of the more important decisions that were taken in PKK's first manifesto included:

- The structure of the evolution will be a national democratic revolution.
- The minimum objective will be to establish an independent non-aligned Kurdistan State in the region.
- The maximum objective will be to establish a state based on Marxist-Leninist principles.
- The proletariat will be the pioneering force of the revolution.
- The peasants will be the major force of the revolution.

- The main alliance for the revolution will be the alliance between workers, peasants and intellectual youth.
- Propaganda activities will be supported by armed violence (Ankara Papers, 2004).

Barkey and Fuller (1998) claimed that PKK moved away from an earlier condemnation of Islam and now speaks of political settlement within the borders of Turkey. They further emphasized that the PKK's abandonment of an independent Kurdistan is false and not convincing.

In terms of tactics, the PKK combined violence and terror with political organizations. According to Barkey and Fuller (1998), the village guards were the top priority target of the PKK for many years. As a result, many school teachers and civil servants were killed, and schools and other public institutions were burned to reduce the existence of a Turkish state in southeast Turkey. Ocalan, the leader of the PKK, once stated that "the violence alternative may be difficult and painful, but it provides results" (Balli, 1991, 204).

The poorer classes of peasants and workers are mainly targeted as possible new members by PKK since these working classes generally live in the standard apartment ghettos located on the surroundings of Turkey's industrial cities. The Turkish government claims that the PKK recruits its guerrillas forcibly and then subjects them to "brainwashing" sessions at training camps in Lebanon. In a survey conducted by Ergil (1996) in southeast Turkey, 42% of the respondents claimed to have a family member in the organization.

The CIA pointed out that the PKK has made international terrorism a key weapon in its fight for an independent homeland in Kurdish-inhabited southeastern Turkey. The CIA viewed the PKK as a threat to U.S. facilities and interests abroad. The CIA also noted that because the PKK has been especially active in Europe, they feared that its tactics might become a model for other ethnic and separatist movements being spawned in the former Yugoslavia and Soviet Union.

Criss (1995) claimed that Turkey was exposed to PKK attacks from Iranian soil between 1993 and 1995; however, in 1995 Iran agreed to help Turkey eliminate PKK camps in her territories. Criss emphasized three reasons for this policy change: (a) *First* was the fear that the PKK could set an example for Iranian Kurds; (b) *second* was the implications of Kurdish separatism on the balance of power in the Middle East; and (c) the *third reason* was because the leadership in Azerbaijan was changed from Elcibey to Aliyev. For example, Elcibey was ultranationalist and supported by Turkey but after this change, Iran felt more secure and changed her attitude on the Kurdish issue.

In another article, Uslu (2007) pointed out the divisions in Turkey's Kurdish community by arguing that the leadership in the Kurdish movement is not centralized as it was intended. Although Zubeyir Aydar who resides in Europe is the head of the political wing, but he cannot give direct orders to Murat Karayilan who is headquartered in the mountains of northern Iraq.

Pedahzur (2005) scrutinized the recruitment strategies of the Kurdish Diaspora in Europe and concluded that many PKK fighters were initially approached by enlistment officers in Kurdish cultural centers where numerous young Kurds spend their time.

Young Kurds went through a process of indoctrination to build up their Kurdish identity and introduce these identities to PKK. Children were also approached in their schools by representatives of the PKK and invited to PKK's cultural camps where they are brainwashed against Turkey.

1.13.2 DHKP/C (Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front)

The Federation of Revolutionist Youth Association was established in 1966 by Turkish college students who shared communist ideas and who wanted a Turkish socialist revolution. Later, this association was divided due to the opposing views on the method used to achieve the revolution.

After the split, one group chose the violent and armed method or urban guerilla tactics similar to Latin American groups. They referred to themselves as the THKP-C (Turkey Public Liberation Party-Front) and Mahir Cayan became their leader. This group carried out numerous terrorist acts between 1968 and 1972. In 1972, Mahir Cayan was killed in an operation and numerous other important members of the group were arrested by security forces.

In 1974, the government released many convicted terrorists due to a general amnesty. After being released from prison, members of the THKP-C attempted to reorganize the organization's structure. In 1976, the Revolutionist Youth Association was established for this purpose. Before implementing their reorganization process, the THKP-C was once again divided. The Istanbul group named themselves Dev-Genc

(Revolutionary Youth), and Dursun Karatas became the new leader (Sol Teror Orgutleri, 1994).

In the pursuit of violent purposes, the Dev-Genc established FTKME (Fighting Teams against Fascist Terror) to carry out armed attacks. In a couple of years, 35 security officers, 23 soldiers, and more than 200 civilians were killed by this armed group. The murder of former Prime Minister Nihat Erim became one of the most well known attacks carried out by this terrorist group.

Dursun Karatas and most of the members of Dev-Genc were arrested and convicted after the military coup in 1980. Dursun Karatas took this opportunity to use the prison as a propaganda and education place. Karatas and his friends reorganized the organization while they were in prison. To reveal the new tactics, Karatas wrote a book (*Hakliyiz Kazanacagiz* = We are right and we are going to win) while imprisoned in which he explained the organization's purpose and its future plans, including a list of enemies who were comprised mainly of government officials, law enforcement agents, ranking soldiers, and judges.

In 1989, Karatas and some of his friends managed to escape from prison. Following the release of other members, the organization regained its power and began to renew its bloody attacks. In the early 1990s, the organization succeeded to murder many of its targets listed in *Hakliyiz Kazanacagiz*.

In 1991, TNP carried out successful nationwide operations against Dev-Sol; some high level members were killed and many members of the organization were arrested other than Karatas who managed to escape to Europe. After holding a congress in

Damascus in 1994, Karatas declared the establishment of a new organization—DHKP-C (Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party-Front)—which has been active in Turkey and Europe since that time. More especially in recent years, however, its function and effectiveness have decreased due to the security forces operations.

DHKP-C attempted to have a simultaneous revolution in the urban and rural areas. In this sense, they differed from other revolutionary terrorist organizations. The DHKP-C foresaw five phases of revolution that included: (a) Vanguard war, (b) increasing vanguard struggle and starting a guerilla fight, (c) expanding and spreading guerilla war beyond the country, (d) becoming connected with local units, and (e) realization of a communist revolution.

The primary goal of DHKP-C is to change the current regime in Turkey and replace it with a new one based on Marxist and Leninist ideology. DHKP-C considers itself to play the leading role in enlightening the mass population and creating a revolution in Turkey.

Parallel to PKK’s recruitment strategy, DHKP/C generally recruits new militants through its legal structures. According to Alkan (2003), university student associations are actively used by DHKP/C for recruitment purposes. For example, new university students are invited join social activities that are held by DHKP/C where they are approached by leaders of the association.

1.14 Recruitment Strategies of Other Terrorist Organizations in the World

Gerwehr and Daly's (2006) study regarding Al-Qaeda revealed that potential recruits are generally persuaded through media channels, local networks (i.e., peer groups and relatives), or institutional structures (e.g., mosques or legally established college associations). According to Gerwehr and Daly, Al-Qaeda looks for people who are dissatisfied with their jobs or resentful of the police or military organizations. Media channels are used for organizing meetings and other activities to reach larger groups. Contrary to Al-Qaeda, media channels are less likely to be used by the Turkish Hezbollah considering the technological improvement of the region.

A recent study conducted in 2009 by the International Crisis Group revealed that the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN)—a separatist movement active in northern Malaysia—(Wikipedia, 2009) recruits young Malay Muslims especially from private Islamic schools. Contrary to my expectations, the Turkish Hezbollah recruits more militants from state colleges versus private colleges, whereas BRN recruitment efforts are more effective in private colleges. According to the International Crisis Group, this difference stems from BRN's ideology that represents an ethno-nationalist insurgency which aims to reclaim the Patani Sultanate's independence. Since BRN is nationalist terrorist organization, local private schools provide the organization with tremendous support.

1.15 Research Questions and Hypotheses

Although there are no scientific methods that can explain how the Turkish Hezbollah recruits more militants, two general methods have been used according to official Turkish records (Van Police Department, 2009):

1. Institutional structures play one of the important roles to persuade an individual to join the Turkish Hezbollah. For example, institutional structures organize movie times, concerts, and other social activities. During these activities, possible candidates are linked to experienced Turkish Hezbollah militants.

2. Social networks include another tool that the Turkish Hezbollah uses to effectively recruit new militants. Typically, Turkish Hezbollah members meet with their younger relatives in mosques where they attempt to convince the youngest to follow the philosophy of the Turkish Hezbollah in order to attract new members and thereby enhance their social standing within the organization. In other words, an individual is brainwashed and motivated through this strategy of sharing values and ideologies related to the Turkish Hezbollah.

In regard to these two effective recruitment methods, the following research questions are answered in my study:

1. *What methods are used to recruit college students into the Turkish Hezbollah, a religiously motivated terrorist organization?*
2. *What are the demographic profiles of the individuals who are recruited by the institutional structures and social networks?*

3. *Does social control theory or social learning theory best explain the Turkish Hezbollah's most successful method of recruiting?*

I focused on Turkish Hezbollah militants who already had or were working on obtaining a college degree. They were either educated in their home town or out of their home town. Students who were educated away from their home towns and were subsequently recruited by institutional structures of Hezbollah were considered to have weak social bonding ties that support the assumptions of social control theory. On the other hand, college students who were educated in their home town and recruited through their social networks revealed that social networking is an effective tool for Hezbollah to recruit new militants and supports the assumptions of social learning theory. In relation to social control and social learning, two major criminal justice theories, I tested the following hypotheses and then provided information related to their expected results:

- H₁: Social networks and institutional structures are two general methods used extensively by the Turkish Hezbollah for recruiting new college student militants within universities.
- H₂: Institutional structures have been used more effectively by the Turkish Hezbollah than social networks for recruiting new militants holding college degrees.
- H₃: Social networks have been used more effectively than institutional structures of the Turkish Hezbollah for recruiting new militants holding college degrees.
- H₄: Social learning theory is more likely to explain how Turkish Hezbollah militants holding college degrees engage in the Turkish Hezbollah.

H₅: Social control theory is more likely to explain how Turkish Hezbollah militants holding college degree engage in the Turkish Hezbollah.

1.16 Methods

In my study, I used secondary data to measure the probability of a college student joining the Turkish Hezbollah religiously motivated terrorist organization dependent upon whether he or she was affected by social networks or the organization's institutional structures.

Because I compared cases involving the probability of college students engaging in the Turkish Hezbollah through social network or institutional structures of the terrorist organization on different variables, quantitative methods were used to answer three research questions. The logic of using quantitative analysis is simple in that both dependent and independent variables can be measured through its data collection method.

In my study, I further explained the factors that determine why Turkish Hezbollah members choose to join the terrorist organization. Five hypotheses were tested through the following dependent and independent variables.

1.16.1 Dependent and Independent Variables

1.16.1.1 Dependent variable (DV).

The dependent variable (DV) consisted of recruitment type (social network = 1 or institutional structure = 0). College educated Turkish Hezbollah members were divided into two groups: (a) those recruited through the social network (social learning theory)

and (b) those recruited through the Turkish Hezbollah's institutional structures (social control theory or absence of social networks).

1.16.1.2 Independent variables (IV).

In regard to *gender* (IV_1), males (0) are more likely than females (1) to become members of the Hezbollah as revealed by the organization's personal reports which indicated that females represent very few members (only 3%). Since the number of female militants is not significant, gender was omitted from the discussion contained in the data analysis section. According to Nachmias and Nachmias (2000) an inadequate sample size for the classified variables may not reflect the true values of a parameter. In my study, therefore, conclusions regarding gender were difficult to make due to the small sample size of females in comparison to males.

Location of college, the second independent variable (IV_2), refers to students attending colleges in their same home town (0) or in a different city (1). Therefore, the question posed in my study was: "In pursuing a college education, does being away from social networking affect the likelihood of being recruited by the Turkish Hezbollah?"

Location of college represents one of the important parameters in my study. College students who received their education in their own home towns were grouped to determine the effectiveness of recruitment methods through social networks, and those students who received their college education out of their home town and had no relatives within the Turkish Hezbollah were grouped to determine the effectiveness of the terrorist organization's institutional structures. Since all Hezbollah militants provided detailed

information in self-reports concerning how they were recruited, the data provided clear information about the Hezbollah's recruitment strategies.

If social control proves to be more accurate, the impact of this variable is expected to show that college students who are away from their families are more likely to be recruited by the Turkish Hezbollah's institutional structures when compared to college students who remain with their family while pursuing a college education. In this case, my study revealed that the Turkish Hezbollah established an effective institutional structure within colleges.

On the other hand, if social learning theory proves to be more accurate, the variable is expected to show that college students who are either with or away from their families are more likely to be recruited by social networks. As previously discussed in the literature review, the region has strong social networks that affect an individual to join the terrorist organization.

College type (IV₃) includes private (0) and state (1) colleges. In my study, I expected that private college students would be less likely to be recruited by the Turkish Hezbollah, given that they are comprised of wealthier students who are typically less likely to be recruited when compared to state college students. In addition, private schools are equipped with more resources that allow for closer follow-up relating to a student's progress, and relations with students' parents are generally stronger in comparison to state colleges. These advantages provide more opportunities for parents to keep sound family ties. Because my study did not have a large enough sample size of private colleges, this variable was excluded from the equation. Because nearly 99% of the

college educated militants received their education from state colleges is another reason that the variable was eliminated from the model.

Regarding *online education* (IV₄), there are two types of college education available in Turkey. One is online education (0) while the other is campus education (1). Online education does not require that a student relocate to another city and therefore keeps the social network strong. It is believed that if a person has no relatives within the Turkish Hezbollah and holds an online education, the chances of being recruited by the Hezbollah are significantly lower (social control theory). However, if a person has relatives within the Hezbollah as well as an online education, the chances of becoming recruited by the Hezbollah are significantly higher.

In the event that social control theory proves to be more accurate, my study is expected to show that college students who obtained an online education are less likely to be recruited by the institutional structures. However, if social learning theory proves to be more accurate, my study is expected to show that college students who have Turkish Hezbollah members within their family are more likely to be recruited through the Turkish Hezbollah's social network.

The fifth independent variable, *family size (ratio)* (IV₅), is based on the number of children. Most of the families in the eastern part of Turkey have large families. For example, those who have less than four children are considered to be a small family size, those having between 4 to 6 children are considered to be a normal family size, and families with more than six children are considered to represent a large family size. According to Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990), the larger the number of children in a

family, the greater is the likelihood that they will be delinquent. In my opinion, if a family does not have any relatives within the Turkish Hezbollah, a smaller family size may decrease the likelihood of being recruited by Hezbollah.

If social control theory proves to be more accurate, college students who are reared in small families are less likely to be recruited by the Turkish Hezbollah when compared to those reared in a large family. However, if social learning theory proves to be more accurate, there will be no significant difference between college students who are reared in either large or small families.

The sixth independent variable, *family income* (IV₆), represents college students who come from either poor, normal, or rich families. As the well-being of the family of origin improves, it is believed that the probability of joining the Turkish Hezbollah will decrease. In considering the average Turkish family monthly income, earnings will be divided into the following three levels as identified by Erdogan (2002): (a) poor (\$1,200 or less); (b) average (\$1,201 to \$3,500); and (c) rich (\$3,501 and above).

If social control theory proves to be more accurate, college students who come from families with rich income level backgrounds are less likely to be recruited by the institutional structures. Because rich college students are generally expected to prefer private schools, having monetary independence will most likely increase the likelihood of taking part in social activities which, in turn, decreases the likelihood of being contacted by the Turkish Hezbollah. In this case, college students will be more likely to share common social norms and ideas that denounce terrorist activities. On the other hand, if

social learning theory proves to be more accurate, my study is more likely to reveal that there is no significant difference between the rich and poor college students.

The seventh independent variable focused on the *ideological background* (IV₇) of recruited Hezbollah militants. This variable was identified as religious versus nonreligious. In my study, I expected that religious college students would be more prone to propaganda and be influenced by the organization's institutional structures, even if there were no Hezbollah militants within their social networks.

If social control theory proves to be more accurate, religious college students who are away from their families are likely to be recruited through institutional structures.

However, if social learning theory proves to be more accurate, religious college students, either with their family or away from family, are more likely to be recruited by their social networks.

The eighth (IV₈) independent variable is the *ideology of the family*. As mentioned above, family has a great influence over the Kurdish originated individuals. In addition, college students who come from a religious family background are considered to be more supportive to religious ideologies. Although terrorism literature does not support the idea that religious individuals are more prone to commit terrorist acts (Ozeren, 2004), the results of this variable are interesting. If social control theory proves to be more accurate, college students who come from religious families are more likely to be recruited by the institutional structures. However, if social learning theory proves to be more accurate, college students who come from religious families, either with their family or away from family, are more likely to be recruited by their social networks.

The ninth (IV₉) independent variable is whether or not militants exist within the social network of college students. This is one of the important variables in my study since its value increases the effectiveness of the assumptions held by social learning and social network theories. If social control theory proves to be more accurate, college students who have militants in their social networks and receive their education away from their family are more likely to be recruited through institutional structures. However, if social learning theory proves to be more accurate, college students who come from religious families, either with their family or away from family, are more likely to be recruited by their social networks.

The tenth and final independent variable includes *reasons for attending Hezbollah* (IV₁₀) is represented by the following explanations:

1 = Religion: People who believe there is no religious freedom; the Turkish State is against Islam.

0 = Other reasons: People who join the Turkish Hezbollah due to other reasons than religion.

Each of the college students had different reasons for attending the Turkish Hezbollah. Therefore, either social networks or institutional structures may play significant roles in a terrorist organization's use of the above arguments to recruit more militants.

If social control theory is more accurate, institutional structures of the Hezbollah are used to recruit more militants by using the above arguments. However, if social

learning theory is more accurate, social networks of the Hezbollah are used to recruit more militants by using the above arguments.

1.16.2 Regression Equation

The regression consisted of one dependent variable (DV) and eight independent variables (IV). To weight the likelihood of each IV's effectiveness, logistic regression was used. Since my study was designed to determine the likelihood that the Turkish Hezbollah uses a particular type of recruitment, logistic regression best fits the model. According to Tabachnick and Fidell (2007), logistic regression can be used in the following four ways: (a) to predict a DV on the basis of continuous and/or categorical IVs; (b) to determine the percent of variance in the DV explained by the IVs; (c) to rank the relative importance of IVs; and (d) to assess the interaction effects and to understand the impact of covariate control variable.

The following equation was used to calculate the probability of the Turkish Hezbollah employing a particular recruitment type:

$$\hat{Y} = \frac{e^u}{1 + e^u} = \frac{e^{a+b_1x_1+b_2x_2+b_3x_3\dots}}{1 + e^{a+b_1x_1+b_2x_2+b_3x_3\dots}}$$

\hat{Y} shows the likely predicted value. Regarding the dependent variable, there are two probabilities in the equation that militant college students are recruited by either social networking (1) or through the institutional structures (0). Because "social networks" are represented by (1), the calculated likelihood shows the likelihood of social networks being used to recruit militants.

To determine the power of each variable on the dependent variable—predicting the dependent variable from the independent variables—I used:

$$U = a + b_1X_1 + b_2X_2 + b_3X_3 + \dots$$

The probability of a college educated militant being recruited by social networks is represented by U . These estimates reveal the relationship between the IV and the DV where the DV is on the logit scale. In addition, the amount of increase (or decrease, if the coefficient sign is negative) is revealed in the predicted logs of being recruited by social networks. Holding all other predictors constant, it shows that one unit will either increase (or decrease) in the IV.

1.16.3 Population and Sample

Nachmias and Nachmias (2000) stated that population, the aggregate of all cases, confirms the designated set of specifications. O'Sullivan, Rassel, and Berner (2003) further stated that for large groups, it is impossible to contact every member in order to collect data besides requiring a tremendous commitment of both financial resources and time. The main purpose for sampling is to provide the conceptual basis to make accurate estimates of the entire population's values. Sampling allows the researcher to gather information on a targeted group in a much shorter amount of time when the sample of the entire set is accurately represented (Nachmias & Nachmias, 2000).

In my study, the population consists of college students with Kurdish descent who were recruited by the Turkish Hezbollah. In 2000, the Turkish National Police captured the Turkish Hezbollah's database which included 7,000 self reports. Out of these 7,000, there were 339 college educated militants of which I have obtained all of their self

reports. Since it is compulsory for every member to submit their self reports after being recruited, I dealt with the entire target population which represents the sample of my study. The research question focused on how these educated militants are recruited through either the institutional structures of the Turkish Hezbollah or through social networks.

Considering the strong family ties that are prevalent in the southeastern part of Turkey which is highly populated by Kurdish-origin citizens, Hezbollah recruits more militants through social ties that are best explained by the social learning theory. On the other hand, Hezbollah uses its legal structures effectively to recruit college students who are pursuing an education away from their home towns. For this group, which is explained in the data collection and instrument section, students who have Hezbollah militants in their social networks are excluded from my study. Rather, I attempted to discover whether or not Hezbollah really does, in fact, use its legal structures to effectively recruit militants. For this group, I will test the social control theory to determine if Hezbollah's recruitment methods support or do not support the theory.

1.16.4 Data Collection and Instrument

In my study, I will use secondary data or data that are collected for a specific purpose. According to O' Sullivan et al. (2003), this method offers a researcher the following advantages: (a) reduces cost, (b) enables studies to be conducted that are otherwise impractical, is helpful for comparative and longitudinal studies, and secondary analysis is a necessary element for an open science.

The Turkish Hezbollah collected data from its members as a means of gaining more insight about the organization and its members. Without these data, it would have been practically impossible to gain knowledge concerning Hezbollah's recruitment tactics. Thus, conducting a survey with Hezbollah members was not feasible. Therefore, I obtained the necessary data from Hezbollah database records retained by the Turkish National Police Intelligence Department.

1.16.5 Limitations

As with other data collection methods, secondary data analysis has certain limitations as summarized by Nachmias and Nachmias (2000) in the following manner: (a) The data may not include all of the instruments that the researcher hopes to find; (b) researchers may have difficulty in obtaining access to reach the data that contain variables of interest since the original investigator may not release the information; and (c) if the researcher does not have sufficient information concerning how the data were collected, he or she may encounter difficulties with internal and external validity when determining potential sources of bias, errors, or problems.

Although it is not clear how many Turkish Hezbollah militants actually exist in Turkey, after the 2000 police raid against the Turkish Hezbollah leader, 7,000 militants' self-reports were seized along with other important information regarding the organization. Since the Turkish National Police (TNP) used that information to eliminate Hezbollah's power, the terrorist organization has subsequently taken more effective

cautions in unveiling its activities. Thus, beginning from that time to the present, the TNP does not have access to the most up-to-date information concerning the organization.

1.16.6 Data Analysis

Initially, I used a frequency table to identify the Turkish Hezbollah's most commonly used structure to recruit militants. Then, I analyzed the data by using logistic regression analysis. The dependent variable was measured by the probability of becoming a member of the Turkish Hezbollah either through institutional structures or by social networks. Depending on this assumption, each independent variable was included in the equation to appraise their effectiveness over the dependent variable. The type of college attended—whether located in or outside an individual's home town—provided valuable information regarding Hezbollah's recruitment strategy. Therefore, I compared the percentage between the number of recruited individuals by social networks and the number of recruited individuals by institutional structures. In addition to the influence of remaining in or leaving home towns to attend college over the dependent variable, I attempted to locate other independent variables in order to calculate each IV's influence over the dependent variable.

1.16.7 Reliability and Validity

Babbie (2007) stated that reliability is a matter of using a particular technique that yields the same results each time when applied to the same object. My dataset included most of the Turkish Hezbollah militants' self reports which were designed as a form to

obtain information concerning the militants' families, backgrounds, and how they were recruited. I believe that the data are reliable, because since the form contained clear and easy to understand questions for every militant. In addition, these reports were prepared for the terror organization itself and not for the police. Since the Turkish Hezbollah is a religiously motivated organization, it is believed that every member provided correct information about themselves.

Nachmias and Nachmias (2000) stated that validity refers to the question "Am I measuring what I intend to measure?" (p. 149). In my study, I searched for the answer to how the Turkish Hezbollah recruits its militants. Because every militant provided detailed information in their self reports concerning their recruitment, I am confident that these reports will help to identify how militants are recruited by the Turkish Hezbollah.

1.17 Conclusion

My study provides detailed and accurate information regarding the strategies used by the Turkish Hezbollah to recruit college students. According to Candarlil (1999), having a false secularist policy such as pressuring religious people, increases the tension of conservative people against the state especially in the Kurdish populated area. Like other terrorist organizations, the Turkish Hezbollah exaggerated all of these policy issues and used them as propaganda to create a group of people who view the state as the enemy of Islam as well as help them recruit more people either through social networks or through the organization's institutional structures.

Similar to other terrorist organizations in Turkey, the Turkish Hezbollah has strong and effective institutional structures within colleges located especially in the metropolis cities of Ankara, Istanbul, and Izmir where they can recruit militants through these institutional establishments. Parallel to social control theory's argument that being absent from social bonds cause individuals to become more inclined to commit crime, if this theory proves to be more accurate, the data will reveal the following.

College students who remain with their social structure while pursuing their education are less likely to be recruited by the Turkish Hezbollah. Additionally, it is expected that college students who are distanced from their social networks during their educational pursuit are more likely to be recruited by the Hezbollah.

On the other hand, the Turkish Hezbollah also uses local structures to recruit militants. For example, especially through mosques and Imams, Hezbollah gains sympathy and is thus able to recruit more militants. Besides considering family ties in the area, I expected that the Turkish Hezbollah is more likely to use family ties to recruit new militants. In other words, young Kurdish people are more apt to accept or follow the Turkish Hezbollah's propaganda if their elders support this message. For example, in the traditional rural Kurdish society, it is expected that the views of elders are respected by the younger generation.

If social learning theory proves to be more accurate, the data will reveal that college students who remain with their social structure while pursuing their education and have relatives who are part of the Turkish Hezbollah are more likely to be recruited by

the social networks. This reveals that family ties are strong enough to recruit new militants.

Whichever the case, the findings of my study provide valuable information regarding the most effective recruitment strategy used by the Turkish Hezbollah. Most importantly, my study provides a more in-depth analysis in understanding and resolving some of the negative issues that are used by the Turkish Hezbollah as a propaganda tool to recruit more militants. By revealing these findings, the Turkish government may, perhaps, be led to establish policy changes in the region. Considering the ethnic and religious structure of the area, Turkey clearly needs additional reforms in order to reap better human rights, democracy, and religious freedom. I believe that my study divulges Turkey's need to make dramatic changes concerning the following topics.

1.17.1 Religion.

Because Islam does not recognize any priesthood, this can exercise authority or interpret the laws of Allah (the God) (Choudry, 1993). However, other than Arabs, as diverse ethnic groups such as the Persians and Turks embraced Islam, they created their unique versions by blending religion in with their previous cultural practices and social arrangements. Along the way, they devised a group of clergymen that enabled the state to control the education and socialization of believers (Koker, 1995). However, under the influence of a positivist argument, the founders of the Turkish Republic claimed that religion in general, and Islam specifically, prevented modernization and sustained backwardness. They perceived religion as the basic reason for the disintegration of the

Ottoman Empire as well as a main threat to the stability and longevity of the new regime, an idea that is not accepted by many. Thus, they followed the example of the Ottomans in controlling religion under government hierarchy (Kologlu, 1999) by instituting the Directory of Religious Affairs.

On the other hand and parallel to Selcuk's (1999) argument, I believe that promoting pluralism and multiculturalism is the key to broaden and deepen the practice of democracy in Turkey. Differences of opinions, beliefs, cultures, and lifestyles neither threaten the regime's stability nor create chaos; on the contrary, recognizing them is the best way to secure Turkish democracy and secularism. Instead, it is argued that the ideal situation exists when government control over religion is decreased and religious activities are organized by civil societal organizations.

1.17.2 Economy.

Although economic theory does not provide a very convincing answer as to whether poverty is one of the important root causes of terrorism (Krueger & Maleckova, 2003), Hamm (1998) claimed that economic poverty is, in fact, connected to terrorism. Considering the economic background of the eastern part of Turkey, there is an unbalanced share of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). For example, when compared to the eastern part of Turkey, the western part is industrialized and more developed (State Institute of Statistics, 2003). Clearly, fighting against terrorism should be supported by economic developments in the eastern area.

1.17.3 Unemployment.

Unemployment is another economic variable that has an effect on terrorism. For example, Bloch (1957) argued that loss of a job increases social inhibition which, in turn, drives individuals to become more prone to criminal activities. In support, Ellis (1991) stated that having a high proportion of unemployment increases the crime rate.

Accordingly, I expect that the higher unemployment rate in the eastern area is another reason for terrorism and creating new jobs will assist in eliminating the Turkish Hezbollah.

2 CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

This literature review provides information regarding the recruitment strategies of terrorist organizations through the perspectives of social control and social learning theories. In this section, the following four major points are addressed that relate to my study.

In the first section, the way in which scholars have observed terrorism and criminology are examined. In addition, I will provide justification as to why criminological theories are used to analyze terrorism. As Ferracuti (1982) argued, because terrorists' goals and motivations remain criminal, terrorism may be studied through criminal theories.

In the second section, social control and social learning theories are explained and some studies pertaining to these theories are summarized. I have also provided details concerning how these theories are used to analyze the Turkish Hezbollah. It is my belief that having terrorists within social networks increases the likelihood of being recruited through these networks. On the other hand, my study is expected to reveal that institutional structures are another effective recruitment tool used by the Turkish Hezbollah. I hypothesized that college students who obtain their degrees away from their families are most likely to be recruited through the Turkish Hezbollah's institutional structures due to the students' weak social bonds.

In the third section, theories associated with terrorist recruitment are summarized and then related back to social control and social learning theories. Like other terrorist

organizations in the world, the Turkish Hezbollah also uses the same recruitment patterns found to be important variables in differential recruitment theory (personal ties, organizational ties, and social networks), the net model (institutional structural weekend activities), and the funnel model (identity building and commitment validation). It is my belief that low self-control and social control help the Turkish Hezbollah to recruit more militants through its institutional structures. On the other hand, a crime or terror-praised society increases the likelihood of individuals being recruited into terror or crime organizations through social networks.

Finally, I will identify whether or not there is a relationship between religion and terrorism as well as discuss theories related to religion and terrorism. Rapoport (1999) stated that there are four types of modern terrorism and each have different ideologies. For example, the anarchist wave attempted to commit political assassinations in order to ignite a popular uprising, the anticolonial wave attempted to obtain independent states, the new-left wave stemmed from a political climate (especially the cold war), and finally, the religious wave used religion as a justification for terrorism.

How religion as a factor in terrorism relates to social control and social learning theories will also be examined in this section. Theoretical literature has suggested that having more ideology in the political system minimizes terrorist activities, and religious ideology, whether fundamentalist or not, should take part in the legal political system. From the social control theory perspective, college students who have weak bonds and religious ideology are more likely to be recruited through the Turkish Hezbollah's institutional structures. Parallel to the findings of social learning theory, I believe that

having militants within relatives is expected to increase the likelihood of being recruited by social networks.

2.2 Criminological Theories and Terrorism

In this section, I will first examine the way in which scholars have traditionally observed terrorism. After providing their traditional perspectives on terrorism and criminology, the various definitions of terrorism and the ways in which I examined other scholars' views are discussed.

There are many conditions that may provoke terrorism. For example, not only deprived and uneducated people may be terrorists, but the affluent and well-educated people may be terrorists as well. While it is not difficult to find terrorists among psychopathic and normal healthy people in addition to both sexes and of all ages, the list is easy to extend. While explaining terrorism, however, the main point that any academic researcher should consider is the wide diversity of conditions and the target population. Conversely, this variability of the conditions and the heterogeneity of the target population create difficulty in oversimplifying terrorism (Katja & Brynjar, 2000). Another drawback for the close study of terrorism is the unavailability of target populations.

Diverse types and complex forms of terrorism have greatly complicated the task of determining the causes of terrorism. For example, most academic studies written after 1968 focused on the causes of terrorism within different levels of explanations (e.g., individual, group, environmental, and international). By the groundbreaking analytical

frameworks of Martha Crenshaw, Jerrold Post, John Horgan, and Andrew Silke, the best understood include the individual and group levels (SNDC, 2006). Their research provided a new outlook for discovering how and why militants join terrorist organizations, which group dynamics work within terrorist organizations, and what obligatory factors influence disengagement from terrorism.

Crenshaw (1981) stated that the direct causes of terrorism should be scrutinized on background conditions that positively encourage resistance against the state. These conditions may not only create an environment in which terrorism is possible, but they also provide direction and motivation for the terrorist movement. According to Crenshaw, the existence of concrete grievances among an identifiable minority is one reason that causes terrorism. Some theoretical researchers have suggested that the idea of justice or fairness may also be related to attitudes toward violence. The second condition that relates to terrorist activities is the lack of opportunity for political participation. Finally, government use of unusual and unexpected force in response to reform attempts or protests often lead to terrorist retaliation. These background conditions for terrorism are largely used as propaganda tools to recruit new militants who view terrorism as a morally acceptable way to overcome the government (Crenshaw, 1981).

Yilmaz (2009) stated that, depending on their point of interest, terrorism theories may be assessed within four categories:

- Strategic theories: Terrorism is used as an instrument to achieve certain goals by rational actors.

- Structural theories: Internal dynamics of political organizations may cause terrorism.
- Psychological theories: Emphasize the influence of personality, gender, age, education, political affiliation, etc. on an individual level.
- Sociological theories: Like psychological theories, they emphasize the influence of individual factors.

While strategic and structural theories focus on decision to act determinants, psychological and sociological theories focus on individual characteristics and their likely responses to different kinds of terrorism.

Although many researchers have stated that focusing on underlying causes, motivational factors, and grievances imply a kind of justification for violence, it is clear that terrorism studies and their future potential will help to devise balanced and effective long term measures (Katja & Brynjar, 2004).

In consideration of terrorism research related to Turkey, there have been few academic studies conducted until only the last couple of years. However, by sending students to the United States for the purpose of earning higher academic degrees has provided Turkey with reliable and important research. On the other hand, Turkey must still identify the recruitment strategies used by terror groups. Although there are numerous studies regarding the recruitment strategies of terrorist organizations throughout the world, unfortunately, there are no scientific studies regarding terrorist group recruitment strategies in Turkey.

Therefore, to identify and formulate an in-depth analysis concerning the Turkish Hezbollah's recruitment strategies, I will use social control and social learning theories that I believe are the most applicable theories that can reveal their recruitment methods. For example, strong relative relations and the Turkish culture of showing respect for the ideas of their elders make young Kurdish originated citizens easy targets for the Turkish Hezbollah. Considering this social phenomenon, I anticipate that the Turkish Hezbollah uses social networks to recruit most of its militants.

On the other hand, the Turkish Hezbollah's legal structures are extremely effective and well-organized especially within state colleges. For example, the Hezbollah provides either free or very low prices for food and shelter to college newcomers. Although, the newcomers may not have any militants within their families, they are brainwashed into the Turkish Hezbollah's house and thus may possibly be recruited. Besides and as discussed by Hirschi (1969), an individual who has a lack of social control is free to commit either terrorist or criminal acts.

To determine the effectiveness of the Turkish Hezbollah's legal structures, I will seek out Turkish Hezbollah members who were away from their families, had no Hezbollah militants among their relatives, and were recruited by the legal structure of the Hezbollah when they were in college. My study is expected to reveal that those groups of students are more likely to be recruited through institutional structures.

Crenshaw (1983) stated that each terrorist group is unique and any study related to them should be researched in the context of their own natural history and culture. Parallel to Crenshaw's argument, Turkey's geographical location as well as its historical

background provides a diversified society (Ozeren, 2004). Therefore, the Turkish Hezbollah should be evaluated within Turkey's strategic structure. Contrary to global Islamist terror groups, the Turkish Hezbollah targets only the Turkish Republic and attempts to change the current regime to Shari'a.

As stated by Karmon (1997), Turkish Hezbollah's members are primarily of Kurdish origin. Here, it is initially important to establish why this group prefers to be part of the terrorist organization and how they are recruited. Although I do not intend to look directly into why this group prefers to be part of the Turkish Hezbollah, it is, however, important to provide demographic information about college students who chose to take part in the terror organization.

According to a study conducted by RAND (2006), manpower is a crucial resource for terrorist organizations in carrying out attacks and sustaining operations. Consequently, hindering the recruitment tactics of terrorist organizations will disable their ability to function. To obstruct the Turkish Hezbollah's recruitment, it is therefore necessary to understand how recruitment works, where recruitment takes place, what are the demographic profiles of recruited students, and discovering the underlying reasons behind why students select to join the Turkish Hezbollah. Obviously, having a clear picture of these recruitment strategies could assist the Turkish government in developing better policies to combat against terrorism.

Parallel to Width and Fahoum's (2006) future research recommendations, I will provide demographic details gathered through the recruited militants themselves. For example, the Turkish Hezbollah members provided detailed information in their self

reports that included their family size, ideology of their relatives, and the process of their families' migrations from one place to another, among other pertinent personal data.

Nichiporuk (2003) stated that high fertility rates, unregulated and unchecked migration flows, and volatile religious and ethnic rivalries can increase terrorist activities. He claimed that the link between demography and the causes of extremism should be broken in order to enhance the victory against terrorism. To Nichiporuk, fertility rates, ethnic/religious composition, internal/international migration, level of capital, and population/environment interactions are very important variables relevant to terrorist activities. My study also provides economic and demographic details to determine what specific motivational factors and underlying reasons lead college students to join the Turkish Hezbollah.

My study is based on the real personal reports which were given to the Turkish Hezbollah by its members. It is my belief that the data are reliable and accurate because the form had clear and easy to understand questions asked of every militant. Importantly, these reports were prepared for the terror organization itself and not meant for the police. In addition to these features, it is believed that every member provided truthful information about themselves given that the Turkish Hezbollah is a religiously motivated organization. Otherwise, their reputation within the terror organization would be diminished. These features increase both the reliability and validity of my data. As mentioned earlier, the unavailability of direct sources related to the militants is one important drawback to any study on terrorism. However, the availability of personal reports in my study is expected to eliminate this criticism.

In my study, I expect to discover effective recruitment strategies that the Turkish Hezbollah uses to recruit college students. In addition, I expect to establish the underlying reasons why the militants chose to participate in the terrorist organization. Considering the ideological background of southeastern Turkey, an individual's religious reasons are anticipated to be the most important issue for joining terrorist activities. Parallel to Crenshaw's (1981) argument, the lack of opportunity for some ideologies may cause terrorist activities.

2.2.1 Definitions of terrorism

Mueller (1979) acknowledged that throughout history, most nations have experienced the phenomenon that is known today as terrorism. According to Crenshaw (1981), the study of terrorism can be structured into three questions: (a) Why does terrorism occur? (b) How does the process of terrorism work? and (c) What are the social and political effects of terrorism?

In the traditional literature, terrorism was categorized into two variations: traditional and revolutionary. Jaspal (2008) argued that while the traditional view considers terrorism to be state originated, the revolutionary view identifies terrorism as a developed protest against political and social injustice and is used as a tool to win freedom and to bring about social and political changes. According to Jaspal, current academic studies characterize terrorism widely as the "weapon of the weak," "violence for effect," and "violence for political purposes."

Although research related to terrorism has a critical and important function to educate the broader public, politicians, and counter terrorism units, these studies have generally failed in their predictive capacity of terrorist events according to the Swedish National Defense College (SNDC) (2006).

While terrorism has existed since the beginning of recorded history, defining the term is problematic (Ferracuti, 1982). Szabo (1979) implied that “terrorism is one of those terms that is difficult to define but easy to use” (p. 5). Depending upon whose point of view is being represented, terrorism has been described in various and controversial ways. For example, terrorism may be referred to by some as a crime and a holy duty, a tactic and a strategy, a justification of reaction against oppression, or an inexcusable abomination (International Terrorism and Security Research, 2009). Thus, the lacking of a common consensus in defining terrorism has created a major dilemma in academic research and has therefore affected future studies and policy development.

According to Victoroff (2005), there are numerous analyses of terrorism that may include political, social, ideological, and economic aspects. Unfortunately, many are typically given less emphasis when compared to security factors in policy formation.

Thus, because there is no single and universally accepted definition of terrorism, the terms used are generally inadequate as well as frequently neglected by terrorism researchers who prefer to cite the basic U.S. Department of State definition (Hudson, 1999) that includes the “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.”

To make an analysis about the Turkish Hezbollah's recruitment strategies, I chose social control and social learning theories that represent two major sociological theories of crime and delinquency. Because terrorist organizations had difficulty in determining their political and monetary support from other countries after September 11, this conjuncture caused terrorist groups to change the types of crimes they committed. For example, to fund their organization, they chose to commit criminal behaviors (e.g., drug trafficking, property crimes, gambling, etc.) that would help them raise funds rather than committing terrorist crimes. Since the types of crimes committed by terrorist groups are generally criminal, I believe that criminological theories can be used to explain terrorism. To support this argument, I will discuss the traditional and post-traditional criminological perspectives in relation to terrorism.

2.2.1.1 Traditional approach

In the traditional approach, divided opinions from both a theoretical and policy making perspective creates the major difference between terrorism and crime. Due to the difference in motivational factors, for instance, some scholars have objections in considering terrorism as a form of crime.

Although terrorists may have diverse motivations such as political, ideological, ethnic, or religious goals, criminals generally look for personal gains. Contrary to criminals who may be motivated to perpetrate crime for its own sake, terrorists commit violence for specific reasons, namely to create self-destructive reactions in a society

(Asal & Wilkenfeld, 2005). Spencer (2006) asserted that when terrorism is used as a politically motivated tactic, the threat or use of force or violence is involved.

By summarizing the differences between criminals and terrorists, Gadek (2008) claimed that there are basic criteria and components that distinguish crime from terrorism that include the following:

- While the terrorist is generally often well trained and state supported, criminals has little backing. Therefore, the violence and level of destruction are much greater in terrorism when compared to criminals. Criminals always seek opportunistic targets. On the other hand, terrorists have a specific goal in mind that is generally more symbolic than opportunistic.
- Contrary to terrorists, criminals run for cover when they are pursued by the police. For example, terrorists generally commit crimes for terrorist propaganda, and they want to be recognized as perpetrators of the crime, and they often enjoy taking credit.

On the other hand, traditional scholars have declared that separate motivations and goals create the differences between crime and terrorism. While terrorism uses violence as a strategy to achieve political goals, it may also be used by those who oppose existing governments (Crenshaw, 2001).

2.2.1.2 Post Traditional Approach

Contrary to the traditional approach, Asal and Wilkenfeld (2005) maintained that there is no motivational difference between terrorists and criminals. As an example, they

claimed that although the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) was formerly a politically motivated terrorist organization, it currently profits from drug trafficking, and its members have always acted criminally to gain financial freedom. This situation is also the case in the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) that remains highly active in the eastern part of Turkey (Candarli, 1999).

Especially over the last decades, political rebels have become criminals while still pretending to be rebels in an effort to recruit new militants by maintaining their legitimate public image. Clearly, most terrorist organizations, including the Lebanese Hezbollah, Al-Qaeda, PKK, and Hamas operate sophisticated fund-raising networks throughout the world (Asal & Wilkenfeld, 2005).

Hamm (2005) revealed that some terrorist groups have traditional sources for funding their activities. However, when those sources dry up, terrorists utilize organized crime to make up the difference. According to Hamm (2005), terrorist groups will increasingly participate in drug trafficking and other illegal activities that will help them to gain money and material, especially with the decline of state-sponsored terrorism.

The Irish Republican Army (IRA) represents one such organization. For example, IRA fund raising efforts were cracked down by the U.S. law enforcement in the early 1970s that caused the organization to search for new sources of revenue. In doing so, the IRA asked its own members to commit crimes with ethnic mobs such as smuggling cars and weapons, running protection, managing underground brothels, et cetera (Dishman, 2001).

Ferracuti (1982) claimed that although terrorists use terror, their goals and motivations remain criminal. Accordingly, their actions begin with legal and accepted forms of dissent such as individual oral protests or petitions that easily progress into illegal but often tolerated acts (e.g., violent demonstrations, vandalism, or property seizures). Eventually, these actions escalate to unacceptable and illegal behavior where sabotage, personal assaults, bombings, and kidnappings occur. Considering their final actions, Ferracuti stated that because most of the terrorists' actions are criminal, they should be approached as criminals.

In discussing the issue that terrorism often involves various kinds of crime including kidnappings, arson, murder, and conspiracy, Ferracuti (1982) further claimed that it is very difficult to make a distinction between terrorism and crime. Koseli (2008) further stated that besides being involved in the same illegal activities, other similarities between terrorists and criminals include the actions and tactics employed by both groups.

In the field, I believe that terrorism is an evolving phenomenon that requires developing technology, a common understanding to prevent terrorism, motivations, financing, and support mechanisms, especially after the September 11 attacks proved that a global effort is crucial in minimizing terrorism. Today, most countries have realized that those which underestimate terrorism or have sympathy toward particular terrorist groups can be the starting point of a devastating attack to those countries. Because all terrorist groups think that the only way to reveal their ideology to the public is to kill more people, this understanding may be overturned in countries that create safe havens to terrorist groups. Especially when terrorist groups have no other chance to commit crimes

inside other countries, this will be the case. Therefore, minimizing terrorism requires maximum cooperation and serious information-sharing with other countries. Each terrorist organization should be researched and supported from a reliable and objective academic perspective.

Willis, Evans, and LaGrange (1999) argued that most current criminological theories are applied to specific cases, and any generalization may be nil given that they are attributed to different geographic locations. According to Willis et al., however, there are always exceptions and alternative theories may better explain the phenomena.

The Handbook on Criminal Justice Responses to Terrorism prepared by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (2007) suggested that a strong criminal justice element is crucial to an effective and prevention-focused response to terrorism that should consist of a broad range of short- and long-term plans that address the underlying conditions that help to spread terrorism. As mentioned earlier, the war against terrorism should include global efforts and cooperation. Considering the campaign's broad experience in promoting and facilitating international cooperation, its operational capacity and field expertise point to the criminal justice system as one of the most effective academic areas to combat terrorism.

From this perspective, I believe that social control and social learning theories are two important criminological theories that should help to identify whether social networks or institutional structures best explain the Turkish Hezbollah's recruitment method.

As discussed earlier, treating terrorists as problematic personalities does not solve the terrorism problem. Rather, their behaviors should be studied through societal influences that may lead researchers to scrutinize the militant's social network. In my study, social learning theory is expected to provide an in-depth analysis related to the Turkish Hezbollah militant's recruitment patterns and strategies.

On the other hand, social control theory in my study is hypothesized to explain the Turkish Hezbollah's process involved in the recruitment of college students. Parallel to the arguments of social control theory, my study includes college students who are away from their families and have weak social bonds. From this perspective, I anticipate that social control theory will be the best criminological theory to clarify the recruitment pattern of college students.

2.3 Social Learning and Social Control Theories

Although there are differences of opinion as to how terrorism and criminality are related, both social learning and social control theories can be applied to research concerning why individuals join terrorist groups because each theory explains the reasons that certain individuals may be prone to engage in crime. As mentioned above, both theories are expected to reveal important tactics and methods relating to recruitment strategies of the Turkish Hezbollah.

2.3.1 Social learning theory

There are several criminological theories that offer an explanation as to why individuals engage in criminal behavior (Akers, 1977; Hirschi, 1969). Social learning is one theory that has important tools which describe criminal behaviors. According to Akers (1979), the modeling and imitation research conducted by Bandura and Barab (1973) provides important contributions to this theory.

Social learning theory suggests that behavior is learned not only through direct experience but also through observation of one's environment. In other words, people learn by observing other people's behavior, outcomes, and attitudes. Akers et al. (1979) pointed out that the more individuals delineate criminal behavior as good (positive definition) or at least justify or neutralize the behavior as unwanted (negative definition), the more likely they are to engage in crime. Bandura (1973) claimed that most human behavior is learned by observation through modeling. For example, while people are learning others' behavior, they have interaction with significant groups wherein they evaluate their norms, attitudes, and orientations as good or bad. These behaviors are generally verbal and cognitive which can be directly reinforced or they may be stimuli for other behavior. Bandura (2005) schematized the social learning theory as shown in Figure 1.




Figure 1. Social learning theory as schematized by Bandura (2005)

While developing his general sociological theory of crime and delinquency, Edwin H. Sutherland relied heavily upon the work of Shaw and McKay, Chicago school theorists (Akers, 2004). Ecological and cultural transmission theory, symbolic interactionism, and culture had an impact on the formulation of Sutherland's theory. In 1947, Sutherland revised the final version of his theory based on nine postulates:

1. Criminal behavior is learned.
2. Criminal behavior is learned through interaction with other persons in a process of communication.
3. The principal part of the learning of criminal behavior occurs within intimate personal groups.

4. When criminal behavior is learned, the learning includes: (a) techniques of committing the crime that are sometimes very complicated, sometimes simple; and (b) the specific direction of motives, drives, rationalizations, and attitudes.

5. The specific direction of motives and drives is learned from definitions of the legal codes as favorable or unfavorable.

6. A person becomes delinquent because of an excess of definitions favorable to violation of the law over definitions unfavorable to violation of the law.

7. Differential associations may vary in frequency, duration, priority, and intensity.

8. The process of learning criminal behavior by association with criminal and anticriminal patterns involves all of the mechanisms that are involved in any other learning.

9. While criminal behavior is an expression of general needs and values, it is not explained by those general needs and values since noncriminal behavior is an expression of the same needs and values.

Social learning theory is a modified and clarified version of Sutherland's differential association theory that consists of two basic elements. *First*, to commit a crime, specific techniques are needed to be learned from criminals. *Second*, interaction with others provides appropriate drives, motives, attitudes, and rationalization for law violations (Vold et al., 2002).

According to Akers (2004), Sutherland's eighth principle asserts that criminal behavior involves all mechanisms of learning; however, Akers failed to identify them. To

create the social learning theory, Burgess and Akers (1966) retained all the principles of Sutherland's differential association theory and combined them with differential reinforcement and other principles of behavioral acquisition, continuation, and cessation in addition to adding more concepts taken from behavioral learning theory (e.g., differential reinforcement, discriminative stimuli and internal stimuli, and schedules of reinforcement). They contended that criminal behavior is learned in the same way that any other behavior is learned and may be explained through the rewards or punishment a person receives from his or her environment (Orcutt, 2002).

According to research conducted by Jessor, Graves, Hanson, & Jessor (1968), individuals who are tolerant or show positive attitudes toward illegal substance usage are much more likely to use illegal drugs than are those who have negative attitudes toward substance use. Peer and parental influences were also two important variables found to have either a positive or negative effect on teenage drug behaviors. In addition, Jessor et al.'s research revealed that teenagers who have a relationship with peers who are users initially learn the definition and jargon that is favorable to use of illegal substances and, in turn, they begin to use them.

Akers (2004) pointed out that social learning theory is not competitive with differential association theory but rather represents a broader version. Research evidence that supports Sutherland's differential association theory also supports social learning theory. Akers further maintained that social learning theory explains criminal and delinquent behavior more thoroughly than Sutherland's differential association theory. According to Akers' theory, much learning between humans occurs in nonsocial

situations and social interactions by observing the consequences of people's behavior from others. Akers' social learning theory focused on the following four major concepts (Vold et al., 2002):

1. Differential association refers to direct and indirect association and interaction with others who engage in certain kinds of behavior or express values, norms, and attitudes. These patterns of interactions with others may result in either unfavorable or favorable reactions to violating the law (Akers & Jensen, 2005).

2. According to Akers (2004), definitions reflect the meanings of one's own behavior. They may be more right or wrong, desirable or undesirable, appropriate or inappropriate, good or bad (Vold et al., 2002).

3. Differential reinforcement refers to the balance of actual or anticipated rewards and punishments that may be consequences of the behavior (Akers & Jensen, 2005).

4. Imitation is the act that comes after observation. The individual observes a behavior from others and then engages in a similar behavior. According to Akers (2004), the imitated behavior is influenced by the characteristics of the model, the observed behavior, and the observed consequences of the behavior.

Hughbank and Hughbank (2009) stated that social learning theory is the persuasion that makes people aggressive by observing others behavior to achieve an illegal goal or be rewarded as a result of committing violent acts. According to Hughbank and Hughbank, social learning theory was initially developed for criminal justice practitioners to learn an individual's behavior in an environment that encourages violent and unstrained conduct. However, when terrorism became a worldwide problem, social

learning theory could be further used to explain and examine how terrorist organizations recruit new militants. In addition, the theory could help to identify how individuals seek personal acceptance within a terrorist organization through union safety, fellowship, and solidarity.

Parallel to Hughbank and Hughbank's (2009) argument, Ryan, Vanderlick, and Matthews (2009) concurred that terrorism is learned behavior which is taught through specific ways. Saper (1988) claimed that because terrorism is a learned behavior, it does not result from a dysfunctional or problematic personality but rather is generally a result of societal influences and unique learning experiences. In this theory, aggression is viewed as a learned behavior, and through observation one may learn the consequences of the behavior. Oots and Wiegele (1985) contended that if aggression is viewed as learned behavior, then terrorism—a specific type of aggressive behavior—can also be learned.

Ryan et al. (2009) claimed that contrary to the general perception of terrorism, while achieving a political goal is the primary objective, harming others is the secondary objective. According to Ryan et al., numerous researchers believe that the ultimate goal of terrorists is not to terrorize any society but to use terrorism as a tool to legitimize political goals when diplomacy fails to meet their needs. Gaynor (2002) concluded that whether religious, political, or otherwise, learned ideological values are simply antecedents to terrorist behavior which does not prove that terrorists have personality defects. Crenshaw (1988) also accepted that terrorism is a rational behavior based on the

learned belief that violence to achieve political goals is effective, feasible, and even morally justified in the eyes of the perpetrators.

According to Rabbie (1991), demographic variables such as age, sex, and occupation are oversimplified and that many, perhaps most, terrorists are normal people who are typically young males from the middle or professional classes. Ferracuti (1982) also attempted to make generalizations regarding the Italian Red Brigade terrorists by concluding that they are politically and actively controlled with no specific difference in their family backgrounds. From the psychological perspective, these two studies revealed that there is no notable difference between criminals and terrorists. Similar to Rabbie's findings, Crenshaw (1988) concluded that terrorist behavior is strategically rational and stems from the learned belief that is used to justify terrorism in a feasible, effective, and moral way.

Bandura's (1998) social learning theory of aggression states that observation and imitation of an aggressive model are followed by violence and this theory helps to explain reconstructed moral imperatives. Teenagers who are in the middle of political conflict may witness terrorist behaviors and they may imitate them through their culture's public praise of terrorists. Through this process, religion maybe used to justify terrorist behaviors.

Victoroff (2005) asserted that audiovisual tapes, compact disks, books, and web sites are some of the tools that terrorists use to justify their killings, assault, and behavior. He infers that the social learning can influence some young students toward terrorism.

For example, the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) states the importance of jihad through its publication as follows (Alexander, 2002, 57):

“We must imprint on the minds of generations of Muslims that the Palestinian problem is a religious one . . . I indeed wish to go to war for the sake of Allah! I will assault and kill, assault and kill, assault and kill.”

Porta (1990) interviewed 28 imprisoned Marxist terrorists to determine how they were recruited and the reasons for joining the terrorist group. The following two points summarize her findings:

- For most of the terrorists, ideological commitment did not play a significant role in choosing to join the terrorist organization.
- Living in the same neighborhood and hanging out in the same places were more important for most of the terrorists.

Most research that has been conducted on social learning theory has revealed strong to moderate support between social learning variables and delinquent, criminal, and deviant behavior (Akers & Jensen, 2005). Akers et al. stated that in comparison to other theories, when social learning theory is tested against other theories by using the same data, generally but not always, the dependent variable gives more support in explaining deviant behaviors.

Similar to the perspective held by other social learning theory scholars, I argue that any individual’s perception of crime may change depending on the social network in which the person grew up. In short, having criminals in one’s social network increases the likelihood of an individual’s involvement in criminal activities.

Through social learning theory, my study is designed for me to answer the following question: “How strong is the Turkish Hezbollah’s social structure in recruiting more militants?” Parallel to Porta’s (1990) findings, I anticipate that most Turkish militants are more likely to be recruited through social networks as opposed to the Hezbollah’s institutional structures. For example, being active in the more conservative area of Turkey, the Hezbollah has an advantage over the religious order to respect one’s elders.

As discussed by Laciner (2007), religion is one of the most important mediators in Turkey’s social life, and the Hezbollah is one of the fundamentalist religious terrorist organizations in the country. Thus, religion is used by this terror group to recruit more militants. To achieve this goal, the group intends to recruit new militants through its social networks by presenting religious talks within mosques or in its nongovernmental legal organizations. In addition, one militant within any family is used as a Trojan effect in which the remaining family members create an easy target for the Turkish Hezbollah. Uslu (2007) inferred that the Turkish Hezbollah urges its militants to pursue younger family members to become a part of its organization.

Parallel to above argument, if social learning theory is more accurate in explaining the Turkish Hezbollah’s recruitment strategies, then my study should reveal that social networks rather than institutional structures are the best tools used to recruit more militants.

2.3.2 Social Control Theory

Social control theory explains the direct relationship between social bonds and crime that can be summarized in one statement: The weaker the social bond, the more likely an individual is to commit crime. However, there are many explanations to describe the actual meaning of social control theory, and an agreed upon definition differs among scholars as summarized below:

- Social control is the use of power with the goal of influencing the behaviors of others (Wood, 1974).
- Social control involves persuading individuals to believe, do, think, and feel as others want them to (Lumbey, 1924).
- Parsons (1951) referred to institutional means in terms of social control but constructed more physical aspects to society's power by describing social control's mechanism as *"a motivational process in one or more individual actors which tends to counteract a tendency to deviate"* (p. 206).
- Social control theory emphasizes the role of control in terms of counteracting delinquency and states that strong social bonds hinder delinquency (Booth et al., 2008).

Hirschi's (1969) social control theory was the first fully developed social bonding theory, and because the theory takes a more prosocial approach, it is particularly attractive to most scholars (Andriot, 2005). According to Andriot, social control theory does not try to explain why individuals commit criminal acts but rather attempts to explain why individuals prefer to conform to conventional norms.

Vold et al. (2002) asserted that many theories of crime and delinquency assume that people generally obey rules if they are left to their own will, and there are various biological, psychological, or social special forces that may drive them to commit crime.

Control theories, however, take the opposite side by stating that all individuals are natural animals and if left to their own devices, they are prone to commit crime. Thus, the key question for control theorists becomes: “Why do people not commit crime?” In answer, control theorists focus mainly on social forces that intercept persons from committing crime. Therefore, the main hidden point behind not committing crime is the weakness of forces that restrain people from doing so. Similar to this argument, being away from social networks increases the likelihood of becoming recruited by terrorist organizations.

Hirschi (1969) assumed that everyone has the potential to become delinquent and criminal, and social controls—not moral values—maintain law and order. According to the social control assumption, individuals will engage in delinquent behavior when their social bond to society is weakened (Alston, Harley, & Lenhoff, 1995). Thus, with a lack of social control, it is possible for an individual to commit either terrorist or criminal acts. Hirschi’s social bond concept is comprised of the following four elements: (a) attachment, (b) commitment, (c) involvement, and (d) belief.

2.3.2.1 Attachment

Attachment refers to the strong ties between individuals and parents and their schools and peers. Hirschi (1969) stated that as the individual has stable and strong attachments to others within a society, he or she is far less likely to commit delinquent

behavior. Conversely, weak attachments and unconcerned behavior about others' wishes cause individuals to deviate from social expectations. According to Hirschi's findings, attachment to schools and parents are the most important contributing factors to hinder the commitment of crimes (Andriot, 2005).

2.3.2.2 Commitment

The concept of commitment assumes that in a society, a person's interests and benefits are at risk if he or she is engaged in criminal acts, because most people acquire their reputation and prosperity from the society in which they live. In 1957, Jackson Toby introduced the concept of "stakes at conformity" by arguing that all youths are tempted to break the law; however, some risk much more than others when they surrender to those temptations. For example, youths who do well in school not only risk being punished if they break the law but they also jeopardize their future careers. In other words, they have high "stakes at conformity."

According to Andriot (2005), commitment refers to future aspirations in which school grade is a strong measure. For example, an individual who is willing to participate in society by becoming educated, creating a positive reputation, and starting a family will be less likely to commit delinquent behavior due to the consequences of losing his or her positive social role (Hirschi, 1969).

2.3.2.3 Involvement

The involvement element proposes that if a youngster is engaged in conventional activities (e.g., school clubs and associations, sports, etc.), he or she is less likely to participate in criminal activities (Andriot, 2005). In other words, it is assumed that the more an individual is simply too busy being involved in positive activities, the less likely he or she will find time to engage in delinquent behavior (Hirschi, 1969). Sutherland also shared the same view that joining conventional activities is a major deterrent for committing crimes. A Turkish proverb best explains the importance of involvement:

“The devil tempts all other men, but that idle men tempt the devil.”

2.3.2.4 Belief

Belief describes individuals who accept the validity of rules and those who enforce the rules (Andriot, 2005). School rules and teachers are good examples. The theory infers that if individuals agree with societal norms, they are more likely to obey them.

According to Hirschi (1969), there is variation in an individual’s perception of obeying societal rules. The absence or weakness of intimate relations with others—especially parents in most cases—causes the affect of belief to decrease.

Andriot (2005) inferred that conformity is achieved when individuals bond to society through each of the four elements (attachment, commitment, involvement, and belief). He added that the stronger the bond, the more likely are individuals to refrain from committing crimes.

Hirschi (1969) tested his theory against social strain (the motivation aspect) and Sutherland's or Miller's theory (cultural or group influence). Contrary to strain theory, or when individuals cannot successfully reach their goals, they experience pressure which may cause them to commit crime (Cullen & Agnew, 2003), Hirschi found no general relationship between delinquent acts and social class. Further, racial differences did not play a significant role in self reported delinquency (Vold et al., 2002). Hirschi's analysis of attachment to parents, schools and peers found that scoring low on parental bonds showed the possibility of scoring high for crime (Leiber, 2007). Although Hirschi's findings supported the control theory, they were inconsistent with cultural theories. In further support of the control theory, he found that youths who were unsuccessful in school were more likely to commit crime.

Contrary to the findings of strain theory, Hirschi (1969) analyzed the effects of attachment to parents, schools, and peers on reported delinquents. Regardless of race or class, and regardless of the delinquency of their friends, Hirschi found that boys who were more closely attached to their parents were less likely to report committing delinquent acts than those who had less close parental attachments (Vold et al., 2002). According to Hirschi, peers do not play important roles for committing and hindering crime (Leiber, 2007).

Although there are numerous scholars who support social control theory, some have criticized Hirschi's theory. For example, Wiatrowski, Griswold, and Roberts (1981) argued that there is no simultaneous or direct relationship between attachment, commitment, involvement, and belief as Hirschi claimed. Rather, the relationship is more

complex and hierarchical. According to Wiatrowski et al., Hirschi did not explain how his four elements might work simultaneous to affect the possibility of delinquent behavior. They further argued that an in-depth analysis of the social bonding elements revealed that there was very little effect of commitment on delinquent behavior. However, compared to the other elements, belief was a very strong mediator for delinquency, and parental and school attachments decreased the likelihood of committing crime.

Junger and Marshall (1997) conducted a study consisting of Turkish, Surinamese, Moroccan, and Dutch male youths to determine whether or not social control theory was applicable to cross-ethnic lines. Consistent with social control theory predictions, they found that the theory measured family integration, school integration, beliefs, and leisure time activities. They concluded that within each of the ethnic groups, a strong bond to society is a protector against delinquent behavior whereas a weak bond results in higher levels of delinquent behaviors.

Akers (1994) considered social control theory to be one of the best theories that provide explanations regarding juvenile delinquency. Because my study relates to college educated students or college newcomers who are between ages of 18 to 30, I predict that social control theory may best reveal how Turkish Hezbollah militants are recruited.

In accordance to social control theory, terrorism emerges from a social response to perceived deviance that stems from underspecific and observable structural conditions (Messner & Rosenfeld, 2004). McCord (2004) further stated that lack of cultural norms

and values decreases an individual's responsibility. Simply stated, individuals who display ineffective or weak social ties make easy targets for terrorist groups.

Britt and Gottfredson (2003) contended that in order to better understand terrorism, the issue should be rightfully studied within the realm of criminology. They further stated that to achieve political ends, terrorism is related to certain elements of low social control.

Similar to other terrorist organizations in Turkey, Hezbollah effectively uses its broad social structure. For example, Muslim associations, mosques, propaganda, publications, and foundations are only some of the tools employed (Kardon, 1998). Earlier, Karmon (1997) found that the Turkish Hezbollah supports its effective recruitment strategies within universities by indoctrinating militants through its radical publications. Typically, students who are living a far distance from their families are especially vulnerable and thus easily manipulated into participating in the organization. In this regard, if social control theory is more accurate in explaining Turkish Hezbollah's recruitment process, then my study should expect to show that when compared to social networks, institutional structures are the best tools that the Turkish Hezbollah employ to successfully recruit more militants.

As discussed earlier, the Turkish Hezbollah is located primarily in the eastern part of Turkey that is dominated by the Kurdish people. Because the area is surrounded by Iranians and Arabs, the Kurds have significant exposure to the Persian and Arabic language resulting in *madrassa* (seminary) education being widespread in the region

(Cakir, 2007). In addition, an Islamic identity helps in the development of a strong clergy class with titles including *mele*, *sheikh*, and *sayyed*.

When individuals' bonds to society are central, social control theories hold that marginalization of certain individuals is increased while social bonds are more structural and weak. Considering all the world religions, Islamic countries have stronger religious institutions. According to Willis et al. (1999) individuals who have weak bonds to society may also be prone to greater deviance and criminality. Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) also found that ineffective parenting can be the result of an individual's low self-control.

If social control theory is more accurate, I expect to find that Turkish Kurds who have weak bonds and weak religious ideologies will be the most likely college students to be recruited by the Hezbollah through institutional structures.

2.4 Recruitment Theories and Recruitment Patterns of Terror Organizations

A clear understanding of the Turkish Hezbollah's recruitment process and tactics used that are revealed in my study may assist governments in developing effective strategies that will hinder the efforts of terrorist organizations to enlist more militants. Importantly, a combination of theories and overall patterns related to the recruitment tactics are also provided.

According to Gerwehr and Daly (2006), terrorist organizations must use specific recruitment tactics given that there is little room for error and failure in the process that may lead to severe consequences for the terrorists. Because there is no single method that fits all terrorist organizations, their tactics may differ accordingly. As suggested by

Gerwehr and Daly, the following theoretical literature related to recruitment reveals a few common structures.

2.4.1 The Political Process Model

McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, (1996) stated that the political process model proposes three factors that scrutinize social movement: (a) the framing process, (b) mobilizing structures, and (c) the political process model.

The framing process can create the perception of injustice toward a situation and the possibility of changing injustice through group work that may motivate people to participate in illegal movements. According to Qi (2005), mobilizing structures may facilitate the recruitment movement. Finally, political opportunity relates to the shifting power between challengers or participants of a social movement and the government. Thus, the stability problem may create power changes between these groups.

2.4.2 Differential Recruitment Theory

According to Snow, Zurcher, and Eklandolson (1983, the differential recruitment theory attempts to determine why one individual becomes involved in terrorist activities while another remains inactive. Qi (2005) inferred that micro structural factors such as personal and organizational ties and social networks are the most significant variables related to an individual's participation in social movements, and a personal connection between potential recruits, movement activists, and personal ties are the most common

predictors. According to this theory, the following process between recruiters and recruits includes:

- (1) *Define the objectives for movement organizations or activities;*
- (2) *Define recruitment needs based on these objectives: whom and how many does the organization or the activity need to recruit to achieve the defined objectives?*
- (3) *Define the means of reaching the target population and solicit application;*
- (4) *Reach the target population and solicit applications with defined and undefined means;*
- (5) *The screening process;*
- (6) *Admission;*
- (7) *Applicants accept or reject admission; and*
- (8) *Evaluate the recruitment result and adjust recruitment strategies for the next round of recruitment (Klandermans & Oegema, 1987).*

Although there are some differences according to the society's cultural and sociological background, it is possible to observe that most of the tactics used by terrorist groups are similar.

Gerwehr and Daly (2006) claimed that effective recruitment strategies should be based on the target and its social, historical, and cultural context. This is especially necessary for illegal and marginal groups given the consequences that getting caught may create severe results for the terror groups; thus, the possibility of making an error should be minimized. Consequently, while terrorist groups maintain access to the target

population, nearly all groups must disguise their activities by changing their dress, meeting places, use of language, types of activities, and names to avoid any interference from official authorities. Although there are a vast variety of recruitment tactics, a review of empirical literature on terrorist groups reveals some basic structures.

2.4.3 The Net Method

In this pattern, the target population is equitably engaged. Some of the used recruitment strategies have included sending videotapes to every student or inviting them to weekend activities. This approach is often used when there is minor opposition in the target population to the terrorist organization. The net model is widely used by Al-Qaeda and has been proven more effective in Pakistan. My study is expected to find that the net model is also widely used by the Turkish Hezbollah through its legal structures. Similar to Al-Qaeda, the Turkish Hezbollah generally uses mosques to gather large populations.

2.4.4 The Funnel Method

The funnel model is used when a recruiter believes that a target population is ready for motivation and propaganda. Through this approach, identity building and validation of commitment are structured by the terrorist organization. This technique is effective within radically polarized groups.

2.4.5 The Infection Method

Generally, a target population is isolated or may be very difficult for the terror organization to reach. To infiltrate within the target population, a trusted agent may be inserted into the group in order to have a direct and personal connection. This method is more likely to be successful in recruiting targets such as the military and police. For example, an infiltrator may covert selected targets who are dissatisfied with their jobs. The infection method is more successful in an environment such as Tanzania or Kenya.

2.4.6 The Seed Crystal

The target population may be so inaccessible that the trusted agent may not be put into this situation. In this case, recruiters may look forward to provide a context for self recruitment. If this method is successful in recruiting new militants, they often follow the infection pattern.

Hamilton (2000) inferred that a low level of self-control and social control may combine to influence individuals to commit crime. According to Hamilton, inner (self components) and external (social structure) pressures and seductions lead to a path of deviant behavior. Parallel to the discussions on differential recruitment theory, Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) asserted that motivation towards crime is constant for every individual and his or her low social bonds compel these impulses. In my study, I infer that low self-control and social control change an individual's perception of social movements, and the change may cause the individual to be an easy target for terrorist organizations. Pinkley (2004) stated that poor, naïve single men who are desperate

individuals with low social bonds are vulnerable to brainwashing and recruitment into terror.

In the social learning perspective, changes in rates of crime are largely dependent upon early learning experiences. This theory assumes that any individual who lives in a crime or terror-praised society is more likely to be recruited by criminal or terror groups. According to social learning theory, social structure plays a significant role in one's decision as to whether or not commit crime. As discussed by Vold et al. (2002), ideas and behaviors may be learned and those behaviors may be supportive of delinquency within a particular group. In my research, I expect that social networks will prove to have a very important influence on college students who live in the south eastern part of Turkey.

2.5 Recruitment Strategies of Other Terrorist Organizations in the World

In Gerwehr and Daly's (2006) study, how Al-Qaeda recruits its militants revealed that potential participants are generally persuaded through media channels, local networks (peer groups and relatives), or institutional structures (such as mosques and legally established college associations). According to Gerwehr and Daly, Al-Qaeda searches out people who are dissatisfied with their jobs or resentful toward police or military organizations. Media channels are used for organizing meetings and other activities to reach larger groups. Contrary to Al-Qaeda, media channels are less likely to be used by the Turkish Hezbollah considering the technological improvement of the region. Besides, Turkey has very strict rules that forbid media terrorism propaganda .

A recent study conducted in 2009 by the International Crisis Group revealed that the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), a separatist movement active in northern Malaysia (Wikipedia, 2009), recruits young Malay Muslims primarily from private Islamic schools. Contrary to my expectations, the Turkish Hezbollah recruits more militants from state colleges than from private ones, whereas BRN recruitment efforts are more effective in private colleges. According to the International Crisis Group, this difference stems from BRN's ideology that represents an ethno-nationalist insurgency which aims to reclaim independence of Patani Sultanate. Because BRN is nationalist terrorist organization, local private schools provide the organization with tremendous support.

Similar to Al-Qaeda and BRN, the Turkish Hezbollah effectively uses social networks and institutional structures to recruit militants. When comparing BRN and Al-Qaeda to the Turkish Hezbollah, Northern Malaysian inhabitants provide a great amount of support to BRN activities, and terrorism is praised within the society. Although the Turkish Hezbollah does not enjoy such strong support in the southeastern part of Turkey, having militants within any family has the Trojan effect for the Turkish Hezbollah. For example, after having militant(s) within any social group, other members become easy targets for the Turkish Hezbollah to recruit new militants. The religious role to respect elders is especially used as a tool to create effective propaganda within that group(s).

Al-Qaeda's strategy to recruit new militants also has common similarities with the Turkish Hezbollah. Like Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah has well-organized legal structures that allows the organization to hold meetings and other social activities to create a chance to spread propaganda over crowded populations.

2.6 Religion and Terrorism

The ideology of religious warfare not only gives individuals the illusion of empowerment, but also provides public attention and importance to the religious organizations and ideas. Although each of the terrorist groups has its own distinctive history and culture, they have three common ideologies (Juergensmeyer, 2002). First, they reject the idea of compromising with liberal values and secular institutions. Second, radical religious movements refuse secular society's boundaries that keep religion private rather than intruding into public life. Finally, religious movements attempt to create a new form of religiosity that rejects weak modern substitutes for the more vibrant and demanding forms of religion.

Sageman (2004) contended that brotherhood, mutual sharing, and spiritual support are the basic tools of religious terrorist groups in recruiting new militants. Sageman added that the religious group causes a delineating function for its newly recruited militants in ways that are not seen within other rival political movements. Berman and Laitin (2008) concluded that contrary to other terrorist groups, a promise of rewards in the afterlife is one of the effective motivating forces for possible targets. I believe that religiosity level is one of the important variables that increase the likelihood of becoming recruited.

Especially over the last decades, violent radical religious groups have become a serious global threat. Ozeren (2004) pointed out that although religious faith itself does

not cause violence and terrorist activities, it is, unfortunately, interpreted to justify an attack on social structure.

Ideology and altruism play significant roles for religious terrorist groups. Especially during the first phase, commitment to terrorist organization's goals and spiritual benefits of supporting a good cause are sufficient incentives for many militants (Juergensmeyer, 2004).

Similar to the definition of terrorism, there is no consensus in defining religious terrorism. According to Perlmutter (2004), each scholar has his or her own definition. Therefore, I prefer to use the Federal Bureau of Investigation and State Department's definition:

“Religious terrorism is defined as any act of violence or threatened use of violence by a group or individual with the intent of intimidating individuals, citizens or governments in the furtherance of religious objectives.”

Rapoport (1999) identified four waves of modern terrorism where each has its own ideological identity. In order to make a comparison between religious and other types of terrorism, it is useful to discuss these waves. According to Rapoport (2004) the following four waves illustrate the general ideological trends in terrorism over the past 130 years:

- *The wave of anarchist violence* was anarchistic in character and is considered to be the first global terrorist experience. The main characteristics of this wave were political assassinations where terrorist groups were expected to ignite a popular uprising by targeting specific political representatives. According to the European Research Project (ERP) (2008), this wave was quite effective

that caused President Roosevelt to “ask in December 1901 for international treaties among all civilized powers to make anarchism a crime against the law of nations and to empower the federal government to deal with this crime.”

According to ERP, this was the first call for an international battle against anarchist terrorism, 100 years prior to President George W. Bush’s call for a war on religious terrorism.

- *The anticolonial wave* emerged in the 1920s that stemmed from the Treaty of Versailles which was signed in 1919. After having victory against old empires, the European victors did not allow ethnic groups to have independent states. As a result, terrorist groups appeared in Palestine. The anticolonial wave diminished with the fall of the colonial empires in the 1950s.
- *The new-left wave* emerged in the 1960s. According to ERP’s report, the Western political climate that was characterized by the Vietnam War and cold war was the main reason for this wave. Terrorist groups were active in Latin America, the United States, and Europe. Political conflict within states caused terror groups to locate state sponsors such as Libya, Iran, and the Soviet Union for example. The end of the cold war that resulted in a decrease of state sponsored terrorism was the main reason behind the dwindling of this wave.
- *Religious wave*: Rapport (2004) stated that the Iranian revolution and the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union comprised the root causes of the

religious wave. For example, religion was used as an ideological justification to sustain terrorist attacks. Although there were other religions used as a tool to justify the terrorist attacks, most scholars argued that this wave was predominantly characterized by fundamentalist Islamist terrorism. The main specification in this wave was the existence of suicide terrorism.

Thompson (2006) briefly schematized the differences between the third wave and fourth wave as shown in Figure 2.

	Third Wave	Fourth Wave
Primary Strategy	Hijackings, Kidnappings, Assassinations.	Attacks on antagonists and their symbols, suicide bombers (beheadings).
Target Identity	Governments in general with increasing focus on U.S. as patron of conservative regimes.	Strong focus on U.S., Israel and secular regimes with Muslim population.
Special Characteristics	Increased international training/cooperation/sponsorship.	Casualty escalation, decline in number of terrorist groups.

Figure 2. Comparing the differences between the third and fourth waves.

Contrary to other terrorist groups, religious terrorist leaders encourage newly recruited militants to participate in terrorist violence by holding out the promise of heavenly rewards or retribution. Some militants choose to participate in terrorist activities because of the fear of being punished an after life. The leaders provide cash payments

after successful operations. They also promise to provide money to the families of martyrs in return for their deadly attacks (Juergensmeyer, 2004).

According to Juergensmeyer (2004), when compared to other terrorist groups, religious terrorism is more violent and brutal because the leaders legitimize their actions as morally and spiritually right. Hoffman (1993) also concurred that approximately a quarter of all terrorist groups and half of the most dangerous groups in the world are motivated mainly by religious concerns.

On the other hand, Emerson and Hartman (2006) contended that with modernization of the world, the role of religion becomes smaller and smaller while secularization becomes more socially acceptable, and religious faith becomes more individualized. Social life is regulated according to policies and procedures, administrative rules, science, et cetera. Contrary to the viewpoint of secularists, however, religion is resurging around the globe, and some religious people endeavor to fortify the borders of religion. Emerson and Hartman claimed that as fundamentalist movements can be found in the Middle East, Africa, North America, Asia, and Latin America, every religion can be used to justify terrorist activities.

Moghaddam (2008) inferred that violent extremism is one of the leading problems in contemporary societies. According to Ozeren (2004), there should be three circumstances to motivate believers to shift their behaviors towards violent action: (a) perception of threat to believers' values; (b) theology should be transformed into a dogma produced through textual interpretation; and (c) violence should be embraced as a means for preserving faith in believers.

Noyon (2003) pointed out that Islam and democracy are compatible, and democratic participation encourages moderation. Noyon also maintained that the absence of democratic politics and Islamist violence are related. On the other hand, Dalacoura (2006) stated that the casual link between the democratic deficit and Islamist terrorism is not proven and needs further research. According to Dalacoura, there is no simple casual relationship between democracy and terrorism in the world. In her study, she defined the following three types of Islamist terrorism.

2.6.1 Transnational Islamist Terrorism: Al Qaeda

The lack of political pluralism and opportunity for participation in the political system, civil liberties, and repression of the regimes are a few of the reasons for transnational terrorism.

2.6.2 Islamist Terrorism and National Liberation: Hezbollah and Hamas

Unlike transnational Islamist terrorism, Hezbollah and Hamas are complex political and social movements. For example, Hezbollah plays an increasingly important political and social role in Lebanon, and the organization participates in national elections as a political party that caused its leadership to move away from insisting on *sharia* law. Similar to Hezbollah, Hamas is a social and political movement as well as a terrorist organization.

2.6.3 Terrorism and domestic Islamist insurgencies: the Turkish Hezbollah and the Islamic Action Front

These types of terrorism emerged in the context of domestic insurgencies against established governments. The political exclusion and repression of the Islamist movement created a casual link between terrorism and democracy. For example, excluding an indiscriminate repression of the Islamic Action Front (FIS) from the Algerian democratic system led some of its members to join radical Islamist groups.

Similar to FIS, the Turkish Hezbollah believes that the Islamist movement was excluded from the Turkish political system. Velioglu, the founder and previous leader of the Turkish Hezbollah who was killed in 2000, stated that Muslims are merely oppressed by the current regimes, and if regimes are destroyed by Islamic movements and replaced by Islamic states, the problem would be solved to a great extent (Atalar, 2006). Similar to FIS leaders, Velioglu tried to participate in the Turkish political system; however, he did not get a chance to reveal his religious ideology to the broader public.

Beginning in the 1980s, the Turkish Hezbollah emerged and attempted to address its ideological goals. According to Nugent (2004), the Turkish Hezbollah intended to replace the secular and constitutional Turkish state with an Islamic law (*seriat*) based state. To achieve this goal, the Turkish Hezbollah tried to get support from Iran and sent most of its leaders to Iran for military, political, and religious training. According to Hezbollah's ideology, there were three steps to be followed:

- Propaganda (*teblig*): People should be persuaded to adopt Islamic rules that lead to Islamic state and administration.

- Community (*cemaat*): The community should be restructured according to the requirements of the first stage.
- Armed struggle (*jihad*): The Islamic way of life should be safeguarded through armed struggle.

Throughout history, terrorist groups have used not only Islam but also other religions as a justification for their vicious activities (George, 2006). Consistent with George, I believe that terrorism is not a war for religion but a war for power. For example, religion is one of the most important tools used by terrorist organizations to obtain more power or to keep what power they have.

In my study, I will discuss the importance of political participation to minimize terrorist activities through various ideologies. To me, the more that ideology takes part in the political system, fewer arguments will be used to legitimize terrorist activities appears to be a common consensus among scholars.

2.7 Ideology of the Turkish Radical Islamic Movement

According to Karmon (1998), most scholars agree that although Turkish Islam has many features with other Muslim countries in the region, its uniqueness lies in different political and social environments. For example, Turkish ideology is tied up with Turkish nationalism and includes the secularist components and European identification of Kemalism.

Contrary to other religiously motivated terror organizations in other countries, the terrorist groups in Turkey have never attacked military or security personnel; however,

they lost numerous members in the antiterrorist campaigns led by the state. In addition, they have never attacked Western targets or acted abroad even though they have some infrastructure in Europe.

Turkish security authorities outlined the objectives of the radical religious movements through the following three stages:

First is the message to call people for an effort to adopt the Islamic religion to social life and establish an Islamic state and administration through the radicals to persuade the community.

Second is to restructure the communities in accordance with the requirements of the first stage.

Third is the struggle to safeguard the Islamic way of life.

Interestingly, although religious motivated groups struggle for the constitution of an Islamic State, they use leftist slogans in their publications, and they accept ex-Marxists in their ranks.

In the early 1990s, the PKK attempted to gain religious communities of Turkey's southeast region. To achieve this goal, they established organizations, namely the Kurdistan Imamlar Birliđi – Association of Imams of Kurdistan – (*imam* = the official person assigned to each mosque). Ozeren and Van De Voorde (2006) argued that the PKK's attempt to become the major power in the region by gaining those communities resulted in a battle between the Turkish Hezbollah and the PKK.

2.8 Research Questions and Hypotheses

Although there are no scientific methods that can explain how the Turkish Hezbollah recruits more militants, two general methods have been used according to official Turkish records (Van Police Department, 2009):

- (a) Institutional structures play one of the important roles to persuade an individual to join the Turkish Hezbollah. For example, institutional structures organize movie times, concerts, and other social activities. During these activities, possible candidates are linked to experienced Turkish Hezbollah militants.
- (b) Social networks are another tool that the Turkish Hezbollah employ to effectively recruit new militants. Typically, Turkish Hezbollah members meet with their younger relatives in mosques where they attempt to convince the youngest to follow the philosophy of the Turkish Hezbollah in order to attract new members and thereby enhance their social standing within the organization. In other words, an individual is brainwashed and motivated through this strategy of sharing values and ideologies related to the Turkish Hezbollah.

In regard to these two effective methods, I will provide answers to the following research questions:

1. *What methods are used to recruit college students into the Turkish Hezbollah, a religiously motivated terrorist organization?*

2. *What are the demographic profiles of the individuals who are recruited by the institutional structures and social networks?*
3. *Does social control theory or social learning theory best explain the Turkish Hezbollah's most successful method of recruiting?*

My study focuses on Turkish Hezbollah militants who have already or are working on earning a college degree. They are either educated in their home towns or out of their home towns. To analyze how they were recruited, the total population consists of two main subpopulations: (a) those attending college in their home towns and (b) those who are away from home. Students who are educated away from their home towns and subsequently recruited by institutional structures of Hezbollah are considered to have weak social bond ties that support the assumptions of social control theory.

College students who are educated in their home towns and recruited through their social networks will reveal that social networking is an effective tool for Hezbollah to recruit new militants and thus support the assumptions of social learning theory. Employing two major criminal justice theories—social control and social learning—five hypotheses were tested followed by information related to their expected results:

H₁: Social networks and institutional structures are two general methods used extensively by the Turkish Hezbollah for recruiting new college student militants within universities.

I expect that the Turkish Hezbollah commonly recruits its militants through social and institutional structures. To test this hypothesis, 339 seized personnel records of recruited college students were used. Each Hezbollah member provided

accurate information pertaining to how they are recruited. The total population was included to determine whether social networks or institutional structures were used more frequently by the Hezbollah in recruiting new militants.

H₂: Institutional structures have been used more effectively by the Turkish Hezbollah than social networks for recruiting new militants holding college degrees.

Institutional structures include one of the effective tools used by the Turkish Hezbollah to recruit new militants. To test this hypothesis, all recruited college students were included in the model. The results of my study are expected to reveal that social networks are a more effective way of recruitment; therefore, I anticipate that this hypothesis will be rejected.

H₃: Social networks have been used more effectively than institutional structures of the Turkish Hezbollah for recruiting new militants holding college degrees.

One of Islam's important teachings requires younger individuals to respect their elders, a rule that is strictly enforced especially among relatives. The Turkish Hezbollah benefits from this teaching, and social networks play an important role for recruiting more militants. I believe that social learning theory best explains the effectiveness of Hezbollah militants to persuade college students to participate in criminal behaviors over their relatives. My study is expected to reveal that when compared to institutional structures; social networks are more effectively used by the Turkish Hezbollah to recruit new militants.

H₄: Social learning theory is more likely to explain how Turkish Hezbollah militants holding college degrees engage in the Turkish Hezbollah.

College students who have relatives and peer groups involved with the Turkish Hezbollah increases the likelihood of being recruited through social networks. In addition, society's perception of valuing terrorist activities increases this possibility.

H₅: Social control theory is more likely to explain how Turkish Hezbollah militants holding college degree engage in the Turkish Hezbollah.

Although *H₅* appears to be similar to *H₂*, the target population is different.

Contrary to *H₂*, I excluded two groups from the model.

- First group is the college students who were with their families, had militants within their social networks, and were recruited through institutional structures are excluded from this hypothesis.
- Second group is the college students who were away from their family, recruited in college, and had militants within their social networks

I expect that when compared to social control theory, a better explanation for Hezbollah's recruitment strategy will be social learning theory.

To test the hypotheses, the perspectives of social control and social learning theories are used. In the next chapter, my study is designed to determine the more effective method of recruitment as well as the variables that increase the likelihood of

recruitment. The methods section provides detailed information regarding the statistical techniques used in my study.

3 CHAPTER THREE: METHODS

3.1 Introduction

The purpose of this study is to identify tactics used by the Turkish Hezbollah to recruit college students into joining their terrorist organization. In this chapter, the methods used to examine the various recruitment strategies are described. The first section includes the research design, research questions, and hypotheses. In addition, a discussion relating to how each variable was operationalized is presented.

The second section provides an in-depth discussion gathered from a unique dataset that describes the Turkish Hezbollah militants, how they were recruited, their economic profiles, whether any other militants exist within their social networks, if their college education was obtained in their home towns or away from their family, their ideology as well as their families, justification for joining the Hezbollah, and personal demographic characteristics.

The third section describes the selected statistical analysis techniques and procedures used to examine the data. To reveal the best type of recruitment tactics used by the Hezbollah, a frequency table is applied to answer the first research question. Next, logistic regression is employed for the second and third research questions to determine important independent variables that influence the behavioral characteristics of recruited militants.

3.2 Research Design and Analyses Techniques

Silke (2004) pointed out that empirical research on terrorism should be maximized and conducted from a broad perspective. According to Silke, fighting terrorism from the perspective that it is the work of madmen or the devil is a mistaken concept that not only weakens the war on terrorism but also provides propaganda tools for terrorist groups. More recently, Plumper and Neumayer (2010) claimed that measuring terrorism is notoriously difficult, because there are no precise definitions that distinguish terrorism from ordinary crimes or guerrilla warfare. Laqueur (2003) cautioned that the causes of terrorism, terrorists, and their motives have changed over time. In other words, there is a broad variety of terrorist organizations and groups with each having a different motivation, decision making structure, and psychology. Yilmaz (2009) also criticized research with methodological problems that have been unable to develop an understanding of terrorism, particularly from an exploratory, explanatory, and descriptive levels.

The unavailability of militants is another drawback for scholars to propose effective policy recommendation. For example, empirical data on terrorism at both the group and individual levels are in short supply due to terrorist networks that are not accessible as pointed out by LaFree and Ackerman (2009). Although research related to the effectiveness of counterterrorism methods has grown rapidly over the last decade, it is still infrequently evaluated with strong empirical studies according to LaFree and Ackerman.

I believe that the explanatory and descriptive explanations in my study will add to the sparse body literature related to militant recruitment. My data contain detailed information regarding recruited college militants' ideological backgrounds, the ideologies of their families, when and where they were enlisted, the type of political motivations, the organization's structure that played the most important role in persuading them to join, and whether or not they were married at the time of recruitment.

To address the research questions in my study, individual level secondary data related to members of the Turkish Hezbollah are used. The data are comprised of self reports that each member submitted to the Turkish Hezbollah as part of their recruitment process. The data are cross sectional given that each member was required to immediately hand in his or her own individual report. In a most generic sense, I utilized a quasi-experimental research design to address the research questions.

Because I compared cases involving the probability that college students joined the Turkish Hezbollah through social networks or the terrorist organization's institutional structures, quantitative logistic regression methods were employed. The logic of using quantitative analysis was not difficult given that both dependent and independent variables can be measured through this data collection method. Finally, factors and certain variables that are expected to increase the likelihood of college students becoming recruited by the Turkish Hezbollah are discussed and explained.

3.2.1 Research Questions (RQ) and Hypotheses

1. What methods are used to recruit college students into the Turkish Hezbollah, a religiously motivated terrorist organization?
2. What are the demographic profiles of the individuals who are recruited by the institutional structures and social networks?
3. Does social control theory or social learning theory best explain the Turkish Hezbollah's most successful method of recruiting?

The statistical methods applied to each research question are shown in Table 1.

Table 1 Statistical Methods Used for Each Research Question

	Research Question 1	Research Question 2	Research Question 3
Frequency Table	X		X
Logistic Regression		X	X

3.2.1.1 Research Question One

Research question 1 was designed to determine the methods used by the Turkish Hezbollah to recruit militants. In order to answer this question, every recruited student was included in the equation. I expect to show that the Turkish Hezbollah uses two general methods that may be through either social networks or institutional structures.

The target population includes all students who either completed or attended college in their own home towns and those who completed or attended college away from their families. In my study, I infer that while the first group is vulnerable to be recruited through social networks, the second group is more vulnerable to be recruited through the Hezbollah's institutional structures.

H₁: The Turkish Hezbollah uses two general methods to recruit college students: institutional structures and social networks.

H₂: Using social networks is a more effective method in recruiting college educated militants when compared to institutional structures.

In comparison to institutional structure methods, most militants are recruited through social networks. On the other hand, the Turkish Hezbollah effectively uses its legal structures to recruit college students who are pursuing an education away from their home towns.

3.2.1.2 Research Question Two

Although establishing the most frequently used recruitment methods provides valuable insight into ceasing the process, it is important to determine which variables increase the likelihood that college students will be recruited through either the Turkish Hezbollah's institutional structure or social networks. Those variables help to identify the demographic profiles of the terrorist organization's militants.

In order to identify the significance of each variable in answering RQ 2, eight bivariate hypotheses were developed that propose a relationship between the more

frequently used recruitment methods and other factors, namely online or campus type of education; having militants within social networks; family's religiosity, attendance at a private or state university, family size, educated in home town or away from the family, and family's income.

The strength of each IV's weight over the DV was tested through logistic regression in which the odds ratio of each variable was compared with others to determine which variables made a difference in recruitment methods. According to Garson (2010), the odds ratio can be summarized as the value of the independent variable that increases or decreases the log odds of the dependent variable.

3.2.1.3 Research Question Three

Research question 3 provides a better theory in explaining the various recruitment strategies used by the Turkish Hezbollah. To answer this question, the factors that influence vulnerable college students into joining the organization are identified according to two criminological theories: (a) social control theory and (b) social learning.

However, students with the following characteristics were excluded from research question 3 due to the difficulty in determining from which perspective they were recruited: (a) those who stayed with their family during their college education and stated that they were recruited in college and had militants within the social structure; and (b) those who were away from their family during their college education and stated that they were recruited while away from the family but had militants within their social networks.

(a) Social control perspective

Social control theory emphasizes the role of control in terms of counteracting delinquency and postulates that strong social bonds hinder delinquency whereas weak social bonds increase one's likelihood of committing crime. Therefore, students who displayed weak social bonds by being away from their family during their college education and did not have any militants within their social networks were considered to be recruited by the Turkish Hezbollah from the perspective of social control theory.

(b) Social learning perspective

Recruited students who were either with or away from their families during their college education and had Turkish Hezbollah militant(s) within their social networks were considered to be targeted and recruited from the perspective of social learning theory which postulates that people learn criminal behaviors through modeling the observations of others.

H₁₁: Social learning theory provides a better explanation regarding the Turkish Hezbollah's recruitment strategies when compared to social control theory.

Initially, a frequency table is used to determine which theory best explains the Turkish Hezbollah's recruitment strategy, then independent variables are included in the equation to get their weight over the DV and develop hypotheses are tested.

3.3 Independent Variables and Sources of Hypotheses

For each independent variable, two hypotheses were developed. While the first developed for RQ 2 relates to the most frequently used recruitment structure (i.e., social networks or institutional structures), the second hypothesis developed for RQ 3 appears

to be the best theory in providing an explanation for the Turkish Hezbollah's recruitment strategy.

IV₁: Any_milt_wth_SN (having Hezbollah militants within the social network).

Because terrorists organize themselves as secret networks in order to cover their unlawful activities, they use more stable and reliable sources to recruit new militants. Sageman (2004) inferred that family relations and peer groups are two important components that may lead an individual to join terrorist organizations. In Sageman's study of 172 militants, their biographical data revealed that other militants within their social networks made young Muslims more vulnerable for recruitment by terrorist organizations.

Hypothesis 3 was developed to determine the effectiveness of the recruitment process when other militants exist within social networks. Through the level of this variable, I examined whether there was any significant difference in terms of being recruited through social networks or institutional structures. Logistic regression was utilized to describe the strength of association by either social networks or institutional structures by interpreting the odds ratio. Related hypotheses within IV₁ include:

H₃: Having Hezbollah militants within one's social structure increases the likelihood of being recruited through social networks when compared to institutional structures. (Developed for RQ 2)

H₁₂: Having Hezbollah militants within peer groups or relatives increases the likelihood of being recruited through social learning theory assumptions when compared to social control theory assumptions. (Developed for RQ 3)

IV₂: Wth_or_awy_frm_fmly (Pursuing college education while away from family).

Gibbs (1989) stated that social control is a very important variable that increases or decreases the likelihood of being recruited by terrorist organizations. According to Gibbs, strong social control is a general deterrence to committing crimes. Given that terror groups often seek out easy targets, colleges represent preferred environments. Likewise, the Turkish Hezbollah uses a variety of institutional structures to recruit more militants within colleges. According to my own experiences, most legal or illegal structures of fundamentalist groups are especially active during the first month of each semester. These time periods provide a great opportunity to meet newcomers who are away from their families and in search of inexpensive shelter and food. The odds ratio and significance level of IV₂ provides valuable information as to whether it will contribute to having a significant effect on the model.

H₄: Pursuing a college education while away from one's family increases the likelihood of being recruited through institutional structures when compared to social networks. (Developed for RQ 2)

H₁₃: Pursuing a college education while away from one's family increases the likelihood of being recruited through social control theory assumptions when compared to social learning theory assumptions. (Developed for RQ 3)

IV₃: Family ideology (Family's religious ideology).

First, it is necessary to mention that four main religions strictly condemn terrorism. However, this may be misinterpreted by religious groups to justify their activities. For example, Ozeren (2004) inferred that terrorist groups do not distinguish a direct relationship between religion and recruitment. Hypothesis 5 measures the vulnerability level of religious families compared to nonreligious families by using the odds ratio and significance level of logistic regression.

H₅: Being reared in families who have religious ideologies increases the likelihood of being recruited through social networks when compared to institutional structures. (Developed for RQ 2)

H₁₄: Being reared in families who have religious ideologies increases the likelihood of being recruited through social learning theory assumptions when compared to social control theory assumptions. (Developed for RQ 3)

IV₄: Online_camp (Having an online education).

Students who receive online college education are with their families while pursuing their degrees. From the social control perspective, being with families keep social bonds strong; thus, these groups of students are less likely to be recruited. Contrary to obtaining an online education, campus-educated students may be either with or away from their families. Hypothesis 6 compares the vulnerability between college students who have online versus campus educations.

H₆: College students who obtain a campus education are more likely to be recruited through institutional structures when compared to social networks. (Developed for RQ 2)

H₁₅: College students who obtain a campus education are more likely to be recruited through social control theory when compared social learning theory assumptions. (Developed for RQ 3)

IV₅: Family_size (Family size).

Yayla (2007) stated that family size is directly related to family control over siblings. In other words, crowded families have less chance to interact equally with each sibling. As a result, having more children in a family is expected to result in weak social bonds that are reasons why individuals may be more vulnerable for recruitment. If this hypothesis proves to be true, college students who come from large households, are away from their social networks, and have no militants within their social networks are more likely to be recruited through institutional structures due to weak social bonds.

H₇: The larger the family size, the more likely are college students to be recruited through institutional structures. Although they may remain with their families and have no militants within their social networks while pursuing their college education, they are still more likely to be recruited through institutional structures rather than social networks. (Developed for RQ 2)

H₁₆: The larger the family, the more likely are college students to be recruited through social control theory assumptions. Although they may be with their families and have no militants within their social networks while pursuing their college education, they are still more likely to be recruited through social control assumptions rather than social learning theory assumptions. (Developed for RQ 3)

IV₆: Income_level (Income level).

The Turkish National Police (TNP) researched 1,077 imprisoned and arrested terrorists in order to produce new procedures and tactics to fight and prevent terrorist activities. According to their findings, 70% of the respondents originated from lower level income groups when compared to the general population (Yayla, 2007). To identify the recruitment effectiveness of coming from low income level families, the vulnerability of this group in my study is tested by logistic regression. In other words, the odds ratio of the lower level family income group is compared to the odds ratio of the higher level family income group to determine whether there is a significant difference between recruitment through social networks or institutional structures.

H₈: Students who come from higher family income levels are less likely to be recruited by institutional structures when compared to social networks. (Developed for RQ 2)

H₁₇: Students who come from higher family income levels are less likely to be recruited through social control theory assumptions. (Developed for RQ 3)

IV₇: Militants_ideology (College student's religiosity level).

This IV compares the types of 'recruited religious students' (religious = 1) to 'recruited nonreligious college students' (nonreligious = 0) according to the Hezbollah militants' self reports that provided detailed information regarding their religious life before joining the organization. The probability of college students' recruitment type is obtained through an odds ratio which is to help making comparison between the religious

college students and non religious depending on their religiosity level before joining the Turkish Hezbollah.

H₉: The religiosity level of college students is more likely to increase the likelihood of being recruited by institutional structures. (Developed for RQ 2)

H₁₈: The religiosity level of college students is more likely to increase the likelihood of being recruited through social control theory assumptions. (Developed for RQ 3)

IV₈: Pol_motiv (Reason for attending Hezbollah)

Because the Turkish Hezbollah is a religiously motivated terrorist organization, my study will show that there is a significant difference between religion and other factors in terms of recruitment. This IV examines the weight of religion on the DV to determine whether there is a significant difference between being recruited through institutional structures or social networks.

H₁₀: Religious reasons increase the likelihood of being recruited through social networks. (Developed for RQ 2)

H₁₉: Religious reasons increase the likelihood of being recruited through social learning theory assumptions. (Developed RQ 3)

3.4 Measurements

3.4.1 Dependent and Independent Variables

3.4.1.1 Dependent variable (DV)

Because RQ 1 reveals the most frequently used structure, only a frequency table was applied. In RQ 2, the dependent variable is the type of recruitment method used to reveal the effectiveness of the IVs. The findings of my study will show that most college students are recruited through social networks or institutional structures in which those methods are DVs. Accordingly, students who are recruited through social networks (social learning theory = 1) and those who are recruited through the Turkish Hezbollah's institutional structures (absence of social networks = 0) are expected to be DVs.

Research question 3 examines the theories that provide a better explanation relating to the Turkish Hezbollah's recruitment strategies. Accordingly, the type of theories (1 = social learning, 0 = social control) that provide a better explanation encompasses the third research question's DV.

(a) Social networks

i- Friends

Individuals satisfy their psychological and social needs within social groups by becoming members of reputable organizations, respected adults, being loved or loving, and establishing one's self (Centre of Excellence, 2008). As discussed earlier, social learning theory postulates that peers have a tremendous influence over their fellow colleagues, and this relationship can result in unexpected negative behaviors that may

lead to the commission crime(s). For example, young people may be influenced by their delinquent peer groups and become drug addicts or unconsciously find themselves within a terrorist organization. Through institutional structures, a majority of terrorist organizations attempt to recruit more militants by taking advantage of workplaces, high schools, universities, and neighborhood friendships.

ii- Relatives

Relative is a term that refers to people who are related to one another through blood or marriage and formed through marriage, birth, or adoption. Within these kinship ties, a social relationship is established and distinctions are created between them (Centre of Excellence, 2008).

Regardless of whether Turkish people live in large cities or small villages, strong ties are connected to relatives. Self reported testimonies of recruited Turkish militants reveal that terrorist organizations take best advantage of these strong kinship relationships.

(b) Local and regional institutions

A Turkish person who is from the same part of a village, province, country, et cetera is referred to as a fellow countryman, a term that is generally used to create an opportunity to begin a friendship. Thus, terrorists use these institutional structures as an opportunity to effectively recruit more members. Generally, people who migrate from smaller cities to larger metropolis cities such as Ankara, Istanbul, and Izmir for either immigration or educational purposes initially look for local legal institutions that can

provide benefits. Fellow countrymen play a significant role in these institutions by acquiring more college students who move to these metropolises. In other words, terrorist organizations take advantage of these relationships developed through local institutions (Centre of Excellence, 2008).

Social and cultural activities that include tea parties, picnics, concerts, sporting activities, movies, meetings between friends, youth camps, et cetera are other methods that create opportunities for getting to know new people. Terrorist organizations prefer to recruit members through these kinds of activities that are generally sponsored by foundations, cultural centers, bookstores, associations, and political parties.

3.4.1.2 Independent variables (IVs)

a. Gender (IV₁)

As revealed by the Hezbollah organization's personal reports, males (1) are more likely than females (0) to become members. As indicated in the reports, females represented only 5% or 17 out of 339 college students. Given that the number of female militants is not significant, gender is therefore omitted from the discussion contained in the data analysis section of my study. According to Nachmias and Nachmias (2000) an inadequate sample size for the classified variables may not reflect the true value of a parameter. Thus, conclusions in my study would be difficult to make given the small female sample size.

b. Location of college (IV₂)

The second independent variable refers to students who are either attending colleges in their home town (1) or in a different city (0). The question to be answered is: “In pursuing a college education, does being away from social networks have a significant influence that increases the likelihood of being recruited by social institutions?”

Location of college represents an important parameter in my study. Students who received a college education in their own home towns are grouped in order to determine the effectiveness of recruitment methods through social networks, and students who received their college education away from their home towns and have no relatives within the Turkish Hezbollah are grouped to determine the effectiveness institutional structures within the terrorist organization. Since all Hezbollah college militants provided detailed information in their self reports regarding how they were recruited, the data provide clear information concerning Hezbollah’s recruitment strategies.

If social control proves to be more accurate, the impact of this variable is expected to show that college students who were away from their families are more likely to be recruited through institutional structures versus those college students who remained with their families while pursuing a college education. In this case, my study will also reveal that the Turkish Hezbollah has established an effective institutional structure within colleges.

On the other hand, if social learning theory proves to be more accurate, the location of college variable is expected to show that college students who are either with their families or away from their families are more likely to be recruited by social

networks. As discussed in the literature review, Turkey's region has strong social structures and having militants within social networks affect an individual's decision to join Hezbollah's terrorist organization.

c. College type (IV₃)

College type includes private (0) and state (1) colleges. I anticipate that students attending private colleges are less likely to be recruited by the Turkish Hezbollah. In contrast to state colleges, private colleges are generally comprised of wealthier students who are typically less likely to be recruited. Private colleges are also equipped with more resources that allow closer follow-up relating to a student's progress, and relationships between their parents are generally stronger than students who attend state colleges. These advantages provide more opportunities for parents to keep sound family ties. However, the data reveal that none of the militants were recruited from private colleges. Because the sample size is inadequate, this variable is therefore excluded from my equation.

If social control theory proves to be more accurate, my study is expected to show that the Turkish Hezbollah has fewer recruitment opportunities over private versus state colleges which also confirms that family members have more control over their children who attend private educational institutions.

Conversely, if social learning theory proves to be more accurate, my study will most probably indicate that when recruiting militants, the Turkish Hezbollah is likely to prefer state over private colleges. Given that the majority of private colleges are profit-seeking institutions which provide amenities to their students, they do not wish to tolerate

any illegal activities that may negatively affect their retention rate. Because private colleges also have strong networks designed to hinder the structured activities of terrorist organizations, state colleges versus private colleges represent the most favorable recruitment grounds.

d. Online or campus education (IV₄)

There are two types of college education opportunities available in Turkey: (a) online (0) and (b) campus (1). Online education does not require a student's relocation to another city and therefore keeps the familial social networks strong. In other words, if there are no militants within the social networks of a student who obtains an online education, the chances of being recruited by the Hezbollah are significantly lower (social control theory). However, if an online educated student has relatives within the Hezbollah, the chances of also becoming recruited are significantly higher.

In the event that social control theory proves to be more accurate, my study is expected to show that college students who have an online education as well as no militant relatives are more likely to be recruited by the Turkish Hezbollah through institutional structures.

Conversely, in the event that social learning theory proves to be more accurate, my study is expected to show that college students who have relatives that are members of the Turkish Hezbollah are more likely to be recruited through the organization's social network regardless of whether they are with or away from their families.

e. Family size (IV₅)

The fifth independent variable, family size, is based on the ratio of households to number of children. Within the eastern part of Turkey, families are typically large. For example, small families usually consist of less than four children whereas families having four to six children are considered to be average, and more than six children represent a large family size. According to Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990), the greater the number of children in a family, the greater is the likelihood that they will be delinquent. In my opinion, a smaller family size may decrease the probability of being recruited through institutional structures if a family does not have any relatives within the Turkish Hezbollah.

If social control theory proves to be more accurate, college students who were reared in small families are less likely to be recruited by institutional structures than are those who were reared in a large family.

However, if social learning theory proves to be more accurate, there will be no significant difference between college students who were reared in either large or small families.

f. Family Income (IV₆)

The sixth independent variable, family income, corresponds to college students who come from either poor, average, or rich backgrounds. As the family's well-being of origin improves, it is believed that the probability of joining the Turkish Hezbollah will decrease. Likewise, recruited college educated militants who come from wealthy families are more likely to be recruited through social networks if they have militants within their social networks. I believe that an individual who has enough financial resources to

support his or her own needs when away from his or her family is less likely to make contact with institutional structures. In other words, the more likelihood recruitment scenario is through a militant's own social networks. In considering the average Turkish family monthly income, earnings are divided into the following three levels as identified by Erdogan (2002): (a) poor (< \$1,200), (b) average (\$1,201 to \$3,500), and (c) rich (> \$3,501)

If social control theory proves to be more accurate, college students who come from rich family income levels are less likely to be recruited by the Turkish Hezbollah given that they generally prefer private colleges. Thus, having monetary independence is most likely to increase the likelihood of participating in social activities that, in turn, decreases the likelihood of being contacted by the Turkish Hezbollah. In this case, college students will be more likely to share common social norms and ideas that denounce terrorist activities. In my study, I presume that college students who are recruited through institutional structures are more likely to be from the low income group.

On the other hand, if social learning theory proves to be more accurate, my study will more likely reveal that there is no significant difference between rich and poor college students given that crime is praised within social networks.

g. Militants' ideological backgrounds (IV₇)

The seventh independent variable focuses on the ideological backgrounds of recruited Hezbollah militants who are identified as religious or nonreligious. In their self reports, recruited college students identified themselves as religious or non religious

depending on their daily religious practices. Hence, ideological level of the college students is identified as religious (1) versus non religious (0).

I assume that religious college students will be more prone to propaganda and influenced by Hezbollah's institutional structures even if they do not have militants within the organization's social networks.

If social control theory proves to be more accurate, religious college students who are away from their families while pursuing a college education will be more likely recruited through Hezbollah's institutional structures.

However, if social learning theory proves to be more accurate, regardless of whether religious college students are with or away from their families, they will be more likely recruited through their social networks.

h. Ideology of the family (IV₈)

The eight independent variables (IV₈) include the recruited militant's family ideology. As previously mentioned, family has a tremendous influence over Kurdish originated individuals, and college students who were reared in a religious family are considered to be more supportive to religious principles. Although the literature does not support the idea that religious individuals are more prone to commit terrorist acts (Ozeren, 2004), it will be interesting to see the results of this variable. Like their religiosity level, college students also discussed their families' religious ideology and classified them as religious or non religious. Parallel to their religiosity level, recruited college students' families are identified religious (1) versus non religious (0).

If social control theory proves to be more accurate, college educated students who come from religious families will be more likely recruited through Hezbollah's institutional structure.

However, if social learning theory proves to be more accurate, college students who come from either religious families or nonreligious families will be more likely recruited through social networks.

i. Having or not having militants within social networks (IV₉)

The ninth important independent variable (IV₉) in my study represents whether or not militants exist within the social networks of college students that increases the effectiveness of social learning theory assumptions and social networks.

If social control theory proves to be more accurate, college students who have militants in their social networks and are educated away from their family will be more likely recruited through the Hezbollah's institutional structures.

However, if social learning theory proves to be more accurate, college students who have militants in their social networks, whether with or away from their families, are more likely to be recruited through social networks.

j. Political motivation to attend the Turkish Hezbollah (IV₁₀)

The tenth and final independent variable (IV₁₀) includes reasons for joining the Turkish Hezbollah that is represented by the following explanations.

1 = *Religion*: People who believe there is no religious freedom; the Turkish State is against Islam.

Religion is a set of beliefs that systematize supernatural powers which are sacred and include believing in God and worship. According to Islamic scholars, religion is a system of divine laws in which wisdom is conveyed to be a person's most beautiful and best thought through his or her own free will.

Whether radical or not, Turkey has various understandings and movements that perceive and interpret Islam differently. According to the Centre of Excellence (2008), groups who make falsified religious interpretations recruit militants either through their institutional or social structures by using people's religious feelings (0 = Other reasons besides religion that people join the Turkish Hezbollah).

Each college student militant has different reasons for joining the Turkish Hezbollah. However, because the Turkish Hezbollah is a religious organization, my study is expected to show that religion as an independent variable increases the likelihood of being recruited. Therefore, either social networks or institutional structures use religion as a strong variable to recruit more militants.

If social control theory is more accurate, institutional structures of the Hezbollah will be used to recruit more militants by using the above arguments.

If social learning theory is more accurate, social networks of the Hezbollah will be used to recruit more militants by using the above arguments.

3.5 Regression Equation

Regression consists of one DV and eight IVs in which the IVs are applied for both the second and third research questions. To weigh the likelihood of each IV, logistic regression is used. Since my study is designed to determine the likelihood that the Turkish Hezbollah employs a particular type of recruitment, logistic regression best fits the model. According to Tabachnick and Fidell (2007), logistic regression can be used in the following four ways:

(a) To predict a DV on the basis of continuous and/or categorical IVs; (b) To determine the percent of variance in the DV explained by the IVs; (c) to rank the relative importance of IVs; and (d) to assess the interaction effects and understand the impact of covariate control variable.

The following equation is used to calculate the IV's weight on the DV:

$$\hat{Y} = \frac{e^u}{1 + e^u} = \frac{e^{a+b_1x_1+b_2x_2+b_3x_3\dots}}{1 + e^{a+b_1x_1+b_2x_2+b_3x_3\dots}}$$

The likely predicted value is shown by \hat{Y} . In the dependent variable, there are two probabilities in the equation that militant college students are recruited either by social networking (1) or through institutional structures (0). Because “social networks” are represented by (1), the calculated likelihood shows the likelihood of social networks being used to recruit militants.

To determine the power of each IV on the DV—predicting the dependent variable from the independent variables—I used the following equation:

$$U = a + b_1X_1 + b_2X_2 + b_3X_3 + \dots$$

Mann-Whitney's U statistic is the probability of a college-educated militant becoming recruited by social networks. These estimates reveal the relationship between the IVs and the DV where the DV is on the logit scale. In addition, the amount of increase (or decrease, if the coefficient sign is negative) is revealed in the predicted logs of being recruited by social networks which shows that one unit will either increase or decrease in the IV, holding all other predictors constant.

3.6 Population and Sample

Nachmias and Nachmias (2000) stated that population or the aggregate of all cases, confirms the designated set of specifications. O'Sullivan et al. (2003) further stated that it is impossible for large groups to contact every member in order to collect data besides requiring a tremendous commitment of both financial resources and time. The main purpose for sampling is to provide a conceptual basis to make accurate estimates for the entire population's values. According to Nachmias and Nachmias, sampling allows the researcher to gather information on a targeted group in a much shorter amount of time when the sample of the entire set is accurately represented.

In my study, the population consists of 339 college students with Kurdish descent who were recruited by the Turkish Hezbollah. In 2000, the TNP confiscated the Hezbollah's database that consisted of 7,000 self reports submitted by college educated militants of which I gained access to 339 of them. Because it is compulsory for every member to submit their self reports upon recruitment, I dealt with the entire target population which represents my sample. The research questions focus on how these

educated militants were recruited through either the Turkish Hezbollah's institutional structures or the militants' own social networks?

Considering the strong family ties that are prevalent in Turkey's southeastern part and highly populated by Kurdish-origin citizens, the Hezbollah recruits more militants through social networks that are best explained by the social learning theory. On the other hand, Hezbollah uses its legal structures to recruit college students who are pursuing an education away from their home towns. In my study, I examined whether the Hezbollah really, in fact, does use its legal structures effectively to recruit college educated militants. Social control theory is tested in this group to determine if Hezbollah's recruitment methods either support or do not support the theory.

3.7 Data Collection and Instrument

For my study, I used secondary data collected for a specific purpose. by the Turkish Hezbollah According to O'Sullivan et al. (2003), secondary data offers a researcher the following four advantages: (a) reduces costs, (b) enables studies to be conducted that are otherwise impractical, (c) is helpful for comparative and longitudinal studies, and (d) is a necessary element for an open science.

The Turkish Hezbollah collected self reported data from its members as a means of gaining more insight about the organization and its members. Without these data, it would have been practically impossible to gain the necessary knowledge concerning Hezbollah's recruitment tactics. Thus, conducting a survey with Hezbollah members would not be feasible to reveal organization's recruitment tactics. I obtained pertinent

data from Hezbollah database records retained by the Turkish National Police Intelligence Department in 2000.

3.8 Limitations

As is true with other data collection methods, secondary data analysis has certain limitations as summarized by Nachmias and Nachmias (2000): (a) the data may not include all instruments that researchers hope to find; (b) researchers may have difficulty in obtaining access to reach data that contain variables of interest because the original investigator may not release information; and (c) if the researcher has insufficient information concerning how data are collected, internal and external validity difficulties may arise when determining potential sources of bias, errors, or problems.

Although it is not clear how many Hezbollah militants actually exist in Turkey, after the 2000 police raid against the Turkish Hezbollah leader, 7,000 militants' self-reports were seized together with other important information regarding the organization. Because the TNP used that information to eliminate Hezbollah's power, the terrorist organization has subsequently taken more effective cautions to conceal its activities. Thus, beginning from 2000 to the present, the TNP does not have access to the latest information concerning the organization.

3.9 Data Analysis

Data were analyzed through frequency tables and logistic regression analysis in which three research questions were applied:

- *Research question 1* was designed to establish the Turkish Hezbollah's recruitment strategies among college educated Hezbollah militants. The data are expected to reveal that the terrorist organization utilizes two main recruitment tactics: social networks and institutional structures. To determine which recruitment structure is more effective, percentage scale frequency tables are used.
- In *research question 2*, to obtain the weight of eight IVs over the DV, eight hypotheses were developed and tested by applying logistic regression to the equation.
- Although the same statistical method used for RQ 2 was applied to the *third research question*, the target population was different from RQ 2. For RQ 3, college students who had the following specifications were excluded from my study because it was not clear as to whether the militant was, in fact, recruited through institutional structures.

Group 1 (N = 4): College students who were with their families when pursuing a college education, were recruited in college, and had/have militants within their social networks (institutional structure efficiency).

Group 2 (N = 8): College students who were away from their family when pursuing a college education, were recruited in college, and had/have militants within their social networks (institutional structure efficiency).

Similar to Group one, I had difficulty in identifying the precise reasons that lead an individual to participate in Hezbollah's terrorist organization.

Through RQ 3, Hezbollah's recruitment methods were examined to determine whether social control theory or social learning theory best explain the process. Similar to RQ 2, the weight of eight independent variables were tested through logistic regression and a comparison between the first and second model are provided.

3.10 Reliability and Validity

Babbie (2007) maintained that reliability is the matter of a particular technique that yields the same results each time when applied to the same object. My dataset includes a self reported form that obtained information concerning Turkish Hezbollah militants' families, backgrounds, and how they were recruited. I have no reason to believe that the data are unreliable given that the form was written in clear and easy to understand questions for every militant. Besides, these reports were prepared for the terrorist organization itself and not for the police. Since the Turkish Hezbollah is a religiously motivated organization, it is believed that every member provided accurate information.

Nachmias and Nachmias (2000) stated that validity refers to the following question: "Am I measuring what I intend to measure?" (p. 149). In my study, I searched for the answer to how the Turkish Hezbollah recruits its militants. Since every militant's

self reports provided detailed information about how they were recruited, I believe that those reports will help to identify the Turkish Hezbollah's recruitment techniques that may further hinder their operations.

4 CHAPTER FOUR: ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

This chapter is comprised of the statistical methods that were run to answer the research questions.

To answer the first research question, a frequency table was used to determine the Turkish Hezbollah's most commonly used structure to recruit college students: "*What methods are used to recruit college students into the Turkish Hezbollah, a religiously motivated terrorist organization?*"

To answer the second research question, demographic details of the recruited college students were identified through the use of logistic regression: "*What are the demographic profiles of the individuals who are recruited by the institutional structures and social networks?*" Eight IVs were included in the model, and their weight over the DV was also tested using logistic regression.

In answer to the third research question which is "*Does social control theory or social learning theory best explain the Turkish Hezbollah's most successful method of recruiting?*" a frequency table and logistic regression were used. Comparing to RQ 1 and RQ 2, the sample size of RQ 3 was different from them. After applying these methods, in terms of assess the each IV's weights on the DV, I compared the results of independent variables that are used in RQ 2 and RQ 3.

4.1 Research Question One

What methods are used to recruit college students into the Turkish Hezbollah, a religiously motivated terrorist organization?

4.1.1 Frequency Table for Research Question One

Frequency tables provide graphical displays and statistics that are useful for describing many types of variables (SPSS, 2007). For the first research question, a frequency table was developed to determine the Turkish Hezbollah's most frequently used method to recruit college students. Using this frequency procedure, 339 college students were included in my study as shown in Table 2.

Table 2. Frequency Table for Research Question One

Institutional Structure (IS) vs. Social Network (SN) Recruitment					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Institutional Structure (IS)	155	45.7	45.7	45.7
	Social Network (SN)	184	54.3	54.3	100.0
	Total	339	100.0	100.0	

Hypotheses 1 and 2

H₁: The Turkish Hezbollah uses two general methods to recruit college students: institutional structures and social networks.

H₂: Using social networks is a more effective method in recruiting college educated militants when compared to institutional structures.

Among 339 college educated students, 184 (54.3%) were recruited through social networks (SN) and 155 (45.7%) were recruited through institutional structures (IS). The

data revealed that none of the students were recruited by any other methods. Parallel to my expectations, SN and IS are two of the most important recruitment tools used by the Turkish Hezbollah. When the methods of recruitment were compared between the two groups of students, social networks rather than institutional structures proved to be the most preferred method as depicted in Figure 3. As noted in the literature review, peer groups and relatives have a tremendous influence over the younger population in the southeastern part of the Turkey.




Figure 3. Frequency of recruitment through institutional structures or social networks.

4.2 Research Question Two

What are the demographic profiles of the individuals who are recruited by the institutional structures and social networks?

Logistic regression was used to obtain the demographic details of college educated Hezbollah militants in which eight IVs were included in the equation. Through logistic regression, each IV's weight on the DV are discussed in addition to their effects on the likelihood of being recruited through either IS or SN. The eight variables in the equation included: (a) having or not having any militants within social networks (any_milt_wth_SN); (b) being away from or with family while pursuing a college education (wth_or_away_frm_fmly); (c) ideology of the family (famly_ideolgy); (d) having an online or campus education (online_cam); (e) family size (family_size_grp); (f) income level of family (income_level); (g) militants' ideologies (militants_ideology); and (h) political motivation (pol_motiv). The DV for the equation was the type of tactics used by the Hezbollah to recruit college educated militants.

4.2.1 Logistic Regression for Research Question Two

In order to predict the categorical DV with two or more categories, logistic regression helped to test the models. Hypotheses 3 through 10 were tested through binary logistic regression in which the effect of each IV over the DV is discussed according to their coefficient values (B) and odds ratios ($\exp[B]$). In my study, a dichotomous dependent variable included two categories, either institutional structures or social networks.

In order to help determine the percent of variance in the DV explained by the IVs, logistic regression was the method used to predict a DV through continuous and/or categorical independent variables. Through this statistical model, it was also possible to

rank the relative importance of IVs in order to assess the interaction effects and to understand the impact of covariate control variables. According to Garson (2010), odds ratios help to show the impact of predictor variables.

In my study, two categorical independent variables were included in the model: *income_level* (income level) and *family_size_grp* (family size). The ‘Forced Entry Model’ was used to assess the predictive ability of the IVs while controlling for other predictor effects in the model.

4.2.1.1 How well does the model reveal the Turkish Hezbollah’s recruitment strategies?

According to outputs derived from SPSS, my study consisted of 339 samples with no missing cases in the data as shown in Table 3. Table 4 further reveals that the model had a discrete DV containing two original values that were defined according to the type of recruitment tactics used by the Hezbollah, either institutional structures or social networks.

Table 3. Case Processing Summary for RQ 2

Unweighted Cases ^a		<i>N</i>	Percent
Selected Cases	Included in Analysis	339	100.0
	Missing Cases	0	.0
	Total	339	100.0
Unselected Cases		0	.0
Total		339	100.0

^aIf weight is in effect, see classification Table 6 for the total number of cases.

Table 4. Dependent Variable Encoding for RQ 2

Original Value	Internal Value
Institutional Structure (IS)	0
Social Network (SN)	1

After defining the variables that were included in the equation of my study, SPSS provided an additional table which revealed two categorical variables in the equation—family size and family income level (UCLA, 2010) (see Table 5). According to the coding, family size was grouped into three categories: (a) small ($N = 25$), (b) average ($N = 141$), and large ($N = 173$). Family income level also consisted of three categories: (a) poor ($N = 195$), (b) average ($N = 119$), and rich ($N = 25$).

Table 5. Categorical Coding of Variables for RQ 2

		Frequency	Parameter Coding	
			(1)	(2)
Family Size	Small Family Size	25	1.000	.000
	Average Family Size	141	.000	1.000
	Large Family Size	173	.000	.000
Income Level	Poor	195	1.000	.000
	Average	119	.000	1.000
	Rich	25	.000	.000

In terms of classification, Table 6 reveals that 184 out of 339 college students were recruited through social networks and 54.3% were recruited through social networks.

Table 6. Classification Table^{a, b} for RQ 2

Observed		Predicted			
		Institutional Structure or Social Network		Percentage Correct	
		Institutional Structure	Social Network		
Step 0	Institutional Structure (IS) or Social Network (SN)	IS	0	155	.0
		SN	0	184	100.0
Overall Percentage					54.3

^aConstant is included in the model; ^bCut value = .500

Table 7 represents the small model that excludes IVs. Here, $p = .116$ or a significance level that revealed the model was not statistically significant at the .05 level. Since IVs were excluded, explaining the model was therefore not feasible.

Table 7. Variables in the Equation for RQ 2

		B	SE	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 0	Constant	.172	.109	2.475	1	.116	1.187

In general, the Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients depicted in Table 8 explained the model's statistical significance in relation to the IVs. As shown, statistics

for the step, model, and block were identical because stepwise logistic regression or blocking was not utilized. The value given in the Sig. column represents the probability of obtaining a chi-square statistic to determine whether or not the null hypothesis was true. In the model, chi-square equaled a high of 190.621 which was significant for 10 degrees of freedom (*df*) at the .000 significance level.

Table 8. Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients for RQ 2

		Chi-square	<i>df</i>	Sig.
Step 1	Step	190.621	10	.000
	Block	190.621	10	.000
	Model	190.621	10	.000

The summary illustrated in Table 9 provides information concerning the model's usefulness. In other words, the predicted power of the model was explained by the IVs. The Cox and Snell R^2 and Nagelkerke R^2 values show the amount of variation in the DV explained by the model. Cox and Snell R^2 had a value of .430, while Nagelkerke R^2 had a value of .575. According to Cox and Snell's R^2 , 43% of the variability was explained by this set of variables. In addition, Nagelkerke R^2 suggested that 57.5% of the variability was explained by this set of variables.

Table 9. Model Summary for RQ 2

Step	-2 Log likelihood	Cox & Snell R^2	Nagelkerke R^2
1	276.849 ^a	.430	.575

^aEstimation terminated at iteration 5 since parameter estimates changed by < .001.

Table 10 represents an output classification for dichotomous DVs. As shown, the columns reveal the two predicted DVs while the rows indicate the two observed DV values. The model had an 83.8% correct rate (76.1%, institutional structures; 90.2%, social networks).

Table 10. Classification Table^a for RQ 2

		Observed	Predicted		Percentage Correct
			Institutional Structure	Social Network	
Step 1	Institutional Structure (IS) or Social Network (SN)	IS	118	37	76.1
		SN	18	166	90.2
Overall Percentage					83.8

^aCut value = .500.

4.2.1.2 Interpreting the meaning of each coefficients (associated with IVs) and comments on the statistical significance of each coefficient

Logistic regression coefficients simply illustrate the change in the predicted logged odds of experiencing an event or having a characteristic for a one unit change in the IVs. The coefficients had the exact same interpretation as the coefficients in regression other than the DV units of represented logged odds (Garson, 2010). This model's output is presented in Table 11 in which each coefficient's power and hypotheses were interpreted as follows.

Hypothesis 3

H₃: Having Hezbollah militants within one's social structure increases the likelihood of being recruited through social networks when compared to institutional structures.

The logistic regression coefficient revealed that a one unit increase for having militants within social networks (any_milt_wth_SN) increased the logged odds of being recruited through social networks by 2.857 while holding others constant. This coefficient was both significant and different than 0 ($p = .000$). Due to the one unit change in having militants within social networks, the Exp(B) was 17.415 signifying that a positive value ($e^{\text{any_milt_wth_SN}} - 1 = 16.415$) increased nearly 16 times for the likelihood of college students being recruited through social networks.

The model indicated that rejecting the null hypothesis was true at the $p = .05$ level of significance. Parallel to the literature review, most recruited college students are statistically and significantly affected by their social networks. My study also supported the assumption that family relations and peer groups may lead an individual to join terrorist organizations, specifically the Hezbollah. Considering the strong social familial ties in the eastern part of Turkey, college educated individuals were more likely to be recruited through social networks if they had or have militant relatives involved in the Hezbollah. Compared to other independent variables in the equation, having militants within social networks had a greater effect that increased the likelihood of being recruited into the terrorist organization through social networks.

Hypothesis 4

H₄: Pursuing a college education while away from one's family increases the likelihood of being recruited through institutional structures when compared to social networks.

The logistic regression coefficient for being with or away from one's family while pursuing a college education (*wth_or_Awy_frm_fmly*) revealed that a one unit increase for this variable increased the logged odds of being recruited through social networks by .882 while holding others constant. The coefficient for being with or away from one's family was both significant and different than 0 ($p = .016$). Due to a one unit change in being with or away from one's family, $\text{Exp}(B)$ indicated that a negative value ($e^{\text{wth_or_awy_frm_fmly}} - 1 = .586$) decreased the likelihood of being recruited through social networks by 41.4%.

In addition, whether with or away from one's family while pursuing a college education was another variable that had a significant effect upon the likelihood of being recruited by the Hezbollah through either institutional structures or social networks. Even if college students had no militants within their social networks, they were recruited when they were away from their families. Parallel to the literature review, strong social control is a general crime deterrence in which the Turkish Hezbollah's institutional structures take advantage of college students who are distanced from their families.

Hypothesis 5

H₅: Being reared in families who have religious ideologies increases the likelihood of being recruited through social networks when compared to institutional structures.

The logistic regression coefficient revealed that a one unit increase for family ideology (family_ideolgy) increased the logged odds of being recruited through social networks by .107 while holding others constant. The coefficient for family ideology was not significant or different than 0 ($p = .753$). Due to a one unit change in family ideology, the Exp(B) positive value ($e^{\text{family_ideolgy}} - 1 = .113$) was 1.113 indicating that there was an 11.3% increase in the likelihood of being recruited through social networks.

A review of the literature suggested that there was no link between religious ideology and terrorism. For example, Pape (2005) researched suicide bombings from 1980 to 2003 and concluded that media news coverage regarding suicide bombings were profoundly misleading. Contrary to the public's general perception, suicide terrorism stems from political rather than religious conflicts according to Pape. Sheehan (2000) also claimed that terrorists portray their causes in religion and cultural terms; however, this is only a tactic to conceal their political goals.

The family ideology variable revealed that both institutional structures and social network methods had no significant difference in the Hezbollah's recruitment of college students. In other words, being reared in a religious family did not significantly contribute to either types of recruitment.

Hypothesis 6

H₆: College students who obtain a campus education are more likely to be recruited through institutional structures when compared to social networks.

The logistic regression coefficient for online or campus education (online_camp) revealed that a one unit increase decreased the logged odds of being recruited through social networks by -.797 while holding others constant. The coefficient for online or campus education was significant as well as different than 0 ($p = .037$). Due to the one unit change in online or campus education, the Exp(B) of having campus education had a negative value of .451 ($e^{\text{online_camp}} - 1 = -.549$) or a 54.9% decrease in the likelihood of being recruited through social networks.

Consistent with the literature, a significantly higher number of campus educated college students were recruited through institutional structures rather than social networks. This also confirmed two important issues: (a) College students who pursue an online education are recruited through social networks significantly more frequently when family militants participate in terrorist organizations; and (b) college students who are with their families and have no militants within their social network are less likely to be recruited through social networks. This variable is another indicator that strong social bonds decrease the likelihood of recruitment and also confirm that college students who are away from their families are more likely to be recruited through institutional structures. Running a cross tabulation between recruitment type and online or campus education might help to develop a clear picture regarding this relationship for H₆ and identify the most effective recruitment methods. Table 11 presents a summary of the variables in the equation.

Table 11. Variables in the Equation for RQ 2

	B	SE	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step ^a						
Having Hezbollah militants within Social Networks	2.857	.373	58.768	1	.000	17.415
Being away from family during college education	-.882	.366	5.800	1	.016	.414
Family Ideology	.107	.339	.099	1	.753	1.113
Online or Campus Education	-.797	.382	4.352	1	.037	.451
Family Size			4.522	2	.104	
Family Size (1)	.665	.601	1.224	1	.269	1.944
Family Size (2)	.677	.333	4.147	1	.042	1.969
Income Level			2.479	2	.289	
Income Level (1)	-.961	.645	2.220	1	.136	.383
Income Level (2)	-.702	.663	1.120	1	.290	.496
Militant's Ideology	-.201	.343	.341	1	.559	.818
Political Motivation	-.716	1.039	.474	1	.491	.489
Constant	.557	1.238	.202	1	.653	1.745

^aVariable(s) entered in step 1: Any_milt_wth_SN, Wth_or_Awy_frm_Fmly, Famly_ideolgy, Online_camp, Family_Size_grp, Income_level, Militants_ideology, Pol_motiv.

As illustrated in Table 12, Pearson's chi-square value was rather high with a significant relationship ($p = .000$). Among the 96 militant students who pursued online educations, 84.4% were recruited through SN and 90.3% who had campus educations were recruited through IS as shown in Table 13. This result was parallel to my expectation that college students who pursued online educations were more likely to be recruited through social networks. Because they were with their families, the likelihood of being recruited through institutional structure was extremely low that may be explained through the assumptions of social learning and social control theories. For example, if an individual has a militant within his or her social networks and stays with his or her family, he or she is more likely to be recruited through social networks rather than institutional structures. Likewise, if an individual is away from his or her family, he or she is more likely to be recruited through institutional structures unless there is a militant within his or her social network.

Table 12. Chi-square Tests for Hypothesis 6

	Value	<i>df</i>	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson's chi-square	48.886	1	.000		
Continuity correction	47.208	1	.000		
Likelihood ratio	53.044	1	.000		
Fisher's Exact Test				.000	.000
Linear-by-linear Association	48.741	1	.000		
<i>N</i> of valid cases	339				

Table 13. Recruitment Type and Campus Education for Hypothesis 6

		Institutional Structure (IS) or Social Network (SN) * Online or Campus Education Crosstabulation			
		Online or Campus Education			Total
		Online Education	Campus Education		
Institutional Structure (IS) or Social Network (SN)	Institutional Structure (IS)	Count	15	140	155
		% within Institutional Structure (IS) or Social Network (SN)	9.7%	90.3%	100.0%
		% within Online or Campus Education	15.6%	57.6%	45.7%
		% of Total	4.4%	41.3%	45.7%
	Social Network (SN)	Count	81	103	184
		% within Institutional Structure (IS) or Social Network (SN)	44.0%	56.0%	100.0%
		% within Online or Campus Education	84.4%	42.4%	54.3%
		% of Total	23.9%	30.4%	54.3%
		Count	96	243	339
		% within Institutional Structure (IS) or Social Network (SN)	28.3%	71.7%	100.0%
		% within Online or Campus Education	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	28.3%	71.7%	100.0%

Hypothesis 7

H₇: The larger the family size, the more likely are college students to be recruited through institutional structures.

Family size (Family_size) represented a categorical variable comprised of three categories: (a) small, (b) average, and (c) large. A large family size was coded as “3” in which logistic regression kept the higher valued category reference by default. According to the .05 significance level, family size did not overall affect the DV and was therefore not significant ($p = .104$).

Hence, the large size family reference variable was possible to compare with the small and average size family. Accordingly, the odds of being reared in an average family compared to a large one was increased by a factor of 1.96 when controlling for other variables in the model. Likewise, the odds of being reared in a small family when compared to a large family was increased by a factor of 1.94 when controlling for other variables in the model.

In relation to the significance level, family size did not have any significant influence that increased the likelihood of being recruited for either institutional structures or social networks. However, in order to determine which group was highly recruited by each structure, cross tabulation must be applied to develop a clear picture of the recruitment type according to family size.

As shown in Table 14, cross tabulation revealed that 51% of the recruited college educated militants came from large families, 41.6% came from average size families, and only 7.4% were reared in small size families.

Table 14. Crosstabulation for Hypothesis 7

		Institutional Structure (IS) or Social Network (SN) * Family Size Group Crosstabulation				
		Family Size Groups				
		Small Family Size	Average Family Size	Large Family Size	Total	
Institutional Structure (IS) or Social Network (SN)	Institutional Structure (IS)	Count	12	58	85	155
		% within Institutional Structure (IS) or Social Network (SN)	7.7%	37.4%	54.8%	100.0%
		% within Family Size Groups	48.0%	41.1%	49.1%	45.7%
		% of Total	3.5%	17.1%	25.1%	45.7%
	Social Network (SN)	Count	13	83	88	184
		% within Institutional Structure (IS) or Social Network (SN)	7.1%	45.1%	47.8%	100.0%
		% within Family Size Groups	52.0%	58.9%	50.9%	54.3%
		% of Total	3.8%	24.5%	26.0%	54.3%
Total		Count	25	141	173	339
		% within Institutional Structure (IS) or Social Network (SN)	7.4%	41.6%	51.0%	100.0%
		% within Family Size Groups	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	7.4%	41.6%	51.0%	100.0%

In terms of each recruitment method, family dispersion according to the institutional structure included the following: 54.8% of the recruited militants were from large families, 37.4% were from average size families, and a mere 7.7% were from small size families.

The social network's family dispersion revealed that 47.8% of the recruited militants were from large families, 45.1% were from average size families, and only 7.1% were from small size families.

In sum, within small size families, approximately 48% of the college educated militants were recruited through institutional structures whereas approximately 52% were recruited through social networks. Within average size families, the Hezbollah recruited 41.1% of the college educated militants through their institutional structures and 58.9% through social networks. Finally, within large size families, while 49.1% of the college educated militants were recruited through Hezbollah's institutional structures, 50.9% were recruited through social networks.

According to the Turkish Hezbollah's recruitment strategies, these statistics reveal that there is no significant difference between family size and being recruited by either social networks or the institutional structures.

Hypothesis 8

H₈: Students who come from higher family income levels are less likely to be recruited by institutional structures when compared to social networks.

Income level (Income_level) was another categorical variable that consisted of three categories: (a) poor, (b) average, and (c) rich. Garson (2010) inferred that categorical variables should be interpreted according to the omitted reference category similar to OLS regression. Because logistic regression keeps the higher valued category as a default reference, rich was used as the reference variable to make a comparison between poor and average income families. In comparison to rich families, the odds of being from a family with average economic power was decreased by a factor of .496 when controlling other variables in the model. Likewise, the odds of being from a family with poor economic power when compared to rich families was decreased by a factor of .383 when controlling other variables in the model.

Parallel to the literature, there was no significant difference between institutional structure and social networks in terms of recruitment strategies used by terrorists. Krueger and Maleckova (2003) claimed that any connection between education, poverty, and terrorism is complicated, indirect, and quite weak. According to Kruger and Maleckova, political conditions play a significant role for terrorism when compared to economic conditions.

Given that income level was a categorical variable, a cross tabulation table was required to reveal the relationship between recruitment methods and each income category. Accordingly, Table 15 shows that Pearson's chi-square value was quite low and had no significant relationship ($p = .138$) between each variable.

Table 15. Chi-Square for Hypothesis 8

	Value	<i>df</i>	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson's chi-square	3.959 ^a	2	.138
Likelihood ratio	3.981	2	.137
Linear-by-linear association	3.788	1	.052
<i>N</i> of valid cases	339		

^aNo cells (.0%) have an expected count < 5. The minimum expected count = 11.43.

As shown in Table 16, cross tabulation revealed that among college educated militants who came from poor families, 50.3% were recruited through institutional structures and 49.7% were recruited through social networks. According to this finding, there was no large difference between both recruitment types.

Within average income family militants, 40.3% were recruited through institutional structures and 59.7% were recruited through social networks. As revealed by the statistics, most militants who came from average income families were recruited through social networks.

On the other hand, among college educated militants who came from rich families, 36% were recruited through institutional structures and 64% were recruited through social networks. According to these statistics, militants who came from wealthy families were most likely to be recruited through social networks which were comparable to my expectations. I believe that individuals who have enough resources to support their needs while away from their families are less likely to make contact with institutional structures. Thus, the more likelihood scenario for them would be recruitment through social networks and having militants within their social networks.

Table 16. Crosstabulation for Hypothesis 8

		Institutional Structure (IS) or Social Network (SN) * Income Level Crosstabulation				
		Income Level				
			Poor	Normal	Rich	Total
Institutional Structure (IS) or Social Network (SN)	IS	Count	98	48	9	155
		% within IS or SN	63.2%	31.0%	5.8%	100.0%
		% within Income Level	50.3%	40.3%	36.0%	45.7%
		% of Total	28.9%	14.2%	2.7%	45.7%
	SN	Count	97	71	16	184
		% within IS) or SN	52.7%	38.6%	8.7%	100.0%
		% within Income Level	49.7%	59.7%	64.0%	54.3%
		% of Total	28.6%	20.9%	4.7%	54.3%
	Total	Count	195	119	25	339
		% within IS or SN	57.5%	35.1%	7.4%	100.0%
		% within Income Level	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	57.5%	35.1%	7.4%	100.0%

Hypothesis 9

H₉: College student's religiosity level is more likely to increase the likelihood of being recruited through institutional structures when compared to social networks.

The logistic regression coefficient of -.201 for militant's ideology (militants_ideology) revealed that a one unit increase for this variable decreased the logged odds of being recruited through social networks by .201 while holding others constant. The coefficient for militant's ideology was not significant and was not significantly different than 0 ($p = .559$). The Exp(B) militant's ideology was .818 ($e^{\text{militants_ideology}} - 1 = -182$) (negative value) indicating that there was an 18.2% decrease in the likelihood of being recruited through social networks due to the one unit change in militants' ideology.

As earlier discussed in Hypothesis 3, the literature suggested that there is no link between religious ideology and terrorism. Parallel to this argument and from the perspective of either type of recruitment, Hypothesis 9 revealed that there was no significant difference in terms of militant college students' ideology. Parallel to my expectancy, having religious ideology decrease the likelihood of being recruited through social networks.

Hypothesis 10

H₁₀: Religious reasons increase the likelihood of being recruited through social networks.

The logistic regression coefficient of -.716 for political motivation (Pol_motiv) showed that a one unit increase decreased the logged odds of being recruited through

social networks by .716 while holding others constant. The coefficient for political motivation was neither significant nor significantly different than 0 ($p = .491$). The $\text{Exp}(B)$ was .489 meaning that ($e^{\text{pol_motiv}} - 1 = -.511$) (negative value) there was a 51.1% decrease in the likelihood of being recruited through social networks due to the one unit change in political motivation.

Political motivation was also another IV that did not have a significant effect on the DV. In other words, there was no difference between institutional structure and social networks in terms of college students being motivated to participate in terrorist groups.

The hypotheses and findings for RQ 2 are identified in Table 17.

4.3 Research Question Three

Does social control theory or social learning theory better explain the Turkish Hezbollah's most successful method of recruiting?

Research question three was designed to provide a better theory in explaining the various recruitment strategies used by the Turkish Hezbollah. As stated in RQ 3, the Turkish Hezbollah uses two structures to effectively recruit college educated students, institutional structures and social networks. Recruitment through institutional structures meets the assumptions of social control theory. In other words, being away from one's family often results in weak social bonds that may lead to the commission of crime(s). On the other hand, recruitment through social networks meets the assumptions of social learning theory or behavior is learned through direct experiences as well as through observation of one's environment.

Table 17. Hypotheses and Findings for Research Question 2 (SN = Social Networks, IS = Institutional Structures)

Hypotheses	Key findings	Sig. Level
H ₃ : Having militants within SN increases the likelihood of being recruited by SN	Increases the likelihood nearly 16 times of being recruited through SN compared to IS	$p = .000$
H ₄ : Pursuing a college education while away from one's family increases the likelihood of being recruited through IS when compared to SN	41.4% decrease in the likelihood of being recruited by SN compared to IS	$p = .016$
H ₅ : Being reared in families who have religious ideologies increases the likelihood of being recruited through social networks when compared to institutional structures.	11.3% increase in the likelihood of being recruited through SN	$p = .753$
H ₆ : College students who obtain a campus education are more likely to be recruited through IS when compared to SN	54.9% decrease in the likelihood of being recruited through SN	$p = .037$
H ₇ : Having a large family size increases the likelihood of being recruited by IS	<i>Small family militants</i> recruited by SN (48% versus 52%), <i>Average family militants</i> recruited by SN (41.1% versus 58.9%), <i>Large family militants</i> recruited by SN (49.1% versus 50.9%)	$p = .104$
H ₈ : Having more family income increases the likelihood of being recruited by SN	<i>Poor family militants</i> recruited by IS (49.7% versus 50.3%), <i>Average family militants</i> recruited by SN (40.3% versus 59.3%), <i>Rich family militants</i> recruited by SN (36% versus 64%)	$p = .289$
H ₉ : College student's religiosity level is more likely to increase the likelihood of being recruited through IS when compared to SN.	18.2% decrease in the likelihood of being recruited through SN	$p = .559$
H ₁₀ : Religious reasons increase the likelihood of being recruited through SN	51.1% decrease in the likelihood of being recruited through SN	$p = .491$

Because RQ 3 provided a better theory for explaining the Turkish Hezbollah's recruitment strategies, the data structure had to be compatible with the assumptions of social control and social learning, two important criminological theories. As explained in the methods section, two groups of college educated Hezbollah militants who met were excluded from my study if they met the following specifications:

Group 1 ($N = 4$): While pursuing a college education, these students included those who were with their families, were recruited when in college, and had militants within their social networks (i.e., institutional structure efficiency). This group was excluded because it was not clear whether the student was recruited purely through institutional structures. Having militants within the family made these groups easy targets for recruitment by the Turkish Hezbollah. From the social learning theory perspective, if there were militants or criminals who existed within a student's social network, the recruited militant most probably would sympathize with the organization. Because this group did not provide ample information regarding their psychological reasons for joining the terrorist organization, by including them may have lead to false results from a theoretical perspective.

Group 2 ($N = 8$): College students who were away from their family while pursuing a college education, were recruited when in college, and had militants within their social networks (i.e., institutional structure efficiency). Similar to the first group, I difficulty in identifying the exact reasons that lead these militants to take participate in the Hezbollah's organization.

4.3.1 Frequency Table for Research Question Three

Hypothesis 11

H_{11} : *Social learning theory provides a better explanation regarding the Turkish Hezbollah's recruitment strategies when compared to social control theory.*

After excluding two groups, my sample size was $N = 327$. Initially, a frequency table was used to reveal the best theory that fit in explaining the Turkish Hezbollah's recruitment strategies. As shown in Table 18, social learning theory was more helpful in understanding how militants were recruited through the terrorist organization. While social control theory explained Hezbollah's recruitment pattern for 146 out of 327 college educated militants (44.6%), social learning theory provides a wider explanation. Figure 4 provides a bar chart that shows the statistical results when a comparison was made between the two theories.

Table 18. Social Control Theory versus Social Learning Theory

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Social Control Theory (SC)	146	44.6	44.6	44.6
	Social Learning Theory (SL)	181	55.4	55.4	100.0
	Total	327	100.0	100.0	




Figure 4. A comparison between social control and social learning theories.

4.3.2 Logistic regression for RQ 3

Table 19 provides a model that includes 327 college students who were recruited by the Turkish Hezbollah. As shown, there are no missing cases. Table 20 consists of recruited college militants whose behaviors were best explained through social control theory and social learning theory.

Table 21 reveals two categorical variables that were encoded into the equation. As shown, family income level was grouped into three categories that included poor ($N = 190$), average ($N = 114$), and rich families ($N = 23$). Family size was also grouped into three categories that included small ($N = 25$), average ($N = 134$), and large ($N = 168$).

Table 19. Case Processing Summary for Research Question Three^a

Unweighted Cases ^a		<i>N</i>	Percent
Selected Cases	Included in Analysis	327	100.0
	Missing Cases	0	.0
	Total	327	100.0
Unselected Cases		0	.0
Total		327	100.0

^aIf weight is in effect, refer to Table 22 for the total number of cases.

Table 20. Encoding of Dependent Variable for Research Question Three

Original Value	Internal Value
Social Control Theory (SC)	0
Social Learning Theory (SL)	1

Table 21. Coding of Income Level and Family Size Categorical Variables

		Frequency	Parameter coding	
			(1)	(2)
Income Level	Poor	190	1.000	.000
	Average	114	.000	1.000
	Rich	23	.000	.000
Family Size	Small Family Size	25	1.000	.000
	Average Family Size	134	.000	1.000
	Large Family Size	168	.000	.000

As depicted in Table 22, 181 (55.4%) out of 339 college students were classified as being recruited through social learning theory assumptions. Further, Table 23 identifies the variables in the equation in which .053 was the significance level. This revealed that the model was not statistically significant according to the .05 significance level. Because there were no IVs in the model, it is not explained any further.

Table 22. Classification Table^{a,b} for RQ 3

Observed		Predicted		
		Social Control Theory (SCT) or Social Learning Theory (SLT)	Percentage Correct	
Step 0 Social Control Theory or Social Learning Theory	SCT	0	146	.0
	SLT	0	181	100.0
Overall Percentage				55.4

^aConstant is included in the model; ^bCut value = .500

Table 23. Variables Contained in the Equation for Research Question Three

	B	SE	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 0 Constant	.215	.111	3.732	1	.053	1.240

As presented in Table 24, the Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients revealed that the step, model, and block statistics were the same because stepwise logistic regression or blocking had not been used. The value shown in the Sig. column represents the probability of obtaining the chi-square statistic to determine whether or not the null

hypothesis was true. In the model, a high chi-square 200.930 was reached and was significant for 10 degrees of freedom (*df*) at the .000 significance level.

Table 24. Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients for Research Question Three

		Chi-square	<i>df</i>	Sig.
Step 1	Step	200.930	10	.000
	Block	200.930	10	.000
	Model	200.930	10	.000

In the model summary shown in Table 25, Cox and Snell R^2 had a value of .459, while Nagelkerke R^2 had a value of .614. According to Cox and Snell's R^2 value, 45.9% of the variability was explained by this set of variables. Nagelkerke R^2 also suggested that 61.4% of the variability was explained by this set of variables. Compared to the previous model that was described in RQ 1, the IVs explained the broader percentage of the DV (43% vs. 45.9%). Hence, it may be concluded that removing those groups helped to better explain the model.

Table 25. Model Summary for Research Question Three

Step	-2 Log likelihood	Cox & Snell R^2	Nagelkerke R^2
1	248.635 ^a	.459	.614

^aEstimation terminated at iteration number 5 because parameter estimates changed by < .001.

Table 26 represents an output classification table for the dichotomous DVs. The columns illustrate the two predicted values whereas the rows include their two observed values. As shown, the model had an 85.9% correct rate with 80.1% for institutional structures and 90.6% for social networks.

Table 26. Classification Table for RQ 3

Observed		Predicted		
		Social Control Theory (SCT) or Social Learning Theory (SLT)		Percentage Correct
		SCT	SLT	
Step 1 Social Control Theory or Social Learning Theory	SCT	117	29	80.1
	SLT	17	164	90.6
Overall Percentage				85.9

^aCut value = .500

4.3.3 Interpreting the Meaning of Each Coefficient Associated with IVs and Comments

Regarding the Statistical Significance of Each Coefficient

This model's output is presented in Table 27 that depicts each coefficient's power followed by discussion of the hypotheses. In RQ 3, because the same variables as RQ 1 were used, and a broader explanation was made for the previous model, I tested the hypotheses and compared the results between these models.

Table 27. Variables in the Equation for Research Question Three

	B	SE	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1 ^a						
Having Hezbollah militants within Social Networks	3.298	.418	62.125	1	.000	27.067
Being away from family during college education	-.500	.419	1.421	1	.233	.607
Family ideology	.119	.363	.107	1	.744	1.126
Online or campus education	-.850	.417	4.162	1	.041	.427
Family Size			4.204	2	.122	
Family Size (1)	.580	.630	.848	1	.357	1.786
Family Size (2)	.720	.359	4.024	1	.045	2.055
Income level			3.807	2	.149	
Income level (1)	-1.248	.683	3.338	1	.068	.287
Income level (2)	-.879	.702	1.569	1	.210	.415
Militant's ideology	-.194	.368	.277	1	.599	.824
Political motivation	-.667	1.097	.369	1	.543	.513
Constant	.497	1.317	.142	1	.706	1.644

^a Variable(s) entered in step 1: Any_milt_wth_SN; Wth_or_Awy_frm_Fmly; Famly_ideolgy; Online_camp,; Family_Size_grp,;Income_level; Militants_ideology; Pol_motiv.

Hypothesis 12

H₁₂: Having Hezbollah militants within peer groups or relatives increases the likelihood of being recruited through social learning theory assumptions.

The logistic regression coefficient for having militants within social networks (any_milt_wth_SN) showed that a one unit increase increased the logged odds of being recruited through social learning theory by 3.298 while holding others constant. The coefficient for having militants within social networks was both significant and significantly different than 0 ($p = .000$). The Exp(B) of having militants within social networks was 27.067 ($e^{\text{any_milt_wth_SN}} - 1 = 26.067$) (positive value) meaning that there was nearly a 26 times increase in the likelihood of being recruited through social learning theory assumptions due to the one unit change in having militants within social networks.

Compared to the previous model, the odds ratio increased which was good for the purposes of my study (16.415 vs, 26.067). Removing group I and group II from the model increased the effect of having militants within social networks over the DV.

Hypothesis 13

H₁₃: Pursuing a college education while away from one's family increases the likelihood of being recruited through social control theory assumptions when compared to social learning theory assumptions.

The logistic regression coefficient of -.500 for being with or away from family while pursuing a college education (wth_or_Awy_frm_fmly) showed that a one unit increase decreased the logged odds of being recruited through social learning theory assumptions by .500 while holding others constant. The coefficient for being with or

away from family during college education was not significant and was not significantly different than 0 ($p = .233$). The Exp(B) of being with or away from family during college education was .607 ($e^{\text{wth_or_awy_frm_fmly}} - 1 = -.393$) (negative value) meaning that there was a 39.3% decrease in the likelihood of being recruited through social learning theory assumptions due to a one unit change in being with or away from family while pursuing a college education.

Compared to the first model, the significance level changed to $p = .233$. Excluding the militant group that were away from their family, were recruited in college, and had militants in SN dropped the significance level of this variable. In other words, because it was not clear whether the excluded group was recruited by IS or SN, the current model provided a clearer picture regarding the most frequently used method of Hezbollah's recruitment strategies. Accordingly, the result of this variable revealed that students who were away from their families during college were not significantly different in terms of being recruited through either social control theory or social learning theory assumptions. Both methods were found to be effective in providing an explanation of recruited college student militants.

From a theoretical perspective, social learning theory provided a better explanation for the entire model when compared to social control theory. Thus, it may be concluded that social learning theory offers a better explanation on the recruitment process of college students who are either with or away from their families. However, as discussed in Hypothesis 9, there was a significant difference between social learning and social control theories when providing an explanation for the recruitment process of

college students who had militants in their social networks. Parallel to my expectations, social learning theory provided a better explanation.

Hypothesis 14

H₁₄: Being reared in families who have religious ideologies increases the likelihood of being recruited through social learning theory assumptions when compared to social control theory assumptions.

The logistic regression coefficient for family ideology (family_ideology) revealed that a one unit increase for family ideology increased the logged odds of being recruited through social learning theory assumptions by .119 while holding others constant. The coefficient for family ideology was not significant and or significantly different than 0 ($p = .744$). The Exp(B) of family ideology was 1.126 ($e^{\text{family_ideology}} - 1 = .126$) (positive value) meaning that there was a 12.6% increase in the likelihood of being recruited through social learning theory assumptions due to the one unit change in family ideology.

Similar to the first model, this model also confirmed that there was no significant difference between the assumptions of both theories that explain the Hezbollah's recruitment process of college students.

Hypothesis 15

H₁₅: College students who obtain a campus education are more likely to be recruited through social control theory assumptions when compared to social learning theory assumptions.

The logistic regression coefficient of $-.850$ for online or campus education (online_camp) showed that a one unit increase for online or campus education decreased the logged odds of being recruited through social learning theory assumptions by $.850$ while holding others constant. The coefficient for online or campus education was significant as well as significantly different than 0 ($p = .041$). The Exp(B) of campus education was $.427$ ($e^{\text{online_camp} - 1} = -.573$) (negative value) indicating that there was a 57.3% decrease in the likelihood of being recruited through social learning theory assumptions due to the one unit change in the online or campus education.

Obtaining a campus education had a significant effect on explaining the recruitment process through social control theory assumptions compared to social learning theory assumptions. Compared to the first model, the second model had less effect on the likelihood of being recruited through the social control theory assumptions. Recall that research question two included college students who had militants in their SN were predominantly recruited through social control theory assumptions. By eliminating those groups from this model caused the social learning theory to increase in providing a better explanation for recruitment of college students.

Hypothesis 16

H₁₆: The larger the family, the more likely are college students to be recruited through social control theory assumptions.

As discussed in the methods section of my study, family size (Family_size) was a categorical variable consisting of three categories: (a) small (a) average, and (c) large.

Hence, the reference variable was the large family size that made it possible to compare

small and average size families to large families. Accordingly, the odds of recruited students who are being reared in an average size family when compared to a large size family were increased by a factor of 1.786 when controlling other variables in the model. Likewise, the odds of being reared in a small size family when compared to a large size family was increased by a factor of 2.055 when controlling other variables in the model.

According to the $p = .122$ significance level, family size had no significant effects as to whether being recruited through the assumptions of social control theory or social learning theory. The cross tabulation table as depicted in Table 28 revealed the following three results: (a) Within small size families, institutional structures recruited 48% of the college educated militants and social networks recruited 52% of the militants; (b) within average size families, institutional structures recruited 40.3% of the college educated militants and social networks recruited 59.7% of the militants; and (c) within large size families, institutional structures recruited 47.6% of the college educated militants and social networks recruited 52.4% of the militants.

Hypothesis 17

H₁₇: Students who come from higher family income levels are less likely to be recruited through social control theory assumptions.

Income level (Income_level) was also a categorical variable consisting of categories: (a) poor, (b) average, and (c) Rich. Garson (2010) inferred that categorical variables should be interpreted according to the omitted reference category similar to OLS regression. Since logistic regression keeps the higher valued category as a default

Table 28. Crosstabulation for Hypothesis 16

		Family Size Groups					
		Small Family Size	Average Family Size	Large Family Size	Total		
Social Control Theory (SCT) or Social Learning Theory (SL)	Social Control Theory (SCT)	Count	12	54	80	146	
		% within SCT or SLT	8.2%	37.0%	54.8%	100.0%	
		% within Family Size Groups	48.0%	40.3%	47.6%	44.6%	
		% of Total	3.7%	16.5%	24.5%	44.6%	
	Social Learning Theory (SLT)	Count	13	80	88	181	
		% within SCT or SLT	7.2%	44.2%	48.6%	100.0%	
		% within Family Size Groups	52.0%	59.7%	52.4%	55.4%	
		% of Total	4.0%	24.5%	26.9%	55.4%	
		Total	Count	25	134	168	327
		% within SCT or SLT	7.6%	41.0%	51.4%	100.0%	
	% within Family Size Groups	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%		
	% of Total	7.6%	41.0%	51.4%	100.0%		

reference, rich represented the reference variable used to make a comparison between poor and average families. In comparison to rich families, the odds of being from a family with poor economic power were decreased by a factor of .287 when controlling other variables in the model. Likewise, the odds of being from a family with average economic power when compared to rich families were decreased by a factor of .415 when controlling other variables in the model. Similar to family size, income level had no significant effect on the likelihood of being recruited according to the assumptions of both social control and social learning theories as illustrated by the cross tabulations in Table 29.

Among the college educated militants who came from poor family backgrounds, 50.5% were recruited through social learning theory assumptions and 49.5% were recruited through social control theory assumptions. The average income family represented 61.4% versus 38.6% and the rich families represented 65.2% versus 34.8%.

Hypothesis 18

H₁₈: The religiosity level of college students is more likely to increase the likelihood of being recruited through social control theory assumptions.

The logistic regression coefficient of -.194 for militant's ideology (militants_ideology) revealed that a one unit increase for this variable decreased the logged odds of being recruited through social networks by .194 while holding others constant. The coefficient for militant's ideology was not significant and was not significantly different than 0 ($p = .559$). The Exp(B) militant's ideology was .824

Table 29. Crosstabulation for Hypothesis 17

Social Control Theory (SC) or Social Learning Theory (SL) * Income Level Crosstabulation					
		Income Level			
		Poor	Average	Rich	Total
Social Control Theory (SCT) or Social Learning Theory (SLT)	Social Control Theory (SCT) Count	94	44	8	146
	% within SCT or SLT	64.4%	30.1%	5.5%	100.0%
	% within Income Level	49.5%	38.6%	34.8%	44.6%
	% of Total	28.7%	13.5%	2.4%	44.6%
Social Learning Theory (SLT)	Social Learning Theory (SLT) Count	96	70	15	181
	% within SCT or SLT	53.0%	38.7%	8.3%	100.0%
	% within Income Level	50.5%	61.4%	65.2%	55.4%
	% of Total	29.4%	21.4%	4.6%	55.4%
Total	Total Count	190	114	23	327
	% within SCT or SLT	58.1%	34.9%	7.0%	100.0%
	% within Income Level	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	58.1%	34.9%	7.0%	100.0%

$(e^{\text{militants_ideology}} - 1 = -176$ (negative value) meaning that there was a 17.6% decrease in the likelihood of being recruited through the social learning theory assumptions due to the one unit change in ideology of the militants.

According to the results, there was no change in providing a better explanation for recruitment of college students through the assumptions of either social control or social learning theories. When compared to the first model, there was a difference in the odds ratio power (.513 versus .489).

Hypothesis 19

H₁₉: Religious reasons increase the likelihood of being recruited through social learning theory assumptions.

The logistic regression coefficient of -.667 for political motivation (Pol_motiv) showed that a one unit increase for political motivation decreased the logged odds of recruitment into the Hezbollah through social learning theory assumptions by .667 while holding others constant. The coefficient for political motivation was neither significant nor significantly different than 0 ($p = .543$). The Exp(B) of political motivation was .513 ($(e^{\text{pol_motiv}} - 1 = -487)$ (negative value) meaning that there was a 48.7% decrease in the likelihood of being recruited through social networks due to the one unit change in the political motivation. Political motivation also had no significant difference in explaining Hezbollah's recruitment process of college students through either social control theory or social learning theory.

The findings of Hypotheses 12 through 19 are summarized in Table 30.

Table 30. Hypotheses and Findings for RQ 3 (SLT = Social Learning Theory, SCT = Social Control Theory)

Hypotheses	Key findings	Sig. Level
H ₁₂ : Having Hezbollah militants within peer groups or relatives increases the likelihood of being recruited through SLT assumptions	Nearly 26 times increase in the likelihood of being recruited through SLT perspectives comparing to SCT assumptions	$p = .000$
H ₁₃ : Pursuing a college education away from one's family increases the likelihood of being recruited through SCT assumptions when compared to SLT assumptions	39.3% decrease in the likelihood of being recruited through SLT assumptions	$p = .233$
H ₁₄ : Being reared in families who have religious ideologies increases the likelihood of being recruited through SLT assumptions when compared to SCT assumptions	12.6% increase in the likelihood of being recruited through SLT assumptions	$p = .744$
H ₁₅ : College students who obtain a campus education are more likely to be recruited through SCT assumptions when compared to SLT assumptions.	57.3% decrease in the likelihood of being recruited through SLT assumptions	$p = .041$
H ₁₆ : The larger the family, the more likely are college students to be recruited through SCT assumptions	<i>Small Family militants</i> recruited through SLT assumptions (48% versus 52%), <i>Average family militants</i> recruited through SLT assumptions (41.1% versus 58.9%), <i>Large family militants</i> recruited through SLT assumptions (49.1% versus 50.9%)	$p = .122$
H ₁₇ : Students who come from higher family income levels are less likely to be recruited through SLT assumptions	<i>Poor Family militants</i> recruited through SLT assumptions (49.7% versus 50.3%), <i>Average family militants</i> recruited through SLT assumptions (40.3% versus 59.3%), <i>Rich family militants</i> recruited through SLT assumptions (36% versus 64%)	$p = .149$
H ₁₈ : The religiosity level of college students is more likely to increase the likelihood of being recruited through SCT assumptions	17.6% decrease in the likelihood of being recruited through SLT assumptions	$p = .599$
H ₁₉ : Religious reasons increase the likelihood of being recruited through SLT assumption	48.7% decrease in the likelihood of being recruited through SLT assumptions	$p = .543$

4.4 Conclusions

My study revealed that social networks and institutional structures are two important methods that are used by the Turkish Hezbollah to recruit college students. In a comparison between the two structures, social networks were found to be more effectively used by the terrorist organization, a finding that was parallel to my expectations given that families who reside in Turkey's southeastern part have quite strong social bonds. Accordingly, RQ 3 provided a clearer picture regarding the effectiveness of social networks. After excluding college student militants whose recruitment styles were not apparent, social networks became more effective in the Hezbollah's recruitment strategies. Especially, students who had militants within their family or relatives increased the likelihood of being recruited through social networks. In addition to this variable and others, being reared in a large religious family with an average or greater income increased the likelihood of recruitment through social networks.

On the other hand, my study revealed that besides social networks, institutional structures are effective tools used by the Turkish Hezbollah to recruit more college students into their organization. For example, social and cultural activities provide opportunities for members to meet new targets. This applies especially to college newcomers who can be contacted by offering free food and shelter. As revealed by my study, being away from one's family had a significant effect on the likelihood of being recruited through institutional structures. In addition, obtaining an online education, being religious, and having political motivations were other variables that increased the

likelihood of a college student's recruitment into the organization through institutional structures.

5 CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION

5.1 Introduction

In my study, I focused on three main issues. First, I explored the institutional structures and social networks that were most frequently used by the Turkish Hezbollah to recruit college students and concluded that social networks were the preferred method. Second, my study was designed to reveal the best theories that explain the behavioral patterns of recruited militants in choosing to participate in the Hezbollah terrorist organization. Considering the target population for institutional structures, students who were away from their families while attending college were generally found to be favored. Because social control theory predicts that weak social bonds lead to delinquency, its assumptions provided a better explanation regarding the behaviors of recruited college students. On the other hand, another finding revealed that the Turkish Hezbollah uses social networks very effectively in their attempt to recruit new militants. Because social learning theory assumes that crime is learned through observing other people's behaviors, outcomes, and attitudes; this was the best fit theory that explained the behavior of college educated students who were recruited through social networks. Finally, I examined demographic details to determine whether a recruited student was influenced through institutional structures or social networks by including eight independent variables in the equation.

In this chapter, research findings are linked to the literature review, related theories, and policies. Implications gathered from terrorism literature are discussed through the findings of my dissertation.

Because recruited militants' personnel reports were seized that provided factual details in their own words concerning how they were recruited as well as an account of their personal demographics, the findings of my research were expected to provide valuable information that would serve to create innovative counterterrorism policies and policy implications for future studies.

5.2 Discussion of Findings

Hypotheses 1 and 2

H₁: Social networks and institutional structures are two general methods used extensively by the Turkish Hezbollah for recruiting new college student militants within universities.

H₂: Using social networks is a more effective method in recruiting college educated militants when compared to institutional structures.

Both hypotheses focused on institutional structures and social networks that were proposed to reveal the most effective tactics used by the Turkish Hezbollah to recruit college students. Considering the social structure of Turkey's southeastern part, there are strong social ties among family members that greatly influence an individual's behavior. In my study, I found that college students who had militants among their relatives or peer groups increased the likelihood of being recruited through social networks. On the other hand, institutional structures proved to be more effective within the group that had no militants within their social network and were educated away from their families as will be further discussed in related hypotheses.

Oguz (2007) claimed that an individual can be affected through criminals who exist within the family circle. For example, family members or relatives who commit criminal and terrorist activities not only set a bad example but also misguide other family members who are around them. My findings supported Oguz's assumption that most college educated militants were recruited through social networks.

On the other hand, Oguz (2007) argued that individuals who suffer from weak family ties and social networks often results in a lack of self-confidence. In this case, their participation in social life activities and sharing common societal values may be difficult. Thus, these individuals become easy recruitment targets for terrorist groups even if there are no militants within their social networks. Although institutional structures are quite effective recruitment tools, they were found to be less likely preferred by the Turkish Hezbollah when compared to social networks.

Hypothesis 3

H₃: Having Hezbollah militants within one's social structure increases the likelihood of being recruited through social networks when compared to institutional structures.

According to my findings, students having militants within their families and/or peer groups had a significant effect on being recruited through social networks rather than institutional structures. As discussed, social networks that are comprised of relatives as well as peers have a great influence over an individual because social and psychological needs are met through these groups. Alkan and Citak (2007) suggested that when compared to relatives, peer group pressure is often so strong that it has a greater

effect on influencing an individual. According to Alkan and Citak, terrorist organizations take advantage of these types of relationships.

On the other hand, the relationship between relatives was another factor that had a tremendous influence over recruited student militants. Like peer group relations, terrorist organizations manipulate potential targets through family member associations. In terms of assessing the influence of Turkish relatives on other family members, the following quote expressed by a left terror group militant is worthy of note:

My uncle was arrested after he was injured in the fight against the security forces in 1992 and sentenced to the life-long imprisonment. Inspired by my uncle, I started to feel sympathy to this organization at the very small age. (Alkan & Citak, 2007, p. 292)

Parallel to the above discussions, my research confirms the strength that social networks had over college students in my study who were recruited by the Turkish Hezbollah. As observed in the odds ratio of having Hezbollah militants within social networks ($\text{Exp}(B) = 17.415$), there was nearly a 16 times increase in the likelihood of being recruited through social networks rather than institutional structures if there were militants included among peer groups and relatives.

Hypothesis 4

H₄: Pursuing a college education while away from one's family increases the likelihood of being recruited through institutional structures when compared to social networks.

Being away from one's social networks often results in weak social bonds that increase the likelihood of being recruited into the Turkish Hezbollah through institutional structures. Although college students may not have any militants within their social networks, this group may provide easy targets for terrorists when they are away from their families. When compared to social networks, my study's findings supported the theory that Turkish Hezbollah uses institutional structures quite effectively to recruit new militants. For example, college students who were away from their families while pursuing a college education were found to be recruited through institutional structures statistically more than through social networks.

Quite different from the United States, college social life in Turkey is more active. In other words, ideologies are represented through legal structures wherein social and cultural gatherings are arranged in order for students to meet one another through sporting events, tea parties, interviews, youth camps, meetings with friends, concerts, picnics, et cetera. Even in smaller college cities, each evening is planned around these types of student organizational events. In addition, most of these institutional structures provide complimentary shelter and food for newcomers who typically come from poor families; thus, these students may easily be manipulated and recruited by the Turkish Hezbollah.

Hypothesis 5

H₅: Being reared in families who have religious ideologies increases the likelihood of being recruited through social networks when compared to institutional structures.

According to Ozeren (2004), literature regarding the religious effect over terror suggests that there is no direct link between terrorism and religion. Irbec (2005) further claimed that religion is generally used to justify terrorism by religiously motivated organizations. According to Irbec, a misunderstanding and misinterpretation of religion helps terror groups to widen their targets and promote their cause. Parallel to the literature, findings of my study revealed that there was no significant difference between being recruited either through institutional structures or through social networks. In general, if there were any links between religion and terrorism, social networks would supposedly have a significant effect on the recruitment of college students. According to the results of my study, the null hypothesis should therefore be accepted: In terms of recruitment methods, there is no difference between college students who were reared in religious families when compared to those who were reared in nonreligious families.

Hypothesis 6

H₆: College students who obtain a campus education are more likely to be recruited through institutional structures when compared to social networks.

In my study, if college students were with their families while pursuing a college education and had no militants within their social networks, they were less likely to be recruited by the Hezbollah's institutional structures. On the other hand, if they were with their families and had militants within their social networks, they were more likely to be recruited through social networks. Considering that these two hypothetical options are true, there should be a significant difference in terms of being recruited through either institutional structures or through social networks according to the type of education

pursued. Parallel to this argument, the model provided significant differences according to type of recruitment.

Referring to Table 16, cross tabulation results run between recruitment and education types revealed that out of 96 online-educated college students, 81 were recruited through social networks. This finding also supported the idea that social networks are important tools used by the Turkish Hezbollah to recruit college students. Placing emphasis on types of education, institutional structures were found to be more effective for on-campus versus online college students.

These two principal findings revealed that while institutional structures generally focus on college students who are away from their families, social networks are more often used to recruit new militants from within their respective peer groups and relatives. As described in the Turkish Hezbollah's recruitment patterns, the net model best explains the organization's institutional structures that are generally used to recruit new militants through social activities.

Hypothesis 7

H₇: The larger the family size, the more likely are college students to be recruited through institutional structures.

For the overall model, my study revealed that family size had no significant influence on the likelihood of college students being recruited through either institutional structures or social networks. However, students who came from average size families were significantly recruited through social networks when compared to small and large family sizes. Except for this group, there was no significant difference for small family

size and large family size in terms of recruitment methods. As clearly shown by cross tabulation (c.f., Table 17), 58.9% of the students from average size families were recruited through social networks and 41.1% were recruited through institutional structures.

As previously discussed, social networks were more likely used by the Turkish Hezbollah to recruit college students who had militants among their peer groups and relatives. Having no significant difference within the smaller size families indicated that institutional structures were as effective as social network recruitment methods. Because this was related more to social control theory, further discussion is provided in Hypothesis 16.

Hypothesis 8

H₈: Students who come from higher family income levels are less likely to be recruited by institutional structures when compared to social networks.

For the overall model and contrary to family size, there was no significant difference between militants who came from families who had poor, average, or rich income levels. According to Krueger and Maleckova (2003), the relationship between education, poverty, and terrorism is complicated, indirect and quite weak. In other words, students who come from poor families should be dominantly recruited through social networks if there is a relationship between poverty and terrorism. Due to the strength of institutional structures, however, my study showed no significant difference between institutional structures and social networks.

Hypothesis 9

H₉: College student's religiosity level is more likely to increase the likelihood of being recruited through institutional structures when compared to social networks.

As discussed in Hypothesis 5, the religiosity level of a college educated militant's family did not provide statistical significant difference in terms of whether students were recruited through institutional structures or social networks. If, however, a family's religiosity level had played a significant role, college students would have generally been recruited through institutional structures given that they would be more open to manipulation. The significance level of this variable also supported that religious as well as nonreligious students were recruited through both IS and SN methods with no significant difference.

Hypothesis 10

H₁₀: Religious reasons increase the likelihood of being recruited through social networks.

Political motivation had no significant difference between college students who were recruited through either institutional structures or social networks. According to the majority of militants' statements, they all chose to join the Turkish Hezbollah for religious reasons. From their viewpoints, Islam's teachings were in danger either across the world or in Turkey, and therefore Turkey should be an Islamic state ruled according to *Sharia* (Islamic law). According to the findings of my study, the Turkish Hezbollah used religion through both institutional structures and social networks to effectively

recruit college students thus indicating that the militants were manipulated through religious ideology. In addition, religious groups have also used terror to obtain their ends.

Hypothesis 11

H₁₁: Social learning theory provides a better explanation regarding the Turkish Hezbollah's recruitment strategies when compared to social control theory.

As discussed in the methods section, two groups ($N = 12$) were excluded from my study in order to meet the assumptions of social control and social learning theories. Because there was no precise information as to which assumptions the militants were recruited under, skewness in the model's data could have possibly resulted. Other than the excluded groups, if institutional structures were used as a recruitment method, college students were considered to be enlisted through social control theory given that having weak bonds may be explained through reasons such as being away from one's family or being reared larger families, for example.

According to the equation, types of methods used to recruit college students were best explained through social learning theory. For example, out of 327 students 181 (55.4%) were recruited through the assumptions of social learning theory and 146 (44.6%) were recruited through social control theory assumptions.

A comparison between the first and second model revealed that the effectiveness of social networks and social learning theory in explaining the Turkish Hezbollah militants resulted in a 1.1% increase when two groups were disqualified, an indicator that the excluded students ($N = 12$) who also had Hezbollah militants within their social

networks were most likely recruited through institutional structures even though they did not provide any details as to how they were initially motivated.

Hypothesis 12

H₁₂: Having Hezbollah militants within peer groups or relatives increases the likelihood of being recruited through social networks comparing to social learning assumption.

Excluding the two groups ($N = 12$) from the equation increased the likelihood of college students being recruited through social learning theory assumptions according to having militants within their social networks. Similar to the first model, the second model also provided significant differences between both models. While $\text{Exp}(B)$ for having Hezbollah militants within social networks in the first model was 17.415, $\text{Exp}(B)$ for the second model was 27.067 indicating that there was a 26 times increase in the likelihood of being recruited through social learning theory assumptions if militants were within the student' social networks. When compared to social control theory, this variable revealed that social learning theory provided the best explanation for the Turkish Hezbollah's recruitment strategy.

Hypothesis 13

H₁₃: Pursuing a college education while away from one's family increases the likelihood of being recruited through social control theory assumptions when compared to social learning theory assumptions.

Like Hypothesis 12, excluding college students ($N = 12$) from the model increased the likelihood of being recruited through social networks. While the first model revealed that being either away from or with one's family decreased the likelihood by 58.6% of recruitment through social networks, the second model increased the likelihood by 17.3%, a percentage increase that dropped the significance level. Although this variable had a significant effect on the first model, the effect was nonsignificant in the second model.

Hypothesis 14

H₁₄: Being reared in families who have religious ideologies increases the likelihood of being recruited through social learning theory assumptions when compared to social control theory assumptions.

Again, this model had no significant effect on the type of recruitment method used, and there was no difference in terms of providing a theoretical explanation to Hezbollah's strategies. There was, however, a slight difference in the effectiveness of this variable on both models. For example, the odds ratio was 1.113 for the first model and 1.126 for the second model which revealed a 1.3% increase in the likelihood of being recruited into the Turkish Hezbollah through social learning theory assumptions.

Hypothesis 15

H₁₅: College students who obtain a campus education are more likely to be recruited through social control theory assumptions when compared to social learning theory assumptions.

After excluding above mentioned college students from the equation, obtaining an online education decreased the significance level of this model. A decrease in the number of college students who were with their families and were recruited through institutional structures was the main reason for this change.

Hypothesis 16

H₁₆: The larger the family, the more likely are college students to be recruited through social control theory assumptions.

Hirschi and Gottfredson (1990) claimed that the greater the family size, the less time parents tend to direct supervision over their children. Thus, the major reason for a person's low self control appears to be ineffective child rearing.

According to social learning theory assumptions, the likelihood of college students being recruited in this second model when compared to the first model increased for those reared in small or average size families. On the other hand, college students who came from a large family were more likely to be recruited through social control theory assumptions. These results supported that being reared in larger families increases the chance of forming weak social bonds that could be a reason for recruitment into the Hezbollah through social control theory assumptions.

Hypothesis 17

H₁₇: Students who come from higher family income levels are less likely to be recruited through social control theory assumptions.

According to each family's income level, this model revealed that having more income decreased the likelihood of a college student being recruited by the Hezbollah through social learning theory assumptions. While in the first model, there was a 61.7% decrease in the likelihood of being recruited through social networks, the second model revealed that the likelihood of being recruited through social networks decreased to 71.3%. There was a similar decrease for students who came from families having average incomes. These percentages showed that the second model provided a better explanation through social control theory assumptions in terms of income level or an indicator that low income families have less control over their children. Even though an individual has no militants within social networks and has low income level, he or she is more likely to be recruited through social control theory assumptions, since they are more prone to be manipulated.

Hypothesis 18 and 19

H₁₈: The religiosity level of college students is more likely to increase the likelihood of being recruited through social control theory assumptions.

H₁₉: Religious reasons increase the likelihood of being recruited through social learning theory assumptions.

Similar to other variables in my study, religiosity level and religious reasons provided a better explanation for this model through social learning theory when compared to the previous model. However, the equation revealed that there was no significant difference between recruitment through IS or SN theories' assumptions when considering the religiosity level of college students. In other words, religiosity level did

not show any significant difference between the theories in terms of providing an explanation for the behavior of recruited student militants. Therefore, both religious and nonreligious college educated militants may be recruited through social networks as well as institutional structures. Differences between the findings of RQ 2 and RQ 3 in terms of Beta level (B), significance level (p) and odds ratio (Exp (B) values are illustrated in Table 31.

5.3 Theoretical Implications

Although terrorism is a significant threat to societies and governments (Mendelson, 2007), the literature lacks theoretical guidance, and most applied theories are adapted from other academic disciplines (Yilmaz, 2009). Such as, as discussed by O'Connor, economics is used to understand terrorism from the point of supply and demand. In this section, I connected the findings of my study to the theoretical explanations related to the Turkish Hezbollah's recruitment strategies.

5.3.1 Social Learning Theory

Findings in my study revealed that when college educated students have militants among their peers or relatives, the likelihood of being recruited through social networks increased significantly. By using eight IVs to test the type of recruitment most frequently used by the Turkish Hezbollah, this variable had the strongest effect. Parallel to social learning theory assumptions, strong social networks that are prevalent in the southeastern part of Turkey had a significant effect on the recruited college educated militants.

Table 31. Comparison between the Findings of Research Questions Two and Three

	RQ 2–Exp(B)	RQ 3–Exp(B)	Comparison Between the Findings of RQ 2 and RQ 3
Having Hezbollah militants within social networks	17.415	27.067	Compared to Model 1, there is a 55% <i>increase</i> in the likelihood of being recruited through SN
Being away from family while pursuing a college education	.414	.607	Likelihood of being recruited through social network is <i>increased</i> by 19.3%
Family Ideology	1.113	1.126	Likelihood of being recruited through social network is <i>increased</i> by 1.3%
Having Online or Campus Education	.451	.427	Likelihood of being recruited through social network is <i>decreased</i> by 2.4%
Small Family Size	1.944	1.786	Likelihood of being recruited through social network is <i>decreased</i> by 15.8%
Average Family Size	1.969	2.055	Likelihood of being recruited through social network is <i>increased</i> by 8.6%
Low Income Level	.383	.287	Likelihood of being recruited through social network is <i>decreased</i> by 9.6%
Average Income Level	.496	.415	Likelihood of being recruited through social network is <i>decreased</i> by 8.1%
Militant's Ideology	.818	.824	Likelihood of being recruited through social network is <i>increased</i> by 0.6%
Political Motivation	.489	.513	Likelihood of being recruited through social network is <i>increased</i> by 2.4%

The second variable that increased the likelihood of recruitment through social learning theory assumptions was being reared in religious families. Although this variable did not significantly affect the likelihood of being recruited through social learning theory, it did, however, increase the likelihood of being recruited through the assumptions of social learning theory. Given that the Turkish Hezbollah is a religiously motivated terror organization, this finding supported social learning from a theoretical perspective.

Cross tabulation tables for family size illustrated that college student militants who were reared in an average size family were most likely to be recruited through social learning theory assumptions. On the other hand, social learning and social control theories had a similar effect on the students who came from either small or large size families.

Another variable that increased the likelihood of being recruited by the Turkish Hezbollah through social networks was income level. For example, college students who came from rich families were more likely to be recruited through social learning theory assumptions in comparison to college students who came from poor or average family incomes. This finding supported the assumptions of both social learning and social control theories. Because college students who come from wealthy rich families are typically more likely to meet their own personal expenses and needs, they were less likely to be connected to the terrorist organization through institutional structures. Hence, the most effective way for the Hezbollah to recruit this group is through the use of social networks as indicated in my study.

In sum, findings revealed that the four IVs—militants within peer groups or among relatives, religious families, family size, and family income—supported the social learning theory consistent with Burgess and Akers' (1966) differential association theory. Accordingly, Jessor et al. (1968) considered peer and parental influence to be two important variables related to either positive or negative behaviors among teenagers. Akers (2004) further stated that an individual learns behavior through both nonsocial situations and social interactions by observing the behavioral consequences common to others. The data related to the recruited Turkish Hezbollah college educated militants supported the perspectives held by these scholars; thus, it can be concluded that most of the college educated Hezbollah militants in my study were recruited through interaction with peers and relatives.

5.3.2 Social Control Theory

Although the majority of recruitment styles were best explained through the assumptions of social learning theory, social control was another important theory that provided a good explanation regarding Turkish Hezbollah's recruitment tactics. Booth et al. (2008) inferred that social control theory emphasizes the role of control in terms of counteracting delinquency through strong social bonds that hinder delinquency. Contrary to other criminology theories, social control theory states that if individuals are left to their own devices, they are more prone to commit crime (Vold et al., 2002).

Accordingly, acquiring a college education while away from social networks was an independent variable that increased the likelihood of being recruited by the Hezbollah

through institutional structures. This finding provided the strongest support for the strength of social control theory assumptions given that being away from social networks weakens social bonds that significantly affect the chances of recruitment.

Obtaining a campus college education was the second variable that supported the assumptions of social control theory. Because campus educated students are more likely to interact through the institutional structures of terror groups, they are also possible targets for the Turkish Hezbollah. Accordingly, the likelihood of recruiting college students through institutional structures was another significant effect that indicated the strength of social control.

Having religious ideologies was another variable that increased the likelihood of college students being recruited through social control theory assumptions. Because these groups were more vulnerable to religious propaganda, recruiting more students into the Turkish Hezbollah through institutional structures showed the strength of social control theory.

Finally, political motivation also increased the likelihood of being recruited through social control theory assumptions. As previously discussed, the Turkish Hezbollah is a religiously motivated terror organization in which institutional structures focus on individuals who may be more prone to religious propaganda.

5.4 Policy Implications

According to the findings of my study, the following policy suggestions for security forces, scholars, and policy makers are recommended. In addition to policy

implications, personal demographic data related to my sample of recruited college educated militants are provided.

5.4.1 Policy makers should consider religious citizens to be represented in the system, and tension between laicism and religion should be eliminated

Influenced by the positivist argument, founders of Turkey were under the impression that religion in general prevented modernization and sustained backwardness. They assessed that religion was the basic reason behind the Ottoman Empire's disintegration and was the main threat to the stability and longevity of the new regime. Thus, they followed the example of the Ottomans in controlling religion under government hierarchy by instituting the Directory of Religious Affairs (Kologlu, 1999). According to Casanova (1994), modernization was intended to drive away religion or at least repel its social and political role. He further claimed that religion was thought to become a private matter between God and the individual believer. However, this never actually happened, at least not uniformly, anywhere in the world including across Europe. Unlike other religions, Islam does not encourage secularization (Gellner, 1981). Consequently, Gellner argued that the Islamic religion has always occupied a central place in the lives of Muslim societies to the point that, interestingly, its influence over society is apparently independent from other aspects of society. Toprak (1981) further claimed that while secularization in the normative model is thought to be associated with enlightenment and freedom of thought, it is imposed from above and protected in an authoritarian manner in Turkey by state institutions that include the military.

To religious people, state policy is based on this misguided assumption which is under the assumption that a “secular” regime is beset with intolerance. More especially, the state’s headscarf policy that is forbidden in schools and workplaces is broadly criticized; therefore religious people claim that there is discrimination against religious individuals (Gulalp, 2003). As previously discussed, religion has a powerful influence over Turkey’s Kurdish originated citizens. Therefore, this controversy between religious and laic people created an opportunity for the Turkish Hezbollah to produce effective propaganda against the state.

Demographic details provided by the recruited college educated Hezbollah militants also revealed the importance of religion. For example, my study revealed that 165 (48.6%) out of 339 families and 162 (47.7%) out of 339 militants were identified as being religious. In addition, 328 (96.6%) out of 339 militants stated that religious reasons were the driving forces behind joining the Hezbollah’s terrorist organization. This statistics reveals that religion is widely used propaganda tool for the Turkish Hezbollah. As mentioned above, weakness of the laicism is effectively used by the religiously motivated terror groups. Government policies over the religion should be well balanced that laic system should not be used as a tool to limit religious independence. Instead, laic system may be used to provide religious independence to the society that nobody can be classified according to their religion. On the other hand, religious rules should not be used as a tool to create pressure on the society. Religion should be lived in the individual level and everybody should be respected on his/her religious chooses.

Therefore, to halt this process, I recommend that Turkey should develop a new approach to current policies. Unfortunately, I believe that the problem with Turkish laicism stems from the policy implementation. In other words, the traditional background practices of Turkey's governmental system created this problem. Clearly, laicism is one of the most important policies in Turkey and implementation of this policy is therefore vital. Through implementing this policy, public policy makers should eliminate the harmful side of this policy by distinguishing between the religious and fundamentalists. In addition, teaching religion through private organizations should be supported and controlled through the state. As Ozeren (2004) argued, not only do all religions denounce terrorist attacks, they also condemn terrorist behaviors. In other words, teaching the basic principles of religions offers fundamental importance in dealing with terrorism.

5.4.2 Response to terrorist activities should be well balanced

As discussed by Mehdiyev (2007), ideological terrorism stems from political, social, and economic problems. Religious intolerance and political oppression are only a few of the arguments widely used by militants to justify terrorist activities. In case of adjusting the political system to these arguments, namely providing an environment to discuss these ideas, responding to terrorist groups in an unstable manner creates a worse scenario. As previously discussed, an unbalanced response from the state represents one strong argument that terrorist groups effectively use. Because people sometimes believe that the state strives to oppress its citizens, unbalanced responses generally create sympathy toward terrorist organizations. Therefore, the state should only attempt to

prevent illegal terrorist activities while fighting against terrorism. Although militants may die during the clash in order to protect citizens, the state should not purposefully kill them in an effort to fight the militants' ideologies.

As revealed in my study, most of the college students were recruited through social networks. It is clear that having militants within social networks has great impact on the likelihood of being recruited by the social networks. Unbalanced response to terror groups not only weakens State's position on fighting against terrorism, but also creates powerful propaganda tools for the terror groups. Accordingly, my study's findings support this argument that having Hezbollah militants within social networks increases the likelihood of being recruited through social learning theory assumptions by 26 times comparing to being recruited through social learning theory assumptions.

In other words, this was an indicator suggesting that the state may kill one terrorist but in the process the Hezbollah terrorist organization may target ten sympathizers who are possible candidates for recruitment. In this respect, a balanced response to terrorism was found to be the core element in the fight against terrorism.

By offering a more democratic atmosphere rather than forbidding each ideology may provide a free discussion environment that can result in a more effective way to fight against terrorism. As discussed by Mehdiyev (2007), if an individual believes that it is impossible to reach his or her goals through the legal system, he or she may search for other ways to achieve these goals. In my opinion, the speakers' corner located in London's Hyde Park is an excellent example for people to freely convey their messages and ideologies. For example, provided that speeches do not tend to provoke violence

(Wikipedia, 2010), everyone is given the opportunity to voice their diverse ideologies through this method. Thus, this kind of environment has the power to eliminate one of the strongest arguments of terror groups.

5.4.3 *More effective policies should be implemented to fight against poverty and decrease unemployment*

According to the economic power of family income level, my study revealed that 195 (57.5%) out of 339 militants identified themselves as coming from poor households, 119 (35.1%) came from families with normal income levels, and only 25 (7.3%) militants came from wealthy family backgrounds. These statistics showed that there was a tremendous gap between the percentage of rich militant families to normal and poor families. As Koseli (2007) pointed out, socioeconomic conditions, namely inequalities and poverty, are important variables that lead individuals to join terror groups. His study revealed that there is a significant relationship between the poverty, inequality, and violent crime.

For example, the southeastern region of Turkey where the Hezbollah is more active is one of the most underprivileged parts of the country (Karaca, 2004). According to the State Institute of Statistics (2001), while the southeastern cities have the gross domestic product per capita as between 568 and 918, western cities have between 2500 and 6168. In addition, unemployment in the southeastern region of Turkey has the highest rate (11.5 to 17.5) comparing to western part of the Turkey (3.6 to 9.4).

Considering the recruited college students who have campus or online education, there is a significant difference between these groups in terms of their recruitment method. College students who have online education are most likely to be recruited by the institutional structures while college students who have campus education are more likely to be recruited the institutional structures. I believe that providing free shelter and free foods helps the Turkish Hezbollah to get more sympathizers. Decreasing the poverty level will help to decrease the number of possible new targets.

Thus, statistics concerning poverty and unemployment rates reveal that the state should take proactive measures in an effort to lessen inequalities and poverty.

5.5 Suggestions for Future Research

5.5.1 *More quantitative research is required to examine the recruitment process of militants in order to explore the factors that increase one's likelihood of being recruited into the Turkish Hezbollah*

Although terrorism has received spectacular international attention over the past decade, unfortunately there remains sparse quantitative research in relation to the recruitment strategies used by terror groups. In other words, most researchers have focused on profiling the terrorist from psychological or sociological perspectives. According to Hudson (1999), studies have revealed that terrorists' personalities are so diverse that they can be observed in any legal profession. Contrary to the general perception of literature related to terrorism, terrorists are typically normal people who are generally misled through religious or ideological ways of viewing the world. Therefore,

until terrorists are assigned to execute their missions, it is impossible to differentiate them from normal people. Hudson therefore inferred that it is useless to describe the terrorist in terms of physical and behavioral characteristics.

Comparable to the above argument, I believe that researchers should identify the required circumstances that lead individuals to join terrorist organizations rather than simply profiling terrorists. From this perspective and through the self reports of recruited college educated militants, I believe that my study has contributed greatly to the literature pertaining to recruitment tactics used by the Turkish Hezbollah. Through my sample of self reports, it was possible for me to provide a quantitative explanation concerning how militants were recruited and what factors lead to their recruitment.

In addition, I believe that counterterrorism is not an easy task. For example, any state should not only fight against terrorists in the field but should identify and fight against their justifications for committing terrorist activities. Through my study, I examined and determined the recruitment factors that were effective in the Turkish Hezbollah's practices. Despite these significant contributions, additional quantitative research should be conducted in order to confirm my findings and produce scientific results. Although my data were unique in terms of reflecting the pure ideology of college educated militants recruited by the Turkish Hezbollah, future researchers may find it difficult to obtain these sources of information. Therefore, I recommend that scholars focus more attention on newspapers, magazines, and other periodical documents produced by terrorists that may reveal details concerning effective tactics used to recruit members. In Turkey, for example, most terrorist publications are written in an attempt to

motivate sympathizers by providing anonymous details related to why militants choose to participate in their organization and what behavioral factors influenced them to join.

5.5.2 Future researchers may consider conducting studies related to the leaders' perspectives on selecting new recruitment targets

Not only from the perspectives of terrorist militants but also from those of their leaders, researchers should make an effort to understand explicit recruitment tactics used by terrorist organizations, specifically the Turkish Hezbollah. Clearly, terror groups apply certain recruitment strategies that are commonly produced by their group leaders. Thus, it is possible for scholars to obtain recruitment strategies through periodicals or through militant statements that have been seized by security forces. Fortunately, I was given the opportunity to read and examine numerous self reported statements submitted by arrested militants in which detailed information was outlined pertaining to how the Hezbollah motivated and manipulated sympathizers into joining their organization. Thus, similar types of academic research may also provide excellent information related to recruitment tactics used by the terrorist groups. In addition, the significance of my findings can be validated through future research.

5.5.3 More studies are required to reveal how all religions strictly condemn terrorism

Given that most terror activities in this decade claim to be related to religious ideologies, scholars should be required to reveal how terrorism and religion are two terms that cannot be interrelated. As mentioned, religion is one of the most important mediators

used in the Turkish Hezbollah's recruitment strategies. As Sageman (2004) observed, religion represents one of the basic tools used to recruit new militants. The findings of my study also supported the assumption that religion is a tool that is effectively used by the Turkish Hezbollah through either institutional structures or social networks to enlist new militants. Therefore, the content analysis between religion and terrorism is required to explain how groups use religious terminology to manipulate and entice potential militants into joining their organization. I believe that such research can provide innovative policy implications that may bring to an end to the recruitment process of terrorist groups.

5.6 Conclusions

In my study, two main objectives were achieved. First, I identified the tactics used by the Turkish Hezbollah to recruit college students into becoming members of their terrorist organization, and second, I provided detailed demographics related to recruited college educated militants. For example, I determined how Hezbollah militants were recruited, their economic profiles, if they had militants within their social networks, whether they were educated while being with or away from their families, their family's ideology as well as their own, justification for joining the Hezbollah, and their family size and income.

To achieve these objectives, I developed 19 hypotheses that were dependent upon eight IVs entered twice into the equation in order to weigh their influence over the DVs. The IVs were initially tested to reveal how the effectiveness of institutional structures and social networks increased or decreased depending upon the IVs. Finally, the IVs were

tested to determine which theories provided a better explanation for the Turkish Hezbollah's recruitment strategies.

My study revealed that recruited college educated militants who had Hezbollah militants within their social networks, pursued their college education away from their families, and obtained an online education had a significant effect on the likelihood of being recruited through either institutional structures or social networks. These findings supported the assumptions of social control theory and social learning theory. According to the results of my study, the following important points were made:

- Weak social bonds increase the likelihood committing crimes (social control theory assumption)
- Crime is a behavior learned through observing the activities of others (social learning theory assumption)

In addition to these findings, my study revealed that being reared in a religious family, having religious ideologies, family's income level, and family size did not significantly differ in terms of the Hezbollah's recruitment tactics and the theory that provides a better explanation. Accordingly, it can be concluded that college educated students who displayed these specifications were not recruited by any specific Hezbollah structure.

Considering the results of my research, the following suggestions are recommended:

First, although findings of my study supported the assumptions of social control and social learning theories, social learning was the most useful theory in explaining the

recruitment methods used by the Turkish Hezbollah. As explained in the literature review, social control and social learning theories were applicable to conduct further research in relation to terrorism. Through these theories, it is possible to provide an explanation concerning recruitment strategies frequently used by terrorist groups.

Second, my findings suggested that social networks and institutional structures are two important tools used effectively by the Turkish Hezbollah to recruit college educated students. As discussed in the policy implication section, Turkey's political system should therefore include as many ideologies as possible in an effort to maintain individuals within its system. In addition, responding to terrorist activities in a well balanced manner should be considered by policy makers.

Finally, I suggest that literature related to terrorism should be supported through more quantitative studies in terms of identifying the extrinsic factors that result in college educated students to become recruited by terrorist organizations, namely the Turkish Hezbollah.

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